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ABSTRACT / LAY SUMMARY 
The Rule of Law is one of the most important, and most contested, 
political concepts. The ideas of thinkers—who are frequently taken to be 
responsible for canonical statements relating to the Rule of Law—are 
frequently used to illustrate the existence of similarities and differences that 
both identify what the Rule of Law is and delineate the conceptual boundaries 
of the concept. In citing these thinkers, the underlying assumption is that the 
Rule of Law can be seen as a single, diachronically conceivable, concept that 
has evolved over time. I question both of these practices. Considering Rule of 
Law conceptions in a superficial sense—by considering only thinkers’ accounts 
in the absence of their authoring context—fails to appreciate nuances and 
inflections that can fundamentally alter perceived similarities or differences; 
where various canonical accounts can no longer be seen as reflecting the 
same ideas, the assumption of a single, evolving, idea of the concept of the 
Rule of Law as drawn in contemporary conceptual discourse cannot be 
sustained. 
I conduct a contextualist examination of two accounts frequently 
associated with the idea of the Rule of Law: Hobbes’s Leviathan and Locke’s 
Two Treatises of Government. To place these in context, I adopt a problem / 
solution approach. I consider their texts as reflecting solutions to problems 
that existed in their societies at the time they were writing. To expose the 
associated problems, I consider pamphlets that were popular at that time. By 
clearly identifying and associating the Rule of Law solutions with the relevant 





By identifying inflections in Rule of Law solutions, it becomes possible to 
disambiguate between superficially similar ideas. By disambiguating in this 
way—and by illustrating superficially similar accounts are fundamentally 
different in their nature—I argue there is no necessary conceptual connection 
between the Rule of Law accounts provided by Hobbes and Locke. I also 
argue that this difference is sufficient to show that, at least between these two 
‘canonical’ accounts, the assumption that the Rule of Law has evolved cannot 
hold; change across Hobbes’s and Locke’s conceptions of the Rule of Law has 
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thesis that he was kind enough to supervise. The world of academia can 
blame Jeremy for my massive over-enthusiasm about my topic. I have also 
been enormously fortunate to have the chance to meet and share ideas with 
Brian Tamanaha. Brian’s immediate academic kindness and generosity to a 
near-stranger—albeit an enthusiastic one—who happens to share a research 
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bounty of riches continues through the many (many) chances that I have had 
to pose ‘just one quick question’ to Neil Walker. His constant refusal to meet 
my quick questions with quick answers has been a particular joy and a 
constant reminder of not only how far I have to go on my academic journey, 
but also as a reminder of what I should do and how I should be once I get 
there. I can only hope that in my own future I can provide a fraction of the 
motivation, and can show the same kindness, that I have been fortunate 
enough to receive from each of these individuals.  
Of course, these are not the only members of the academy that I have 
been motivated by. From my first weeks in Edinburgh I had the great joy to 
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seminars, Festivals, and WiP sessions over the last few years have given me 
more ideas (and headaches) than I can care to mention.  
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deeply engage with my argument and to probe aspects of my thesis that 
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page. I cannot thank them enough for their time, attention to detail, and the 
academic curiosity that they gave to my work. 
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All of these people have contributed in some way to the completion of 
this thesis. Their support, inspiration, and motivation made it what it is. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
NEGLECTING THE HISTORY OF THE RULE OF LAW:  
(UNINTENDED) CONCEPTUAL EUGENICS1 
INTRODUCTION 
Origins matter. In our everyday life—both consciously and 
subconsciously—we value things based on their origin. We may do this in 
various ways and in a variety of settings: in our selection of food; in electing 
the school our children should attend; in the identification of which dog we 
should buy or which racehorse to bet on; or, in deciding which paper we 
should advance to the top of our reading pile. This assessment may be for 
moral reasons (the purchase of a Fairtrade or similarly ethically sourced food 
item), for financial or quality-based reasons (in sourcing an animal with a 
known pedigree), or in relation to a prior or perceived level of academic 
rigour (regarding a school or a known academic journal). Yet, it is clear that, 
whilst origins matter, consideration of origins can be applied for wrong 
                                               
1 The vast majority of this chapter is derived from my published article: Paul Burgess, 
Neglecting the History of the Rule of Law: (Unintended) Conceptual Eugenics, 9 
HAGUE J. RULE LAW 195–209 (2017). Minor amendments have been made to facilitate 
the argument in this thesis. 
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reasons. Assessment of the value inherent in origins can also be, and has 
been, controversially used in structuring eugenics programmes and in all 
aspects of racism. As is well known, however, the virtue of any tool’s use—and 
this is something I will return to later in this chapter as well as in Chapter 3—
should not be marred by its use for potentially evil ends.2 Of course, 
regardless of how or for what purpose it occurs, in each of these examples 
there is some consideration of a perceived level of value. In some 
circumstances—and in many of the circumstances that I will outline in this 
introductory chapter—this value can take the form of an enhanced perception 
of the legitimacy of the thing being considered. Here, I provide a justificatory 
argument for the importance of the endeavour exemplified by the remainder 
of this thesis. In making this argument, I suggest that consideration and 
assessment of the origins of the concept of the Rule of Law not only matters, 
but also that it is a practice that is often neglected. Further, I suggest, 
neglecting the origins of the various frequently cited conceptions of the Rule 
of Law has the potential to result in (unintended) conceptual eugenics. 
The concept of the Rule of Law has been increasingly studied in recent 
years. It is relevant to question whether there is anything left to explore. What 
                                               
2 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 225–6 (2 ed. 
2009). 
Chapter 1: Neglecting the History of the Rule of Law 
 
3 
can be said about the Rule of Law that is truly original? By framing my 
discussion around history, and by taking a broadly interdisciplinary approach, 
I explore a wealth of original ideas. I pose a basic research question that 
facilitates a much deeper discussion: What is the nature of the change across 
Rule of Law conceptions? This broad question leads me to pose and answer a 
number of sub questions: What forms of change can / did occur? What does 
‘the Rule of Law’ mean? What conceptions are ‘Rule of Law conceptions’? In 
answering these, and other, questions, my original contribution is dispersed 
throughout the following six chapters. After introducing the broad rationale 
for the work in this first chapter, I critique the existing arguments and illustrate 
a fundamental problem that exists in the Rule of Law literature that has 
previously gone unacknowledged. In doing so, I propose—and execute in the 
rest of the thesis—an original methodological solution to the problem. My 
conceptual definition of the Rule of Law proposed in Chapter 3, and adopted 
across the thesis, stems from a novel process of distilling canonical Rule of 
Law ideas to get beyond the ever-present status of contestation that 
dominates discussion of the concept. My application of this definition, 
together with the methodological solution proposed in Chapter 2, to 
Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule of Law ideas in Chapters 4 and 5—in terms akin to 
an intellectual history—is also original and represents a delimitation of the 
boundaries of the research question. It follows that the analysis of these 
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chapters, in Chapter 6, is also novel. For these reasons, my original 
contribution comes from both the answering of the broad research question 
as well as the creation and application of the several novel approaches and 
methodologies that are developed over the course of the thesis. 
A NEGLECTED ORIGIN? 
Do we know anything about the Rule of Law’s origins? Do we write 
about the concept’s origins? Of course we do. And we do it frequently. In 
journals and books relating to the Rule of Law, particularly when focus is 
placed on the concept itself, it is not uncommon—in fact it is actually quite 
common—to see in the opening sentences, paragraphs, or pages a statement 
or synopsis of the concept’s history.3 In this respect, the history of the Rule of 
Law occupies a principal position in the literature regarding the concept’s 
content and meaning; yet, arguably, it does not occupy a position of 
principle. By this, I mean that reference is made to conceptions that are 
frequently associated with the Rule of Law, in (broadly) chronological order, 
by way, it seems, of illustrating what the concept of the Rule of Law is or was 
through some form of progression or, at least, through some sort of ‘history’.  
                                               
3 I return to the introductory content of Rule of Law articles in Chapter 2. 
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Why the scare quotes? The method frequently adopted is ‘history’, and 
not history proper, as it simply provides a review of the most frequently 
mentioned Rule of Law authors, who just so happen to be the authors of texts 
produced in the historical past. In effect, the ‘history’ provided is used as an 
intellectual narrative for, or a conceptual back-story to, the idea. This 
approach, whilst useful in some contexts, has the potential to substantially 
misrepresent or misinterpret an author’s meaning. Interpretation outside of 
an understanding of the context in which the text was created risks importing 
a meaning that is fundamentally different to that intended by the author. I do 
not suggest that we cannot use an earlier idea to innovate in our own time; 
after all, doing so may be essential should a new problem arise. What I do, 
however, suggest is that there should not be a distortion of the original ideas. 
In these terms, the practice of history, as a particular method, is not a 
principle that is generally applied to the analysis or consideration of Rule of 
Law-relevant texts in the Rule of Law literature.4 This results in the reliance on 
superficial references to past Rule of Law authors that result in a misleading 
                                               
4 There are, of course, a number of fields of research in different disciplines—history 
included—that relate to the Rule of Law in the broadest sense; whilst I do not 
discount this contribution—in fact, as will be seen, I both welcome and encourage it—I 
will, in this chapter, confine my comments mainly to the more narrowly defined ideas 
associated with the concept of the Rule of Law. 
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appreciation of the history of the concept. Accounts that take a more 
rounded historical approach to the evolution of the concept of the Rule of 
Law are few and far between. By illustrating this relative neglect, both in this 
chapter and in introducing my wider thesis, my hope is that the significance 
of the historical approach to the Rule of Law can be illustrated.  
There are many examples of ‘history’ in the Rule of Law literature.5 I 
mention only a couple here. Many accounts commence by citing Aristotle as 
the originator of the idea, or by hinting at older origins by suggesting the 
Rule of Law is ‘at least’ as old as Aristotle’s account.6 It is also frequently taken 
as a standard position that the concept has ancient roots; Møller and 
Skaaning state, in relation to an oft quoted Aristotelian passage stating that 
law should govern, ‘[t]hese sentences were written by Aristotle over two 
millennia ago (in Politics, 3.16), and they go to show that the ideal of the rule 
                                               
5 For an expansion of these, and other trends in the literature, see Chapter 2.  
6 Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS 120–147, 121 (1994); 
RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 1 (2001); THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, 
THEORY AND CRITICISM, 75 (Pietro Costa, Danilo Zolo, & Emilio Santoro eds., 2007); 
Martin Krygier, Rule of Law (and Rechtsstaat), 38 in THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF THE RULE 
OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE (RECHTSSTAAT) 45–59, 46 (James R. Silkenat, James E. 
Hickey, & Peter D. Barenboim eds., 2014); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2016 ed. 2016), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/ (last visited Jul 20, 2018).  
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of law is ancient.’7 My identification of a trend of reference to ancient origins is 
hardly revelatory. In opening his book, and whilst pointing to necessary 
caution in doing so, Brian Tamanaha acknowledges: ‘Many accounts of the 
rule of law identify its origins in classical Greek thought...’8 Consideration of 
origins is not, of course, limited to the citation of ancient sources. Authors in 
the Rule of Law literature will frequently go on to cite various ‘usual suspects’ 
of the Rule of Law: authors whose accounts frequently also happen to be 
‘historical’ in the sense that they were authored in either the recent or more 
distant past.9 My own, non-scientifically derived and non-exclusive, list of 
historical Rule of Law usual suspects includes: Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, 
Dicey, Hayek, Fuller, Dworkin, and Raz. A slightly different, though not 
contradictory, list has been described as forming ‘… a ‘Who’s Who?’ of 
Western political thought…’10 Such is the importance and prevalence of these 
thinkers, I will return to these usual suspects of the Rule of Law literature 
                                               
7 JØRGEN MØLLER & SVEND-ERIK SKAANING, THE RULE OF LAW: DEFINITIONS, MEASURES, 
PATTERNS AND CAUSES 2 (2014). 
8 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 7 (2004). See 
also, Julian A. Sempill, Ruler’s Sword, Citizen’s Shield: The Rule of Law & the 
Constitution of Power, 31 JL POL 333, 342–3 (2015).  
9 Throughout the thesis, I will use ‘usual suspects’, ‘canonical authors’, or their 
cognate phrases, synonymously. 
10 MØLLER AND SKAANING, supra note 7 at 2. 
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throughout my thesis. Whilst more names could be added, these names—and 
reference to these authors as Rule of Law usual suspects or as producing 
‘canons’ of the Rule of Law—will likely be readily recognisable to anyone even 
broadly familiar with the literature relating to the concept of the Rule of Law.  
By referencing these thinkers, and in acknowledging that many of them 
hail from the dim and distant past, the origins of the concept of the Rule of 
Law are frequently either implicitly or explicitly alluded to. Whilst explicit 
reference can take the form of a statement that the nature or content of the 
concept has changed over time,11 a more oblique reference to historical 
differences can also be seen. For example, a relative difference between 
present and past conceptions is apparent in the statement ‘…the precise 
meaning of [the Rule of Law] may be less clear today than ever before.’12 The 
connection between history and the Rule of Law is also apparent in 
descriptions of the concept that either suggest earlier ideas have some point 
                                               
11 JOHN P. REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 3–4 (2004). I also explore the idea of change over time as one 
of the assumptions of the Rule of Law literature in Chapter 2. 
12 Richard H. Fallon Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1–56, 1 (1997) (citation omitted).  
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of difference from contemporary ideas,13 or in terms where there has been an 
acknowledged ‘historical evolution’.14 
But why do we do this? Why are so many valuable words used up, so 
frequently, in the opening of so many books and papers related to the Rule of 
Law if it is simply to restate things that are already well known? There could, 
of course, be many reasons: to satisfy general academic curiosity in the 
reader; to provide a level of rigour to the argument, claim, or assumption 
being made; to avoid any suggestion that the author is claiming to be 
proposing a new and previously unstated concept; or, to make clear the 
precise nature of the Rule of Law that is being discussed—for example, 
through using previous thinkers’ positions to clarify whether a thin or thick 
conception will be preferred. Another possible reason to focus on, or at least 
allude to, the concept’s history and its origin is to suggest there is something 
of enduring worth in the concept itself. After all, one could take the position 
that as it has been used, applied, and thought of by many thinkers in the past, 
there is value in continuing to think about and apply the concept in the 
                                               
13 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV. 
781, 781 (1989).  
14 Olufemi Taiwo, The Rule of Law: The New Leviathan, 12 CAN JL JURISPRUD. 151, 152 
(1999). 
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present.15 One final reason—one that is interrelated to all of those just 
outlined—is that the statement and allusion to origins adds, in some form, 
legitimacy to the nature and form of the argument being made. The 
argument represents a form of an appeal to authority. The bolstering of 
legitimacy in this way could relate to the acknowledgement that the argument 
being proposed in the work is not totally original; and I do not mean this in a 
negative sense. What I mean is that the argument being made is the 
continuation of a string of intellectual thought or a chain of ideas that is seen 
—at least by the author seeking to bolster the legitimacy—as bringing ideas 
together within a single tradition. It is in this way that ideas that have come 
before are modified, expanded, and potentially improved upon through 
reapplication. In this sense, legitimacy comes from the support and extension 
of a previously made, and (perhaps) generally accepted, argument that is 
already considered as being valuable. In doing this, and although it is 
                                               
15 Of course, there are inherent logical problems in applying this rationale; the mere 
idea that a thought or a position is or was seen as sound, authoritative, or important 
in times gone by does not mean the idea should be considered a useful or valid 
point of discussion now or in the future. (This issue underlies the idea behind my 
thesis.) Notwithstanding this, the fact that there has been previous thought and 
academic debate in an area is frequently used as a basis for further interjection. 
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generally not the case that this argument is explicitly made, we take up and 
use—and innovate with—the conceptual toolkit that is available to us.   
But, there can be problems with this approach: Do we know—and do 
we care—exactly where (or when) the tools came from? What, exactly, were 
the tools originally intended to be used for? Why are these tools in this box? 
And, what exactly did the person who originally deposited them mean to 
communicate? It is only through answering these questions that the origins of 
the concept of the Rule of Law—and, hence, the value that the concept has for 
our present problems and in its present application—can properly be 
understood and, further, that our future problem-solving ability be fully 
retained. These are the questions I answer. 
The potential neglect of this active consideration of the concept’s 
origins inspired the underlying questions motivating my thesis. I’ll come back 
to this. But, first, I want to outline why the neglect of the Rule of Law’s origins 
can, potentially, have dire consequences. 
OUR CONCEPTUAL TOOLBOX 
By virtue of the vast array of Rule of Law thinkers—as the usual suspects 
of the Rule of Law literature—that have come before us, we have a truly 
massive assortment of tools that can be applied to our own respective 
The Problems and Solutions of Change in Conceptions of the Rule of Law  
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projects. We can, of course, apply the available tools in whatever way we 
want. But, as a way of framing the justification for the wider arguments taken 
up in the rest of my thesis, my argument in this opening chapter is that—even 
if we are going to, eventually, use the tool in a completely new way—we must 
be aware of, understand, and appreciate the original purpose or intent 
behind the tool’s existence. As, if we do not understand fully the origins of the 
various Rule of Law conceptions, then we will not be able to apply the Rule of 
Law to our contemporary problems in the most effective way.16 Before going 
any further, through the use of a very brief, and broadly stated point, I want to 
illustrate one way in which origins, and the use and amendment of a 
conceptual tool in the present, can be relevant to the concept of the Rule of 
Law. Whilst some exceptions exist,17 contemporary ideas of the Rule of Law 
                                               
16 This point echoes one previously made by Krygier—in referring to Cotterrell’s work 
and their shared views on the Rule of Law—that, in relation to the origin of Rule of 
Law ideas ‘one learns something, sometimes lots, from exploring those 
circumstances.’ Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law After the Short Twentieth Century: 
Launching a Global Career, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 327–346, 328 (Richard Nobles & David Schiff eds., 
2014). See also, ROGER COTTERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2 ed. 2003). 
17 See, for example, PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW, (Lisa M Austin & Dennis 
Klimchuk eds., 2014).  
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are intimately intertwined with the idea of the state.18 The modern-day view 
and application of the concept of the Rule of Law—as some sort of normative 
force acting as a constraint upon the exercise of power—is nestled within a 
state-centric paradigm. However, many of the usual suspects of the Rule of 
Law formulated their ideas in times when this state-centric paradigm either 
did not exist, or was not as all-consuming an idea—with respect to the way in 
which the concept of the Rule of Law operates—as it is now. For this to be 
apparent, it is not necessary to extend our view back to the city states of 
Ancient Greece. Fundamental differences in the nature, role, and extent of 
the state apparatus can be seen even in the relatively recent past. In A.V. 
Dicey’s late-19th century England, the fears he expresses for the decline of the 
Rule of Law are offered in a context very different to that which exists today. 
Dicey’s Rule of Law idea calls for: the absence of arbitrary power on the part 
of the government; equal application of the law (meaning no individual is 
above the law and all are subject to the law); and, judicial decisions to be 
                                               
18 For an account of the Rule of Law's significance for the limited government 
tradition, see Sempill, supra note 8. The relationship to the state can exist in either 
the domestic or the international sphere. Although I do not address the international 
application directly here, in this respect, see Simon Chesterman, An International 
Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. LAW 331–362 (2008). See also, Paul Burgess, Deriving 
the International Rule of Law: an Unnecessary, Impractical and Unhelpful Exercise, 
(FORTHCOMING). 
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privileged (as general principles of the constitution result from those 
decisions).19 Dicey’s perceived erosion of the Rule of Law, and the 
accompanying rise in the welfare state, underscores the problem that he 
seeks to solve. In framing his Rule of Law ideas, and in particular ideas 
associated with the absence of arbitrary power and the equal application of 
the law, Dicey sees the rise of the administrative state as the (Rule of Law) 
problem. Accordingly, his (Rule of Law) solution is particularly focused on this 
problem; in this sense, it is clear Dicey’s Rule of Law solution was provided 
with a particular agenda in mind. (I will return to this point in a moment.) The 
importance of reading Dicey in context, and in relation to the changes in 
society over time, is not new. A compelling case for doing so was made by 
F.H. Lawson in 1959.20 In the same year, Lawson’s comment was referred to 
by E.C.S. Wade in the preface to the 10th edition of Dicey’s work.21 However, 
when context is taken into account, it becomes readily apparent that Dicey’s 
perceived problem is different to any present-day problem. The 19th century 
                                               
19 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
175, 180 and 182 (3 ed. 1889). 
20 F.H. Lawson, Dicey Revisited. I, 7 POLIT. STUD. 109–126 (1959); F. H. Lawson, Dicey 
Revisited. II, 7 POLIT. STUD. 207–221 (1959). 
21 A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION x (10 ed. 
1979). 
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expansion of the state and its apparatus that provided the motivation for 
Dicey’s fear, and resulted in his perceived Rule of Law problem, seems quaint 
when compared to the scope of the administrative regime that is embodied 
by modern western democratic states that profess adherence to the Rule of 
Law. For Dicey, the present situation would be anathema to the existence of 
the Rule of Law. The attempt to return to a situation that would reflect and 
embody a Diceyean Rule of Law state would now, in the face of the modern 
administrative state, be impossible.   
It is possible to look to an even more recent example to illustrate that—
in situations where a Rule of Law idea is proffered with a particular agenda in 
mind—the context of an idea’s formulation is crucial in the understanding, and 
potential re-application, of that idea. Like Dicey, Hayek—writing in 1944—
provides a popular and widely cited account of the Rule of Law. And, like 
Dicey, that account was focused on pressing a particular agenda. The use, 
citation, and application of both accounts can be seen as a paradigmatic 
instance of the way in which the Rule of Law’s usual suspects are deployed.22 
Hayek’s account differs to Dicey’s as it can be seen at its core as an attack on 
socialism. State coercion is, for Hayek, a fundamental issue that can be 
                                               
22 Dicey and Hayek can, together, be seen as providing a backbone for the way in 
which the international Rule of Law is derived. See, Burgess, supra note 18. 
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tempered only by the actions of a limited government being predictable. 
Nationalisation and state control of resources in the United Kingdom during 
World War II also give rise to a fear in Hayek that those measures may 
continue after the war.23 For Hayek, this problem could be solved by 
constraining the government’s actions and by allowing an individual to plan 
around state action and, therefore, avoid coercion. In this respect, and whilst 
Hayek sees himself as engaged in a different project to Dicey,24 both thinkers’ 
projects reflect their fears of the rise of the social welfare state and the 
decline of the Rule of Law in the United Kingdom.   
I do not suggest the early 21st century is devoid of problems 
associated with the fear of totalitarian or arbitrary rule or the coercion of the 
populous through the imposition of unknowable sanctions. But, in 
circumstances where Dicey and Hayek’s fears relate to problems of a 
fundamentally different nature and character than those which exist today, 
their solutions must be viewed in a way that acknowledges and recognises 
that difference. Given this fundamental difference between socio-political 
                                               
23 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 11 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007). 
24 In a footnote to his oft cited definition of the Rule of Law, Hayek suggests ‘[l]argely 
as a result of Dicey’s work the term [the Rule of Law] has, however, in England 
acquired a narrower technical meaning which does not concern us here.’ Id. at 112. 
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environments in which Rule of Law conceptions may have been authored and 
those in which they are applied in modern society, an increased awareness of 
conceptions’ origins is necessary to avoid the loss of solutions to future—Rule 
of Law-relevant—problems. 
I commenced this part with a brief allusion to a tool-based analogy.  
Let us deepen this a little further. Around the world, there are many butter 
knives that have been press-ganged into service as pseudo flat-head 
screwdrivers; and there are many flat-head screwdrivers that have been used 
to open—and sometimes stir—tins of paint (which may explain why the knife 
was needed for the screw in the first place!) I am not suggesting that the use 
of these things is wrong; after all, each innovative re-application clearly 
served a present need. The re-application of a tool in this new way can often 
achieve, precisely, the desired effect. In this sense, the innovation could even 
be construed as a good thing. But, what happens when the original purpose 
is lost or forgotten? What happens when the knife (as a screwdriver) is not 
returned to the cutlery drawer and, instead, is placed in our (actual) toolbox? 
Is the tin-opening, and now paint-covered, screwdriver still able to be used 
effectively as a screwdriver? It seems conceivable that, despite the tools’ 
original purpose—the purpose for which they were originally made before 
being innovatively re-purposed—can be obscured by the new function. This is 
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certainly not a problem in some respects. After all, even if the screwdriver’s 
function is lost or forgotten, a new tool—in the shape of our knife (as a 
screwdriver)—now exists to tackle any similar screwdriving jobs that may arise 
in the future. But, if the original purpose—and the connection between that 
purpose and the original problem that it was designed to solve—is forgotten, 
then something is lost: the original solution to the original problem as 
addressed by that tool. One argument against this could be that this isn’t 
really a problem if another tool can provide an adequate solution to the 
original problem. After all, in our example, the knife replaces the lost function 
of the flat-head screwdriver and is able to solve the immediate problem that 
arose. Yet, whilst there are undoubtedly situations in which a knife can 
provide an almost identical solution and act as a replacement, there are 
circumstances where a knife simply cannot achieve the same result as a 
screwdriver. Think, for example, of a situation where the screw is recessed. 
Should a problem of this kind arise in the future, then, as the function of the 
screwdriver (as a screwdriver) has been lost, we are left without a solution. 
(Or, in the least, we are required to innovate from scratch to come up with a 
new solution.) This may not be—at the time of the initial re-application / 
innovation that repurposes the butter knife and abandons the screwdriver—
immediately apparent. It may be some time before the need that cannot be 
satisfied by the new tool—but could have been satisfied by the old tool—arises. 
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My point is that, at the moment when the old tool is abandoned, any 
potentially unique problem-solving utility that it may have had is also lost. 
This loss is important. Our choice of problem solving solutions in the future is 
restricted by virtue of alternative solutions being lost or driven out.25 It is only 
by actively considering the purpose for which a tool exists and the purpose 
for which it was originally employed and deposited in the toolbox that we can 
hope to maintain and understand the tool’s application in the past and in the 
present as well as in the future. Doing otherwise deprives us of potentially 
useful solutions. (I will return to this point later.) 
This somewhat extended analogy illustrates two things. First, 
innovating in the use of our toolkit is not a bad thing; in fact, it can lead to 
solutions that would not, otherwise, have been contemplated had the tools 
been used solely for the purpose for which they were originally created. 
Innovation may, in fact, become essential should the original tool not work in 
the same way (for example, if the underlying problem changes). Further, 
innovating in a way that does not distort the originally posited ideas provides 
a way to maximise our potential—by not curtailing available options—to deal 
with new problems. Second, understanding the history of our conceptual 
toolbox is essential to ensuring that we do not lose solutions that may 
                                               
25 For a similar sentiment, see Krygier, supra note 16 at 330. 
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otherwise have proven useful in relation to our current and future problems. 
Of course, these things are not mutually exclusive. Both could be achieved at 
the same time. In bringing the analogy back to the topic at hand, it is relevant, 
then, to ask at least two questions: Are both being achieved in relation to the 
concept of the Rule of Law? And, does the inclusion of a history or back-story 
at the start of so many papers satisfy this requirement? I think that the answer 
to both questions is, currently, ‘no’. Whilst innovation in the application and 
use of the concept of the Rule of Law is undoubtedly taking place, there 
seems to be an under-appreciation of the purpose, meaning, and relevance 
of the Rule of Law ideas posited in the past. Putting this another—more 
positive—way, there is considerable scope for research to be conducted into 
the original meaning of the Rule of Law solutions that are so frequently 
alluded to when the concept is being considered. But, a key question then 
arises: is undertaking this research-challenge practical?   
I do not suggest that the origins of every Rule of Law conception must 
be chased down every rabbit hole in every inquiry. Attempting to do so 
would, of course, be impractical. However, my suggestion that there should 
be an increased focus on the history and origins of Rule of Law conceptions 
more generally is practical; or, at least, it is achievable practically. It is this 
idea that informs my thesis in general terms. There is a burgeoning interest in 
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the connections between theory and history in the law. Recent work suggests 
there are distinct advantages that may result from a dialogue between the 
two sub-disciplines (of legal theory and legal history),26 or in the critical re-
evaluation of the law as the product of a historical evolution.27 A more Rule of 
Law-specific version of this general trend would benefit greatly the academic 
pursuits associated with the concept of the Rule of Law. The exploration, in a 
more rigorously historical sense, of the various frequently cited Rule of Law 
positions’ origins would ensure that the original meanings of those concepts 
could, if lost, be rediscovered or, if known, be more deeply appreciated. 
Establishing that this is both possible and desirable—not to mention, 
interesting—is a fundamental goal of my work.  
Whilst an increased focus on the history and origins of Rule of Law 
conceptions may be worthwhile, I do not suggest that this is a project that can 
be easily realised or located within a single field of study. History is, of itself, a 
massive, complicated, and technical discipline. Most of the Rule of Law usual 
                                               
26 MAKSYMILIAN DEL MAR & MICHAEL LOBBAN, LAW IN THEORY AND HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS 
ON A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE (2016).  For my assessment of this work’s importance, see  
Paul Burgess, Review: Law in Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected 
Dialogue.  Ed by Maksymilian Del Mar and Michael Lobban, 21 EDINB. LAW REV. 305–
307 (2017). 
27 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A REALISTIC THEORY OF LAW (2017). 
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suspects referred to above, by virtue of being members of the ‘Who’s Who?’ 
of Western political thought,28 have already been the subject of an entire 
industry of academic production across a variety of disciplines. No single 
work could supersede this. However, as the works cited immediately above 
illustrate, there is scope for a Rule of Law-relevant dialogue to be expanded 
upon. In this sense, there can be benefits afforded even through appreciating 
and applying the range of basic forms of historical inquiry that are available 
(even to non-formally trained historians). Of course, as the Rule of Law is a 
concept that has often extended across arbitrarily imposed disciplinary 
boundaries, this should be no great surprise. But it also serves to illustrate 
that, whilst I have remained based in a law school whilst writing this thesis, 
cross- or inter-disciplinary exploration of the topic is both possible and, dare I 
say, interesting.   
On this basis alone, the argument that I pursue in this thesis seems 
worthwhile. Whilst, for example, aspects of archival research may prove both 
unattractive and impractical for some, other ways of ‘doing’ history may be 
more familiar to the (non-historian) lawyer’s skill set. Various approaches to 
textual analysis or conceptual and intellectual history may provide sufficiently 
                                               
28 See, MØLLER AND SKAANING, supra note 7.  
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robust yet practically achievable methodologies to facilitate a project of the 
sort imagined (for a non-historian). Taking this sort of approach—or any 
approach that affords a level of heightened historical appreciation of the 
ideas associated with the concept of the Rule of Law—even at the level of an 
individual paper, provides a way to ensure that the solutions initially 
proposed are not forgotten, and that subsequent innovative uses do not 
ultimately prevent the reapplication of original uses in the future. The two 
‘case studies’ in this thesis—relating to Hobbes’s Leviathan (in Chapter 4), and 
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (in Chapter 5)—together with the 
analysis, assessment, and extension of the ideas (in Chapter 6) illustrate how 
thinking about the Rule of Law in greater historical depth across only two 
different historical periods can clearly and, relatively, easily illuminate, 
enhance, and extend our understanding of both the historical and the 
contemporary idea of the Rule of Law.29   
In returning briefly to the analogy introduced above, the ultimate result 
of this increased focus will be to afford clarity as to why a particular tool is 
included within the toolbox; or, in other words, the meaning and intention 
behind the tool’s inclusion will be illuminated. What’s more, it seems 
conceivable that an increased focus on the history of Rule of Law conceptions 
                                               
29 I return to this point in Chapter 7. 
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will not only illuminate what is in the toolbox, but it may also illuminate what is 
not presently accepted as being in the box (but perhaps was intended to be 
included by original thinkers). After all, there are—even with widely cited 
conceptions of the Rule of Law—aspects of a thinker’s original idea that are 
often neglected in contemporary application; for example, Dicey’s third 
principle—that judicial decisions are to be privileged (as general principles of 
the constitution result from those decisions)—is often neglected when Dicey’s 
conception is applied more generally.  
In considering the colouring of our way of thinking about the Rule of 
Law—as a result of the current, state-centric, paradigm introduced at the start 
of this part—it seems there could be ideas—associated with the earlier, pre-
state-centric, paradigms—that have been practically forgotten (insofar as their 
application in a Rule of Law-sense) that could, nevertheless, prove useful 
when applied to contemporary problems. For example, ideas that may have 
been neglected as a result of their relative unnecessariness or unimportance 
in a state-centric paradigm could have particular relevance to the 
contemporary application of the concept in a similarly non-state-based 
sphere (for example, in international law). By considering—or reconsidering—
the Rule of Law in this way, the start of a relationship—or, more specifically, an 
inter-relationship—between the usual suspects’ conceptions begins to form.  
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PATHS (HISTORICALLY) TAKEN, AND THOSE NOT TAKEN 
The phrase ‘it is what it is’, could easily—although, perhaps, not very 
helpfully—be applied to current approaches to the concept of the Rule of Law; 
however, the same cannot really be said for the slightly modified phrase ‘it is 
what it was’. Merely understanding the origin of the Rule of Law with respect 
to the differences between a single point in the past, and another single 
point—perhaps the present—seems, somewhat, unsatisfactory if the Rule of 
Law is viewed, as it is by many, as a continuing tradition.30 A lot can happen 
between then and now. As noted earlier, ideas about the Rule of Law have 
changed as various aspects have fallen into and out of favour. Furthermore, at 
each intervening point, any new thinker has the potential to innovate in 
relation to the meaning of the concept of the Rule of Law for that thinker at 
that time through the application of and in relation to the Rule of Law 
conceptual toolkit that is available to him or her at that time. (Here, and for 
the purpose of this discussion, I sidestep the—admittedly difficult—issue 
relating to establishing the nature and extent of influence of one thinker’s 
                                               
30 Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW PHILOS. 237 (1986); Arthur H. Garrison, The 
Traditions and History of the Meaning of the Rule of Law, 12 GEORGET. J. LAW PUBLIC 
POLICY (2014). 
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work over another’s.31) This would mean that at any stage, and for any thinker, 
meanings of previous ideas could be either retained, changed, or lost. This 
could be compounded as, say, an early thinker’s ideas are re-interpreted by a 
subsequent thinker and these re-interpretations are themselves re-
interpreted by a later thinker. At each stage, the same options to retain, 
change, or lose the earlier meaning exists. As each of the subsequent thinkers 
could be acting in response to a new or different problem, and/or be acting 
with his/her own agenda, this renders the task of plotting the overall history of 
the Rule of Law substantial (to say the least).  
 Further, should there be some form of continual re-invention of the 
conceptual toolkit through time, path dependency will impact the eventual 
outcomes.32 The existence of a prior conceptual toolkit, and the consideration 
of change across ideas of the Rule of Law through history, may enable a 
determination to be made as to whether path dependent processes have 
                                               
31 See, for example, Quentin Skinner, The Limits of Historical Explanations, 41 
PHILOSOPHY 199–215 (1966). For a convincing exposition of the benefits of the idea, 
see FRANCIS OAKLEY, POLITICS AND ETERNITY: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL AND 
EARLY-MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT Chapter 5 “Anxieties of Influence:” (1999). 
32 For a similar consideration of ideas of this sort, Jørgen Møller, Medieval Origins of 
the Rule of Law: The Gregorian Reforms as Critical Juncture?, 9 HAGUE J. RULE LAW 
265–282 (2017).  
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operated over time.33 One way of seeing and understanding path 
dependency is in these terms: ‘A path-dependent sequence of […] changes is 
one of which important influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted 
by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by chance 
elements rather than systematic forces.’34 For the sake of clarity, and as it has 
been used in previous Rule of Law relevant analyses,35 it is also relevant to 
mention Douglass North’s definition of the same idea. North’s idea is not—in 
the context of this chapter—incompatible with the definition outlined above. 
North views path dependence in terms of ‘the constraints on the choice set in 
the present that are derived from historical experiences of the past’.36 Both of 
                                               
33 In relation to the ideas of path dependence generally, see Paul A. David, Clio and 
the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332–337 (1985); Graham Ferris, The 
Path-dependent Problem of Exporting the Rule of Law, 101 ROUND TABLE 363–374 
(2012); Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q. J. POLIT. SCI. 87–115 (2006). 
34 David, supra note 33 at 332.  See also Jonathan Rose, Studying the Past: the 
Nature and Development of Legal History as an Academic Discipline, 31 J. LEG. HIST. 
101–128 (2010). In particular, see note 7, at page 103: ‘The basic notion is that where 
you start determines where you end up and that you may have ended up 
somewhere else had you started at a different place.’ 
35 Ferris, supra note 33. 
36 See, for example, DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
CHANGE 52 (1999).  The Northian analysis is explored and applied in Ferris, supra 
note 33. See also, consideration of North’s ideas in terms of Law and Development 
The Problems and Solutions of Change in Conceptions of the Rule of Law  
 28 
these views reflect the sense that decisions in the past can be considered as 
influencing not only presently available choices, but also the outcomes that 
may ultimately be available in the future as each choice that is made by an 
innovating Rule of Law thinker has the potential to impact the nature of the 
choices available to the ‘next’ thinker; and it is this ‘next’ or future thinker that 
applies the Rule of Law concept—now, potentially, slightly modified as a result 
of the retention, change, or loss of options that were available to the earlier 
thinker—that is available to him or her. And so, the process goes on.   
Yet, these intricacies are lost—as, potentially, are various specific 
aspects of conceptions that may have been rejected along the way—if a 
simple ‘then’ and ‘now’ approach is taken to previous Rule of Law ideas. To 
fully appreciate the complexities of the concept of the Rule of Law—and even 
to fully justify the correct use of the statement ‘it is what it is’—it is necessary to 
explore and understand that ‘it is (also) what it was’; which, when considered 
in more path dependent terms, may more accurately be stated as ‘it is (also) 
what it is as a result of what it was’.37 Through engaging with the historical 
ideas that underpin the origins and intent behind each of the usual suspects’ 
                                               
in Julio Faundez, Douglass North’s Theory of Institutions: Lessons for Law and 
Development, 8 HAGUE J. RULE LAW 373–419 (2016). 
37 I am grateful to Martin Krygier for raising this point.  
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Rule of Law accounts—and by more accurately understanding what they were 
by considering, as I do in this thesis, the question of whether canonical ideas 
of the Rule of Law can be seen as being engaged in a form of conceptual 
evolution or revolution—this process can, at least, be started.38 
THESIS STRUCTURE 
My thesis represents a modest step in increasing the focus on the 
history—and understanding the historical origins—of ideas that can be 
included under the broad banner of the concept of the Rule of Law. In 
examining canonical Rule of Law accounts from Hobbes and Locke—two of 
the canonical authors of the Rule of Law literature—my aim is to examine the 
way in which two Rule of Law accounts that are closely related in time (the 
mid and mid-late 17th century,) and culture (English political society,) can be 
seen as being similar or dissimilar in terms of the accounts’ subsumption 
under the conceptual umbrella of the Rule of Law. However, before any 
consideration of those thinkers can take place, it is necessary to do two 
things: first, to consider, in more detail, the way in which ideas of the Rule of 
                                               
38 From early origins, social scientists and theorists—for example, Marx, Durkheim, 
and Weber—have considered the operation of time in relation to their ideas. My 
approach to evolutionary and revolutionary ideas is, as will become apparent, 
somewhat different. 
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Law are presently used, deployed, and examined; and, second, to define in 
more precise terms what I will consider the Rule of Law to be for the purpose 
of this thesis. I do this in the second and third chapters, respectively.  
In Chapter 2, I identify four tropes of the Rule of Law literature—as four 
common assumptions that can be identified at the start of the vast majority of 
papers that consider the meaning and application of the concept of the Rule 
of Law—in order to illustrate that whilst the assumptions are accepted as part 
of the conceptual narrative of the concept, the assumptions’ cogency falters 
when they are considered collectively. I argue that consideration of collective 
cogency is necessary for conceptual clarity. To illustrate the essentiality of 
doing so, I stipulate two hypothetical and extreme forms of conceptual 
change—evolutionary and revolutionary39—and illustrate that, when the 
assumptions are considered in terms of these forms of change, the nature of 
the inconsistency varies considerably. This approach illustrates not only the 
general inconsistency, but also that inconsistency varies between the 
mechanisms. This variance leads to a fundamental problem: without the 
                                               
39 I define these in Chapter 2. Here, it suffices to note that for evolutionary change, 
subsequent ideas are necessarily reliant on earlier ideas; if change is not 
evolutionary, it is revolutionary. I return to, and reapply, these forms of change when 
considering the change that has occurred between Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule of 
Law-like ideas in the final chapter. 
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identification of the change mechanism that has operated across Rule of Law 
related ideas, there is no way to assess whether the Rule of Law’s common 
assumptions are, or can be, consistent with one another. I also suggest one 
way to solve this problem: the use of a problem / solution based contextual 
examination of Rule of Law accounts. This methodology is adopted—in the 
assessment of Hobbes and Locke—in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The appreciation of the Hobbes and Locke case studies and, more 
specifically, the necessary identification of Rule of Law-relevant problems with 
which to pair the two thinkers’ Rule of Law-relevant solutions requires a clear 
understanding of what the Rule of Law is. However, in circumstances where 
the very meaning of the Rule of Law is contested, and most popular ideas of 
the Rule of Law are derived from contemporary understandings of the 
concept, using a present-focused idea to identify the existence of a historical 
idea of the Rule of Law risks putting the conceptual cart before the 
conceptions’ horse. In other words, if a methodology like the one I adopt is 
not adopted, the danger would be that an argument could simply read into 
the historical accounts what we already know; in terms of the analogy 
explored in this chapter, by using the contemporary idea of the Rule of Law 
we would risk forgetting that the concept (as a tool) may have had a prior and 
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more specific use that may otherwise have been forgotten.40 In order to avoid 
this, an idea of the Rule of Law that is not solely derived from the 
contemporary conceptual view is necessary. I develop this view in Chapter 3.  
I do not claim that the methodology I adopt is the only way to 
approach the issue of how to historically interrogate the Rule of Law. Doing 
so would require a far broader undertaking; although its achievement—by, 
perhaps, conducting a detailed study of each moment in history relevant to 
Rule of Law ideas—affords an interesting way to consider the potential path 
dependant nature of the concept.41 I frequently describe my methodology as 
being a modified approach derived from Quentin Skinner’s broad 
contextualist methodology and the logic of question and answers advocated 
by R.G. Collingwood.42 However, after settling on the approach that I would 
take, I became aware of a parallel idea that closely mirrors the hybrid 
methodology that I have adopted. This broadly similar idea—that of serial 
                                               
40 I am not the first to relate the Rule of Law to the idea of a tool. See, for example, 
RAZ, supra note 2. For an expansion of this point, see Chapter 3.  
41 I expand on this point in Chapter 7. 
42 For the classic statements of these points, see Quentin Skinner, Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. THEORY 3–53 (1969); ROBIN GEORGE 
COLLINGWOOD, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1939). 
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contextualism as a history in ideas—has recently been advocated by David 
Armitage.43 Armitage describes the idea in this way: 
The outcome of an openly admitted and consistently pursued 
serial contextualism would be what I have called a history in 
ideas. I take this to be a genre of intellectual history in which 
episodes of contestation over meaning form the stepping-
stones in a transtemporal narrative constructed over a span of 
time extending over decades, if not centuries.44 
Armitage, as a former student of Skinner, adopts an approach that—
whilst it may not be described as being ‘Skinnerian’—could certainly fall within 
the Cambridge School of intellectual history that Skinner helped to create.  
The parallel with my approach can most closely be seen in Armitage’s 
examination of the concept of civil war across history. He explores several 
periods in order to identify the meaning—and the difference in meaning—
attributed to the concept of ‘civil war’ in various historical periods. There is 
also commonality in our approaches as Armitage adopts a long historical 
                                               
43 David Armitage, What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the Longue Durée, 38 
HIST. EUR. IDEAS 493–507 (2012). See also the application of this idea to a similarly 
debated and ancient concept—that of civil war—in DAVID ARMITAGE, CIVIL WARS: A 
HISTORY IN IDEAS (2017).  
44 Armitage, supra note 43 at 499. 
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period under his methodology. It is this point at which Armitage, and I, depart 
from the Cambridge School’s more detailed historical examination within a 
particular very narrow window of time.45 Whilst providing a parallel, the 
temporal scope of focus also forms a crucial point of differentiation between 
Armitage’s approach and mine. Armitage seeks to compare the meaning of 
the concept of civil war from antiquity to the present day. Whilst I see a similar 
extended temporal scope as being a worthwhile endeavour in relation to the 
concept of the Rule of Law overall,46 this extremely longue durée approach is 
not one that I advocate in this thesis (for purely practical reasons). In this 
respect, whilst my methodology derives from Skinner and Collingwood, and 
even though it closely resembles Armitage’s serial contextualist approach, it 
most accurately lies somewhere in between the two. 
Accordingly, the problem / solution approach (as I refer to it 
throughout this thesis) that I adopt represents a novel methodology that is 
applied in an original way to the concept of the Rule of Law. The problem / 
solution methodology’s application to the question of historical changes in 
the concept of the Rule of Law does provide a way—and a theoretically robust 
                                               
45 For a broader statement of Armitage’s purpose in this respect, see JO GULDI & 
DAVID ARMITAGE, THE HISTORY MANIFESTO (2014). 
46 I expand on my ambitions in relation to this point in Chapter 7. 
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and beneficial way—to assist in our understanding of the concept of the Rule 
of Law more generally and contemporaneously.  
In Chapter 3, taking a broad survey of all canonical Rule of Law 
thinkers, and by attempting to identify the ‘need behind the need’ that exists 
in each of the usual suspect’s conceptions, I attempt to identify an agreed and 
agreeable Rule of Law idea that exists beyond the contested sphere of the 
Rule of Law literature. In other words, because the contested nature of the 
concept renders the use of a single theorist’s conception or, alternatively, the 
adoption of a hybrid conception open to criticism, there is no settled and 
practical way to identify what could broadly be conceived as a Rule of Law-
like idea. Accordingly, I argue in Chapter 3 that the fundamental needs 
undergirding canonical conceptions can be used to identify common 
elements of the Rule of Law. By taking this approach, I distil two necessary 
Rule of Law elements: Comprehension; and, Procedural Pellucidity. As a 
result of their elemental nature, an inability to comply with the elements 
reflects a total inability to be conceived as a Rule of Law-like idea regardless 
of the canonical conception preferred.  
Across the thesis more broadly, I use the two Rule of Law elements—
together with a slightly more abstract idea of the Rule of Law as a normative 
force—in order to frame a working definition for the concept of the Rule of 
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Law. I provide more details about the rationale for doing so and the basis on 
which the ideas are formed in Chapter 3. However, it is useful to note at this 
stage that the reason for the distillation of an idea of the Rule of Law that can 
be seen to exist beyond the relative levels of contest regarding the concept is 
to avoid pre-determining the outcome of my wider thesis (by adopting a 
presentist idea of the Rule of Law.) I use the elements and the normative force 
idea of the Rule of Law as ways to identify aspects of Hobbes’s and Locke’s 
ideas (in Chapters 4 and 5) that could be considered as being encompassed 
by my working definition. In other words, I use the working definition to 
identify Rule of Law-relevant aspects of both the solutions—that are the 
subject of both Hobbes’s and Locke’s canonical Rule of Law works—and the 
Rule of Law-like problems that I argue, in Chapters 4 and 5, can illuminate 
and disambiguate those Rule of Law-like solutions.  
The Hobbes and Locke case studies (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, 
respectively) can be discussed together. The problem / solution 
methodology is used to shed extra light on both thinkers’ ideas. By 
contextualising each thinker in relation to his environmental, relational, and 
authorial context, I illustrate that the Rule of Law problem that is commonly 
taken to be the target of each of the thinkers’ Rule of Law solutions—in 
Leviathan and the Two Treatises—is inaccurate due to the fact that a number of 
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other Rule of Law-relevant problems exist to which the accounts could be 
seen to relate. (In terms of my tool analogy, these problems have been 
forgotten in the Rule of Law debate.) I treat the thinkers’ accounts in these two 
works as a solution to problems in society that were perceivable by each 
author and that can be identified through an exploration of the pamphlets 
that were most popular during the period that each author was writing. In 
these chapters, I largely limit myself to the application of the problem / 
solution methodology and to exploring and illuminating the various facets of 
the thinkers’ Rule of Law accounts.  
In Chapter 6, I bring together the Hobbes and Locke case studies and 
explore similarities and differences in their accounts. I explain how the 
application of the problem / solution methodology facilitates the clarification 
of Hobbes’s and Locke’s conceptions of the Rule of Law, and how it brings 
clarity to the content of the concept of the Rule of Law more generally. By 
considering similarities and differences that can be seen at varying levels of 
analytical scrutiny in Leviathan and the Two Treatises, I argue that the 
accounts, whilst both being conceived in terms of the broad umbrella of the 
Rule of Law, have almost no true similarity. This absence of similarity is not 
simply based on the fact that the two accounts are, on the face of it, very 
different accounts. By considering their Rule of Law accounts as being 
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solutions to perceivable societal problems, I, first, identify similarities that 
could be seen to exist in the accounts. Second, I illustrate why those 
superficial similarities cannot be seen as true similarities: the solutions—even if 
couched in similar terms—respond to different problems; and, different 
inflections in the solutions reflect different meanings. This renders them 
distinguishable from one another. I then illustrate that the differences that are 
identifiable in the problems that are posed are also different in nature to the 
differences that exist in relation to the broadest caricatures that are often 
associated with both thinkers’ work. By taking this approach, I illustrate that 
considering the accounts in terms of a problem / solution relationship 
disambiguates any similarities and differences that are, otherwise, confused.  
Chapter 7 provides a very brief conclusion. (In this sense, it could have 
been described as ‘concluding remarks’ in preference to ‘chapter’.) In 
addition to addressing the issues raised in this chapter, I consider both the—
evolutionary or revolutionary—change between Hobbes’s and Locke’s 
conceptions of the Rule of Law and answer my research question. I also 
consider the impact that my conclusion and analysis more generally will have 
on our contemporary conceptions—as well as our meaning, understanding, 
and application—of the Rule of Law. 
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(UNINTENDED) CONCEPTUAL EUGENICS 
In concluding this introductory chapter, I return—one last time—to the 
toolbox analogy. As noted above, the use and innovative re-use of tools that 
we currently have in the toolbox for the solution of problems that we currently 
have is all well and good, but we are potentially missing something if we fail 
to consider both the intention behind the tools’ current inclusion in the box 
and, relatedly, the reasons why other tools are not (or are no longer) in the 
box. In the same way, increasing our focus on the origins of ideas associated 
with the Rule of Law will not only illuminate the rationale for and behind the 
contemporary operation of the concept, but it will also illustrate aspects of 
the concept or conceptions that are no longer included. In returning to the 
example given above, this could—in the simplest sense—result in the relative 
unshackling of Rule of Law ideas from the state-centric system in which the 
contemporary concept cannot—otherwise—be disentangled. Consideration of 
the original or earlier intentions and motivations that generated ideas we now 
accept as part of the dominant Rule of Law paradigm may, in this sense, 
prove to be both useful and, in some respects, essential in avoiding future 
dire conceptual consequences. 
What dire consequences? One relates to the sub-title of this chapter: 
(Unintended) Conceptual Eugenics. If it is the case that there is some form of 
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path dependent operation to the Rule of Law—meaning that our present 
choices are derived from, and to some degree influenced by, experiences of 
the past—then we neglect origins at our peril. Should we fail to take account 
of the origins of the concept—by continuing to simply innovate around the 
idea that we presently have, by overlooking both the meaning and context 
behind the current concept, and by forgetting those ideas that we no longer 
see—then future development of the Rule of Law will be impoverished and 
will, potentially and perversely, not be faithful to the ideas from which it is 
ultimately derived. To be clear, I am not suggesting we must simply accept 
the earlier accounts as they were written. Instead, we must understand the 
accounts in order to ensure that any acceptance, change, or modification—by 
way of the contemporary application of those older ideas—does not 
unintentionally impoverish the options available to us or to future thinkers: in 
re-purposing the butter-knife, we must not forget the screwdriver. Doing so—
and in taking steps to better understand the origins of Rule of Law ideas—will 
better enable us to innovate in ways that allow responses to both current and 
future problems. In other words, whilst we are free to consider, accept, and 
reject various aspects of earlier thought, our intellectual obligation is to not 
distort or misrepresent those earlier ideas.47 By failing to appreciate its origins 
                                               
47 I am grateful to Brian Tamanaha for stressing the importance of this clarification.  
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today, we risk the (unintentional) imposition of a selective approach—a too 
selective approach, perhaps—in the interpretation and application of the 
concept in the future.    
 Today’s failure to take account of the past restricts the potential 
options available to us in the future. This process may not be the result of a 
conscious choice; the selections that we have available in respect of future 
solutions may—as a result of our current neglect—become increasingly 
restricted as a result of the simple acceptance of the dominant paradigm and 
our failure to examine the concept’s origins. In effect, the consequence of our 
neglect is the unintentional pre-selection—or limitation—of the potential future 
Rule of Law solutions that will be available. In putting this another way: origins 
matter. This thesis is an attempt to both illustrate that this is the case and to 
suggest one way in which this dire process of (unintentional) conceptual 












THE RULE OF LORE IN THE RULE OF LAW:  
PUTTING THE PROBLEM OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CONTEXT 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a substantial problem in the Rule of Law literature: without the 
clear identification of the actual change mechanism that has operated across 
Rule of Law related ideas—something that we do not yet have—there is no way 
to assess whether various common assumptions in the Rule of Law literature 
are, or can be, consistent with one another. In this chapter, in order to 
illustrate the motivation for the thesis more generally, I identify a number of 
commonly accepted assumptions that form a common and recurring 
contemporary narrative in the Rule of Law literature: the Rule of Law is over 
2000 years old; there have been a number of canonical Rule of Law ideas; 
contemporary ideas of the Rule of Law differ to earlier Rule of Law ideas; and, 
the Rule of Law is a highly, or essentially, contested concept. I describe them 
as assumptions as they are generally cited as forming part of the conceptual 
backstory of the Rule of Law; they represent foundational, generally 
unexamined, beliefs about the Rule of Law on which more substantive 
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arguments are based. The assumptions derive from both primary works that 
could be seen to form a canon of work associated with the concept—the usual 
suspects introduced in the previous chapter that include: Aristotle; Hobbes; 
Locke; Dicey; Hayek; and, Fuller—and from a secondary literature that 
analyses that canon. Within this body of work the assumptions’ collective 
cogency has not previously been considered. Yet, as further ideas are based 
on the assumptions—and where the assumptions are often provided with a 
view to establishing a shared understanding about the concept—I argue that 
consideration of this collective cogency is necessary for conceptual clarity.  
This chapter provides a fundamental statement of the motivation 
behind the thesis and functions as an overview of the literature that forms the 
debate regarding the conceptual content of the Rule of Law. In illustrating the 
basic problem—that without the clear identification of the actual change 
mechanism that has operated across Rule of Law related ideas, there is no 
way to assess whether various common assumptions in the Rule of Law 
literature are, or can be, consistent with one another—and through illustrating 
the basic form of one way to solve the problem, the rationale behind (and 
structure of) the remaining chapters becomes clear. In short, I illustrate that a 
problem exists to which my thesis provides—at least one aspect or small part 
of—the solution. 
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I expose the potential for inconsistency when the assumptions are 
considered together by exploring the assumptions’ cogency in terms of two 
hypothetical mechanisms of change. The result is not only the identification of 
inconsistency generally, but also the finding that the inconsistency varies 
between the mechanisms. This fundamental problem of inconsistency across 
the works that represent the ‘go-to’ authors in the Rule of Law debate 
represents a substantial problem. It is this variance that leads to the problem 
identified in this chapter’s first sentence. Further, it is because of the existence 
of this problem that my thesis’s wider argument has both value and structure. 
It has value as I provide one possible solution to this problem and approach: I 
suggest a contextual assessment of Rule of Law accounts as being one way 
that the problem can be solved. In circumstances where the concept is so 
often cited, referred to, and deployed in academic argument, yet where 
potentially inconsistent assumptions play a foundational role, enhanced 
clarity is undoubtedly both necessary and long overdue. My thesis is also 
structured by this argument as, in adopting the solution that is advocated, I 
go on, in the fourth and fifth chapters, to illustrate the application of the 
methodology before, in the final two chapters, explaining how the 
assessment benefits and addresses the problem identified here.  
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In this chapter, I cite a number of sources that identify, and rely on, 
various common assumptions in relation to the analysis of the Rule of Law. 
These citations can generally be found in the opening paragraphs (or 
opening sentences) of the works cited. This is, as will become apparent, a 
clear and recurrent theme. The authors offer their statements to describe 
what the Rule of Law is and, relatedly, as an account of where the concept’s 
origins lie. The foundational importance of this analytic approach is apparent 
from Martin Krygier’s observation: ‘It is common to start discussions of the 
rule of law by saying what it is before going on to ask what, if anything, it 
might be good for and worth…’1 In establishing an agreed, and agreeable, 
foundation for what the Rule of Law is, the assumptions—whilst relating to 
different characterisations of the concept—provide a shared understanding 
about the concept on which further arguments about the meaning or 
operation of the concept can be based. In this respect, the assumptions do a 
lot of—largely hidden—work. The assumptions each offer a relatively weak 
notion of what the Rule of Law is but, through their collective cogency, they 
purport to provide a strong base on which to structure a Rule of Law 
argument. The way in which these ideas come—or are brought—together 
                                               
1 Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles About the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where? And Who 
Cares?, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 64–104, 65 (James Flemming ed., 2011). 
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reflects a consilience of inductions: where ‘an Induction, obtained from one 
class of facts, coincides with an Induction, obtained from another different 
class. This Consilience is a test of the truth of the Theory in which it occurs’.2 In 
other words, if two (or more) independent notions lead to the same 
conclusion, this provides support for the wider theory; ideas, by their 
consilience, reinforce one another. The assumptions I identify reflect 
different—historical, analytical, or ontological—characteristics of the concept of 
the Rule of Law. To provide consistent support for the wider theory of the 
Rule of Law, the assumptions—when viewed as independent notions—would 
be expected to support the same conclusion. However, as I will illustrate, the 
assumptions do not and cannot come together as various inconsistencies 
result in their—ultimate—failure to provide a base on which to structure more 
substantive ideas. 
Notwithstanding their foundational importance, the assumptions do 
not, in this respect, represent positions of considered argument. In effect, the 
statements reflect the commonly endorsed positions in relation to the 
concept of the Rule of Law in the Rule of Law literature; their existence or 
                                               
2 WILLIAM WHEWELL, 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE INDUCTIVE SCIENCES, FOUNDED UPON THEIR 
HISTORY 469 (New ed. 1848). See also, EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF 
KNOWLEDGE 8–9 (Reprint edition ed. 1999). 
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correctness is simply assumed. The common assumptions are assumptions 
not only because they play a crucial foundational role on which further 
arguments are structured, but also because they are often treated—in those 
arguments—as unspoken aspects of the argument; there is frequently no 
argument—other than mere citation of canonical works—offered in support of 
the various statements. Of course, we must, to some degree, rely on works 
that have come before us; it would be impractical to suggest—and I do not 
intend to do so—that in every mention of, for example, Aristotle, a complete 
exegesis of his works should be undertaken. I highlight this issue only to 
illustrate that the common assumptions are used as background information 
and as a way of setting the scene for the discussion to come. By highlighting 
the assumptions’ incompatibility—where our reliance on robust and consistent 
assumptions is advantageous—I expose the nature and scope of a problem 
inherent in the literature: that without the identifying the way in which Rule of 
Law ideas have changed, there is no way to assess whether the common 
assumptions in the Rule of Law literature are, or can be, consistent with one 
another. It is on this fundamental problem that I have focused my thesis: the 
aim is to illustrate, and consider, the change mechanism that has operated 
between two of the canons of the Rule of Law literature.  
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The problem can be seen when the assumptions are considered in 
terms of potential mechanisms of change. If it is accepted that there has been 
some form of change in relation to the idea of the Rule of Law—a position that 
must be accepted if the various works that form the Rule of Law literature 
relate to the same overarching family of ideas—the mechanism of change can 
impact the extent of any inconsistency across the common assumptions. To 
demonstrate this, I stipulate two hypothetical and extreme forms of 
conceptual change: evolutionary and revolutionary change. I then illustrate 
that, when the assumptions are considered in terms of these forms of change, 
the nature of the inconsistency varies considerably. In short, I demonstrate 
that the operation of either of the change mechanisms impacts the nature, 
extent, and frequency of the inconsistencies in the assumptions. By exploring 
these two (crude) ways of conceiving a macro- process of change, I expose 
the potential for substantial inconsistencies across the assumptions and 
suggest that, if clarity is important, it is, therefore, necessary to identify the 
change mechanism that has operated.   
The solution to the problem is, simply stated, to identify the 
mechanism of change. One way to do this is to identify precisely what (a 
particular conception of) the Rule of Law is (or, more properly, was) at the 
point at which the idea was stated. A closer examination of canonical Rule of 
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Law ideas, in the context of their creation, will more clearly illustrate exactly 
what the Rule of Law was (for each canonical author) at that time and, thus, 
when compared to any subsequent canonical conception, the mechanism of 
change can be identified. Change can only be considered—and, hence, the 
problem identified in this chapter be answered—once this has happened. I 
introduce this idea as a solution to the problem—and as a methodology for 
the remainder of the thesis—at the end of this chapter. Before we can begin to 
explore the problem in the Rule of Law literature, however, some conceptual 
ground-clearing is required.   
The Rule of Law spans a number of disciplines and is viewed in a 
discreet conceptual form within each. Further, it seems likely each individual 
in Rule of Law relevant fields may have his or her particular idea of what the 
Rule of Law is. So, to narrow the scope of this chapter, I only explore the body 
of work that looks to identify—or at least comment on—the precise nature of 
what the Rule of Law is. I do not explore the wide body of—practically or 
empirically focused—work that seeks to identify or test the extent to which the 
Rule of Law can be measured in legal or political systems of the world. In this 
sense, defining the scope of this chapter is relatively straightforward. What is 
more complicated is the provision of a working definition or attachment of a 
meaning to the term the Rule of Law. As I criticise the wide body of literature 
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that itself has seen much ink spilt in trying to define the Rule of Law, any 
attempt to provide a definition seems to be both imprudent and arrogant. 
Focussing the conceptual scope is, however, necessary to provide some 
clarity. I do not offer a definition. Instead, and before taking more time to 
delineate the precise boundaries of a usable conception in Chapter 3, I 
simply identify one feature that the Rule of Law necessarily possesses: 
whatever else the Rule of Law may be, I take it to be an idea that relates to a 
normative force acting upon the exercise of power. This broadly stated 
feature encompasses commonly stated Rule of Law-ideas whilst further 
narrowing the relative conceptual scope of the discussion and provides clarity 
for my argument.3 To narrow the scope further, I consider the Rule of Law only 
in terms of its Anglo-American conception. My reasons for doing so are three-
                                               
3 By delineating the concept this way, I do not suggest that the Rule of Law should be 
considered in terms akin to a ‘unit idea’. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF 
BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (New ed. 1976). (See, in particular, Ch. 1, 
for his explanation of this idea.) Instead, in circumstances where the Rule of Law was 
not used as a particular phrase by many of the authors considered to be canonical, 
some frame of reference is necessary in order to explore the ideas relevant to this 
overarching and broadly defined category. The intent is to use this broad idea of the 
Rule of Law to identify the various thoughts that fall into a particular conceptual 
sphere in order that these can subsequently be used to explore the nature of the 
similarity or differences between those ideas. This broader application does not, 
however, comprise the content of and is not explored in this chapter. 
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fold: first, I do not consider the Rule of Law and the often-associated 
continental ideas of, for example, the Rechtsstaat or the Etat de droit, as being 
directly comparable; second, sufficient space is not available for me to 
consider all of the various Rule of Law-relevant concepts here; and, third, the 
literature I critique is largely focused on this same form.  
In what follows, I first outline the nature of the problem before, briefly, 
suggesting a potential solution. In the part immediately below, I identify the 
common assumptions in the Rule of Law literature before, in the next part, 
explaining why they are inconsistent. After providing a brief re-statement of 
the problem, I suggest one potential way out of (or around) the problem in 
the penultimate part before concluding.   
WHAT ARE THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW? 
‘As political philosophers,’ states Jeremy Waldron, ‘we like to keep our 
armoury of concepts in good shape’.4 Though not everyone engaged in 
conceptual analysis may self-identify as a political philosopher, Waldron’s 
                                               
4 Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 
21 LAW PHILOS. 137–164, 138 (2002). 
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position is sensible. However, this is not being adhered to; the political 
philosophers’ armoury is, instead, being neglected.5   
In the body of literature in legal or political philosophy that considers 
exactly what the Rule of Law is or that relates to the immediate impact of the 
terms of definition of that concept (‘the Rule of Law literature’) there is, 
frequently in the opening paragraphs, a common expository passage that 
serves as a proxy for either a short-form literature review, a conceptual 
history, a definition of the concept itself, or as a summary of previous 
arguments. These assumptions are used to provide a foundation on which 
further arguments rest. They are used to strengthen the ideas of what the 
Rule of Law is. Whilst I explore the precise terms below, it will suffice here to 
state the assumptions briefly: first, the Rule of Law is over 2000 years old; 
second, there have been a number of canonical Rule of Law ideas; third, 
contemporary ideas of the Rule of Law differ to previous ideas of the Rule of 
Law; and, fourth, the Rule of Law is a highly, or essentially, contested 
                                               
5 This is a position that Waldron himself, at least in some respects, concedes.  Id. at 
138. Of course, strict maintenance may not always be possible; Waldron goes on to 
point out there can be, to a point, a difference between the meaning of a concept 
like the Rule of Law ‘on the streets’ and that of its strict philosophical meaning. But, 
even if street level political philosophy is discounted, I have cause to doubt the truth 
of the initially stated position—at least insofar as it relates to the Rule of Law. 
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concept.6 I do not suggest all of the Assumptions are present in every modern 
Rule of Law paper; nor do I suggest that my list contains an exhaustive 
account of ideas that could otherwise be considered as Common 
Assumptions. I do, however, suggest any contemporary account that omits all 
of the Assumptions would represent an outlier and, further, the Assumptions 
form a recurring narrative in the Rule of Law literature.7 I draw on the 
examples below for illustration and, where multiple Assumptions occur in a 
single work, for citational brevity, I have sought to utilise and refer to the 
same account regardless of the existence of alternative sources that could 
also have illustrated the same point.  
Through the invocation of the assumptions in the Rule of Law literature, 
and through the mutual reinforcement that could be said to exist when 
differing ideas are collectively cogent or consilient, the use of the 
                                               
6 Collectively, I refer to these as Common Assumptions or Assumptions of the Rule of 
Law literature. In no way to I endorse, or suggest the correctness of, the 
Assumptions. 
7 Martin Krygier has recently identified a separate (yet not inconsistent) set of 
common themes in the literature. He identifies various clichés of the Rule of Law that 
relate to the concept’s: vogueishness and increasing popularity; promiscuity (as 
there are a number of potential commentators); and, contestability (in terms where it 
is ‘so “essentially contested”’). Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law: Pasts, Presents, and 
Two Possible Futures, 12 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI., 1 (2016).   
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Assumptions is intended to provide a solid foundation—a platform—on which 
more substantive ideas about the Rule of Law can be constructed. The 
Assumptions do not, however, come together; they do not facilitate 
consilience by virtue of the inconsistencies that arise and, therefore, they 
cannot provide a foundation on which to structure further Rule of Law ideas. 
Despite the frequency of their invocation—and despite any suggestion that 
the concept of the Rule of Law should be kept in good shape—the 
Assumptions are not internally consistent.8 This situation occurs because 
there has been insufficient consideration of whether the Common 
Assumptions are correct or, indeed, whether they make sense when 
expressed together. In the next part, I point to the nature of this 
inconsistency; but, first, in the following sections, I outline the precise way 
each of the Assumptions are expressed.   
Assumption One: The Rule of Law has Existed for Over 2000 Years 
In the Rule of Law literature, accounts frequently commence with a 
statement of the concept’s historical origins. Many accounts point to Aristotle 
                                               
8 Here, I am not suggesting consistency across individual or disparate accounts is 
necessary. My suggestion relates, not to different arguments but, instead, to 
different assumptions on which arguments are based. I expand on this below. 
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and suggest he was the originator of the idea.9 This plays a central role in 
statements like these: ‘The ideal of the rule of law, which can be traced back 
at least as far as Aristotle, is deeply embedded in the public political cultures 
of modern democratic societies.’10 and ‘[t]he concept of the rule of law 
embodies ideals that have figured in political and constitutional discourse at 
least since Aristotle…’11 Attribution of the concept’s classical origin has also 
been noted as a specific trend by others. In the opening sentence of his book, 
whilst pointing to necessary caution in doing so, Brian Tamanaha 
acknowledges that: ‘Many accounts of the rule of law identify its origins in 
                                               
9 See, for example, THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM, 75 (Pietro Costa, 
Danilo Zolo, & Emilio Santoro eds., 2007). Some hint the concept is, potentially, 
older by suggesting the Rule of Law is ‘at least’ as old as Aristotle’s account. RONALD 
A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 1 (2001). 
10 Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS 120–147, 121 (1994). 
11 Martin Krygier, Rule of Law (and Rechtsstaat), 38 in THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF THE 
RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE (RECHTSSTAAT) 45–59, 46 (James R. Silkenat, James 
E. Hickey, & Peter D. Barenboim eds., 2014). There is occasionally some hesitancy in 
ascribing a particular start to the concept. For example, in relation to the idea of the 
law ruling as opposed to rule by men, this is described as being a point that is ‘as old 
as Hobbes; maybe even as old as Aristotle…’ Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the 
Rule of Law, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 91, 101 (2007). However, not too much should be read 
into this hesitancy as the same author also suggests the beginnings of the Rule of 
Law tradition and the associated ideals ‘have resonated in our tradition for 
centuries—beginning with Aristotle’. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
MEASURE OF PROPERTY: THE HAMLYN LECTURES 3 (2012). 
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classical Greek thought, quoting passages from Plato and Aristotle.’12 The fact 
that there has been some debate as to the content of the Rule of Law, or that 
it has some different facets or formulations, is also put into Aristotelian terms 
by some.13 A more general statement regarding the concept is also common. 
It is a point of agreement, or at least popular consensus, that the origin of the 
Rule of Law—as an initial formulation—can be traced, if not immediately to 
Aristotle (or any other individual), to the ancient or classical period.14 From 
                                               
12 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 7 (2004). In the 
second paragraph of his article, Fallon adopts a similar approach in stating ‘Some 
have traced the modern ideal to Aristotle, who equated the Rule of Law with the rule 
of reason.’ Richard H. Fallon Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1–56, 1 (1997). Whilst there may be different 
meanings attributable to the Rule of Law, at least one is stated as being attributable 
to Aristotle by Judith Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: 
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1–16, 2 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987). 
13 Rodriguez et al state suggest that theorists since the time of Aristotle have been 
interested in describing the Rule of Law in terms that ‘withstand analytic scrutiny.’  
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Matthew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, The Rule of Law 
Unplugged, 59 EMORY LJ 1455, 1464 (2009) (citations omitted).  
14 Waldron suggests it has been a hugely important tradition for millennia.  
WALDRON, supra note 11 at 7. And, in referring to an Aristotelian passage stating that 
law should govern, Møller & Skaaning state ‘Theses sentences were written by 
Aristotle over two millennia ago (in Politics , 3.16), and they go to show that the ideal 
of the rule of law is ancient.’ JØRGEN MØLLER & SVEND-ERIK SKAANING, THE RULE OF LAW: 
DEFINITIONS, MEASURES, PATTERNS AND CAUSES 2 (2014). As part of a discussion related 
to the idea of a government of laws and not men, John Phillip Reid states: ‘These 
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these limited examples, I hope it will be clear that it is possible to observe—
and to do so without committing to the accuracy of the claim—that a common 
assumption exists in the literature that the Rule of Law is ancient and, 
probably, originated with Aristotle. In this sense, the classical origin of the 
concept forms the First Common Assumption of the Rule of Law. 
Assumption Two: Citation of Various—and Particular—Rule of Law Canons 
Rule of Law accounts frequently invoke, relate, or refer to various 
canons of the concept. Here, I use ‘canons’ of the Rule of Law simply as a 
shorthand to refer to the Rule of Law authors’ accounts that are most-invoked 
or referred to in the literature (and not in a way that suggests, or endorses 
that, the accounts should be accorded more authority than any others). In 
giving this caveat, and in the exposition of this Assumption, I adopt a position 
that neither contradicts nor endorses Radin’s statement that, in relation to the 
Rule of Law itself, ‘… there is no canonical formulation of its meaning…’15 For 
the purposes of my argument, they represent the ‘go to’ authors common to 
                                               
words not only encapsulate the essence of rule-of-law, they have echoed over the 
centuries even back to classical times…’ JOHN P. REID, RULE OF LAW: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 5 (2004). 
15 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV. 
781, 781 (1989). 
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many Rule of Law accounts. Of the philosophers’ and political thinkers’ 
conceptions frequently invoked or deployed, the field is substantial. As noted 
in Chapter 1, Møller & Skaaning suggest ‘… listing the philosophers and 
political thinkers who have celebrated [the ideal of the Rule of Law] reads as a 
‘Who’s Who?’ of Western political thought.16 In identifying core Rule of Law 
thinkers whose accounts are frequently invoked, this—non-exclusive—list could 
include Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Dicey, 
Hayek, Fuller, Habermas, Dworkin, Raz, Radin, Bingham, Waldron, and Rawls. 
My identification of these thinkers does not result from any particular scientific 
rigour or empirical selection criteria. These usual suspects will be familiar to 
anyone with anything more than a passing familiarity with the Rule of Law 
literature.17 Whilst reliance on a single thinker’s position is rare—especially 
given the frequently invoked contested nature of the concept explored 
below—there is, routinely, specific recognition provided to A. V. Dicey. Dicey’s 
                                               
16 MØLLER AND SKAANING, supra note 14 at 2. 
17 Reference is made to some, or all of these, in works by: Jeremy Waldron, Stare 
Decisis and the Rule of Law: a Layered Approach, 111 MICH. LAW REV. 1, 4 (2011); 
CHARLES SAMPFORD ET AL., RETROSPECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 14 (2006); REID, supra 
note 14 at 5–8; H. W. Arndt, The Origins of Dicey’s Concept of the “Rule of Law”, 31 
AUST. LAW J. 117 (1957); WALDRON, supra note 11 at 3–4; Krygier, supra note 1 at 65; 
Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2016 ed. 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-
law/ (last visited Jul 20, 2018). 
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account of the Rule of Law has been referred to as being famous,18 the most 
famous,19 or the most influential.20 Reid—by way of criticism of Radin’s 
sentiment that there is no canonical formulation of the Rule of Law21—suggests 
it was Dicey who cast the Rule of Law into canon.22 Of course, Reid’s 
statement exists in at least partial opposition to the position stated by Arndt: 
that the Rule of Law, whilst formulated differently to the Diceyan vision, was 
seen as something different for earlier thinkers.23 This relative fame could be 
attributed to Dicey’s popularisation of the phrase the Rule of Law.24 Arndt’s 
caution—that the Rule of Law, in the Diceyan form did not exist until the 1860s 
                                               
18 CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE RULE OF LAW: THE COMMON SENSE OF GLOBAL POLITICS 34 
(2014). 
19 Fallon, supra note 12 at 1. 
20 Solum, supra note 10 at 122. 
21 Radin, supra note 15 at 781. 
22 REID, supra note 14 at 7–8.   
23 Arndt, supra note 17 at 117.   
24 Of course, terms like ‘the empire of laws and not of men’ had been invoked in the 
mid-seventeenth century and, arguably, before; for example, in using this phrase, 
Harrington paraphrases an Aristotelian sentiment. See, for example, JAMES 
HARRINGTON, HARRINGTON: “THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA” AND “A SYSTEM OF 
POLITICS” 8–9 (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1992). Waldron, too, recognises this: ‘It is 
sometimes said that Dicey in 1885 was the first jurist to use the phrase “the Rule of 
Law.” I don’t think that’s true, except in the most pedantic sense of the exact 
grammatical construction.’ WALDRON, supra note 11 at 7. 
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and that it meant ‘very different things to Bracton, Coke, Locke and Dicey.’25—
should, however, be kept in mind. Despite the disputation, what is clear is 
that there are, and have been, a number of popular—or at least frequently 
invoked—accounts of what the Rule of Law is. These canonical accounts are 
frequently cited, and referred to, in the literature in a way that suggests they 
represent basic statements of the Rule of Law. This, therefore, forms the 
second Common Assumption of the Rule of Law.  
Assumption Three: Contemporary Conceptions Differ to Historical 
Conceptions  
In terms where a number of canonical accounts are provided in 
different terms over the course of more than 2000 years, it may seem trite to—
specifically—recognise that contemporary conceptions of the Rule of Law 
differ from earlier conceptions. Nevertheless, it is important to do so as this 
obvious factor is also—specifically—recognised in the Rule of Law literature. 
Not infrequently are the generalised differences specifically stated; for 
example, extracting an example that relates to both Assumptions One and 
Two, Todd Zywicki states ‘Dicey’s characterization of the modern content of 
the rule of law may be distinguished from the ancient “classical” conception 
                                               
25 Arndt, supra note 17 at 117. 
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of the rule of law, such as found in Aristotle.’26 Whilst explicit reference is also 
often made to the change or difference in conceptions over time,27 some 
authors make explicit, yet more oblique, reference to historical differences; 
for example: Fallon states ‘[t]he Rule of Law is a much celebrated, historic 
ideal, the precise meaning of which may be less clear today than ever 
before.’28 Acknowledgement of the implicit change in the Rule of Law is 
                                               
26 Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, SUPREME COURT ECON. 
REV. 1–26, 3 (2003). Shklar also contrasts and compares the specific differences 
between a number of historical conceptions in the opening paragraphs of her 
frequently cited work. Shklar, supra note 12 at 1–3. Zywicki, at note 5, references 
Shklar’s work in relation to identifying the differences between the ancient and 
modern ideas of the Rule of Law. 
27 REID, supra note 14 at 3–4. This also extends to differences between conceptions at 
various points in the past; for example, Arndt specifically states Dicey’s conception 
cannot be traced back to conceptual origins in the middle ages or, even, to Locke.  
See, for example, Arndt, supra note 17 at 117. 
28 Fallon, supra note 12 at 1. Further, Krygier describes the impact of the differences 
in conceptions over time in this way: ‘The rule of law is today more talked about in 
more places by more people than perhaps ever in its history, but that does not mean 
it is any clearer in meaning or significance, or better understood.’ Martin Krygier, 
Inside the Rule of Law, RIV. FILOS. DIRIT. 77–98, 77 (2014). Krygier also suggests the 
concept’s recent rise to prominence and the variety of conceptions results in it being 
‘rendered increasingly murky what the concept might mean, what the phenomenon 
might be, and why anyone should care.’ Krygier, supra note 7 at 1. For an illustration 
of the different historical approaches to Rule of Law conceptions, see the special 
issue, edited by Neil Walker and I, devoted to the operation and applications of the 
Chapter 2: The Rule of Lore in the Rule of Law 
 63 
apparent not only from the specific discussion in the literature but also in the 
structure and commentary provided in various Rule of Law texts. For example, 
the concept’s historical background is provided by Brian Tamanaha across 
the first six chapters of his book.29 An apt description of the position taken in 
relation to the Rule of Law is that it is a historic ideal—which could be taken to 
mean earlier ideas have some point of difference to contemporary ideas30—or 
in terms where there has been a ‘historical evolution’.31 As a further illustration 
of a point of difference, the modern trend toward the incorporation of ‘thick’ 
ideas into the Rule of Law—in particular notions of human rights and 
democracy32—also differs substantially in comparison to Rule of Law ideas 
                                               
Rule of Law through history: Special Issue on the History of the Rule of Law, , 9 HAGUE 
J. RULE LAW (2017).   
29 TAMANAHA, supra note 12. Christopher May characterises Tamanaha’s account as 
describing a ‘historically shifting norm’. MAY, supra note 18 at 37. Further implicit 
reference to the change in the conception is apparent through Reid’s hope to 
identify how the Rule of Law ‘once functioned’. REID, supra note 14 at 4. 
30 Radin, supra note 15 at 781.  
31 Olufemi Taiwo, The Rule of Law: The New Leviathan, 12 CAN JL JURISPRUD. 151, 152 
(1999). 
32 Ideas in these terms are not explored here in preference for a conceptually cleaner 
and clearer examination. An exploration and outline of formal and substantive ideas 
can be found in Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Raw 
an Analytical Framework, PUBLIC LAW 467–487 (1997). For a further example of these 
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produced by earlier thinkers. In these terms without committing to the truth-
value of the stated positions, there can be little doubt that the dominant 
assumption in the Rule of Law literature is that the Rule of Law, or at least 
conceptions of the Rule of Law, have varied over time. These differences are 
evident in either ideas associated with the concept itself or with the canons’ 
conceptions of the same. This, then, provides our Third Common Assumption 
of the Rule of Law.  
Assumption Four: The Rule of Law is a Highly (or, even, essentially) 
Contested Concept  
There is an accepted or at least acknowledged ambiguity or 
imprecision in the statement or articulation of the Rule of Law. This much is 
likely apparent from the various examples provided above. In the paragraph 
opening his book, Reid describes the idea of the Rule of Law in these 
delightful terms:  
… we are standing on a slippery slope. The ground is not only 
slick, it is covered with the grease of jurisprudential ambiguity 
and the treacherous underfooting of imprecise definition. “Rule 
of law” is an expression both praised and ridiculed by adherents 
                                               
ideas in the international sphere, see Paul Burgess, Deriving the International Rule of 
Law: an Unnecessary, Impractical and Unhelpful Exercise, (FORTHCOMING). 
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of opposite political philosophies, and it is a principle claimed as 
the lodestar for widely differing legal theories.33 
It is useful to, once again, specifically state what may, nevertheless, be 
obvious for the purposes of evidencing the Common Assumptions: 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law are not only long lasting, commonly invoked 
and varied, but also are frequently pitched in opposition to one another. 
Some, however, deny an element of contest by suggesting there exists a fairly 
well understood conceptual core.34 The large number of conceptions is, 
nevertheless, readily acknowledged by many.35 These conceptions are ‘often 
conflicting and not infrequently rather confused’.36 This has led to the 
suggestion that the very idea of the Rule of Law is—itself, and in the least—
deeply contested.37 There is increasingly a common thread in the literature 
                                               
33 REID, supra note 14 at 3. 
34 Zywicki, supra note 26 at 3. See also Adriaan Bedner, An Elementary Approach to 
the Rule of Law, 2 HAGUE J. RULE LAW 48–74, 50–51 (2010); James A. Grant, The Ideals 
of the Rule of Law, 37 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 383–405, 387 (2016). See also, Simon 
Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. LAW 331–362, 342 
(2008). 
35 For the suggestion that it may be best ‘to understand the ideal of the rule of law as 
a set of ideals connected more by family resemblance than by a unifying conceptual 
structure’ see Solum, supra note 10 at 121.   
36 Andrei Marmor, The Rule of Law and Its Limits, 23 LAW PHILOS. 1–43, 1 (2004).  
37 Radin, supra note 15 at 781.   
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that accepts the concept may even be properly characterised as being 
essentially contested (in the Galliean sense).38 Waldron’s 2002 paper39 is 
generally cited in support of this position.40 Some are more cautious. Krygier 
states ‘Like many other important moral, political and legal ideals, among 
them democracy, justice and liberty, [the Rule of Law’s] meaning, scope, 
conditions and significance are all highly, perhaps essentially contested.’41 
Some commentators, as I do here, simply report on the adoption or relative 
                                               
38 W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOT. SOC. 167–198 
(1955). 
39 Waldron, supra note 4. (Which, in turn, references the suggestion of essential 
contestability by Fallon: Fallon, supra note 12.)  
40 Krygier, supra note 7 at 1. In conjunction with sentiments that the Rule of Law’s 
contestedness ‘strongly indicate[s] that the Rule of Law is an essentially contested 
concept’ see MØLLER AND SKAANING, supra note 14 at 7. Regarding the idea that that 
‘the rule of law seems to be an essentially contested concept’ see Ryan E. Carlin & 
Rodolfo Sarsfield, Rethinking the Rule of Law: Concepts, Measures, and Theory, 33 
JUSTICE SYST. J. 125–130, 125 (2012); Jørgen Møller & Svend-Erik Skaaning, 
Systematizing Thin and Thick Conceptions of the Rule of Law, 33 JUSTICE SYST. J. 136–
153, 137 (2012). See also, Jeffrey K. Staton, Rule-of-Law Concepts and Rule-of-Law 
Models, 33 JUSTICE SYST. J. 235–241, 235 (2012). (Acknowledging the contested 
nature of the concept—in the Waldronian sense—is a concern in the literature.)   
41 Krygier, supra note 11 at 46 (citation omitted).      
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acceptance of this characterisation in the literature,42 whilst others merely 
report on the trend.43 One notably absent reference to Waldron’s ever-
popular categorisation of the Rule of Law as essentially contested comes from 
Waldron himself. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for the 
Rule of Law, Waldron outlines—in a section entitled The Contestedness of the 
Rule of Law—the general contestation prevalent in the literature but makes no 
reference to the concept as being essentially contested.44     
This all adds up to a general acceptance that the concept is at least 
(generally) contested. What is nevertheless clear is that there appears to be 
an ongoing contest between the various Rule of Law ideas. A number of Rule 
                                               
42 Tamanaha states simply that ‘Legal theorists have called it an “essentially 
contested concept”.’ Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, 
SINGAP. J. LEG. STUD. 232–247, 232 (2012). 
43 For example, by stating: ‘Theorists since Aristotle have been primarily interested in 
fashioning a coherent description of [the Rule of Law] that can withstand analytic 
scrutiny. Nonetheless, there are those who believe this to be a fool’s errand—that the 
rule of law is an “essentially contested concept.”’Rodriguez, McCubbins, and 
Weingast, supra note 13 at 1464 (citations omitted).   
44 Waldron, supra note 17. I do not suggest Waldron rejects or resiles from his earlier 
position. It does, however, seem that, for him at least, the question of essential 
contestedness is not sufficiently accepted—despite the widespread citation and 
adoption of his own position—to warrant inclusion in an encyclopaedia entry. For 
more on the contest between conceptions of the Rule of Law, see Chapter 3. 
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of Law-ideas are postulated in terms that differ in their precise formulation 
from one another yet remain connected by virtue of: the idea’s author’s 
explicit intention to contribute to the Rule of Law discussion; or, alternatively, 
through a subsequent discussion that seeks to incorporate earlier ideas—in 
which no explicit reference is made to the Rule of Law or any other Rule of 
Law theories per se—into the subsequent Rule of Law discussion. Whether this 
situation results in essential contestability—in the truly Galliean sense—appears 
to, itself, be contested. In essence, there is a continued debate as to the 
meaning of the concept across both time and geography.45 Whilst early 
accounts associated with Rule of Law ideas infrequently, if at all, relate their 
ideas to the precise context of one another—for example, there is no explicit 
mention of either the Rule of Law or Hobbes’s accounts of that idea by Locke—
there is explicit engagement and discussion across contemporary writers. For 
example, after acknowledging Hayek’s definition as ‘one of the clearest and 
most powerful formulations of the ideal of the rule of law’, Raz uses his 
critique of Hayek as a springboard into his own formulation of the idea.46 
Furthermore, it will be apparent from the contemporaneity of the citations 
                                               
45 Chesterman, supra note 34 at 340. 
46 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210 (2 ed. 2009). 
For Hayek’s definition, see FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 112 (Bruce 
Caldwell ed., 2007). 
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relating to the contested nature of the concept, the contest—or at least the 
popularity of citing the contest as continuing—subsists.    
It is, then, clear that there are a number of different conceptions 
associated with the concept of the Rule of Law either at a specific point in 
history—in comparing a single historical conception to one from the present—
or in relation to its contemporary conception. The accuracy and / or 
appropriateness of the essential contestability remains a topic that is debated 
and explored in the literature and the very existence of the debate, itself, 
forms part of the literature. It is on this basis that the observation of the 
contested status of the Rule of Law comprises our fourth Common 
Assumption. 
WHY ARE THE ASSUMPTIONS INCONSISTENT? 
Even on the basis of my brief examination, it is apparent that a number 
of very different, often opposing, conceptions have been presented and 
accepted, in the Rule of Law literature. Before moving forward in the thesis 
more generally, it is necessary to expand the nature of these inconsistencies. 
After all, the rationale for the broader research question—that fundamentally 
seeks to illustrate the nature and benefit of considering the mechanism of 
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change across conceptions of the Rule of Law—stems from the existence and 
prevalence of these inconsistencies.  
The four Assumptions are frequently stated and presented without 
principled argument; they are accepted as part of the Rule of Law’s 
conceptual narrative. Notwithstanding this acceptance and frequency of 
presentation, I will, in the final section in this part and with a view to 
establishing why the wider question raised in this thesis is relevant, outline 
why the Assumptions’ use creates inconsistencies in the account. To make this 
point, it is, however, useful to first address a preliminary question: is it even 
possible for the Assumptions—where they are characteristically distinct and 
could be seen as relating to very different aspects of the Rule of Law—to be 
sensibly considered as being consistent or inconsistent with one another? To 
provide a positive answer to this question—and before going on to illustrate 
that the Assumptions are not, in fact, consistent—I consider the opposing 
question: are the Assumptions too different to be considered as being 
consistent or inconsistent?  
Where the assumptions could be classified as relating to historical, 
analytical, or ontological characteristics, it could be suggested that it is not 
appropriate to assess their consistency as they relate to very different aspects 
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of the concept of the Rule of Law.47 Should this be the case, attempts to locate 
consistency could be seen as akin to assessing whether the quality of a novel 
together with the kind of tree used to make the paper on which the text is 
printed are consistent; whilst both could be seen as reflecting the quality of 
the book (more generally), and whilst both may be separately relevant to its 
quality (in the broadest sense), there is no reason to expect or require 
consistency between the two characteristics. The Assumptions, however and 
notwithstanding their different characteristics, should not be viewed in this 
way. It is possible to assess their consistency by virtue of the fact that they are 
each being used to collectively illustrate what the Rule of Law is; the 
Assumptions are together being used to provide a conceptual background 
and to support a particular view of the concept. In the book example, the 
parallel is in value: both the words and the paper stock impact the book’s 
value. Value draws the characteristics together in a way that may require 
some level of consistency. In returning to the Assumptions, by virtue of their 
being brought together in this particular endeavour, their differences in 
character can be viewed together and can sensibly be assessed in terms of 
consistency / inconsistency. Further, where the Assumptions are collectively 
                                               
47 I am grateful to Andrew Lang (London School of Economics) for suggesting 
expansion of this point during discussions of my argument in this chapter.  
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being used in a way that promotes consilience, the collective cogency of the 
Assumptions is necessary for conceptual clarity. Before I outline why the 
Assumptions’ use creates inconsistencies in the account generally, it is useful 
to first pause and reconcile the Assumptions into a collective sentiment.   
Change (Over Time and by Thinker) in Rule of Law Ideas 
The fundamental point of relative agreement that is evident when the 
Assumptions are considered together is change. This could be put something 
like this: ideas of what the Rule of Law is—and the use of those ideas—have 
varied over time.48 This is most apparent in Common Assumption Three.49 
However, it is also a necessary feature across the other three Assumptions. 
The fact that there are a number of Rule of Law conceptions and no 
definitive—agreed—statement of exactly what it is, speaks not only to the fact 
that there is a difference across time and across each author’s conception, but 
also to the fact that there has been some form of change over time. So, to say 
that the idea of the Rule of Law has changed over time appears to be—when 
                                               
48 This observation is, of course, far from revolutionary and has been noted by a 
number of authors. For example, Bedner states: ‘Rule of law definitions seem bound 
to vary over time, place, context, and from author to author.’ Bedner, supra note 34 
at 48 (citation omitted).  
49 Assumption Three: Contemporary Conceptions Differ to Historical Conceptions. 
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the Common Assumptions are considered individually—a relatively 
uncontroversial notion.50 Notwithstanding this fundamental point of relative 
agreement, problems creep in if we consider the assumptions in terms of 
different mechanisms of change. If we simply accept that there has been 
some change in the conceptions, it is a logical extension to question or 
enquire as to the nature of the change. Here, I do not intend to refer to the 
micro- mechanics of change (i.e. the influences on each canon’s author’s 
precise formulation of his or her conception). What I mean is the more 
general idea of change that could occur: the macro- mechanics. I do this 
purely as a tool to illustrate the importance of understanding how change 
occurred; because different forms of change can impact levels of consistency. 
At this macro- level, there are various ways to describe change. I consider 
only two—relatively binary and extreme hypothetical—mechanisms: 
                                               
50 This statement does, of course, presuppose to some extent that the various 
thinkers were talking about the same thing; something that, in the context of the 
examination of the Rule of Law literature, is also an uncontroversial idea. Whilst it will 
become apparent that there are difficulties with this characterisation—not least 
because few canonical accounts refer to ‘the Rule of Law’—it is clear is that, over time, 
individual thinkers’ conceptions have changed. It is relevant to note here that I am 
making no claims as to the actual existence of a broad category of the Rule of Law as 
a concept; I am merely reporting on the accepted position in the literature wherein it 
seems to be held to be relatively uncontentious that the various canonical ideas 
relate to some broad concept of the Rule of Law. 
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evolutionary change and revolutionary change.51 I do not, however, suggest 
either mechanism did operate. I also do not suggest that various intermediate 
or mixed forms of change do not exist or did not actually operate. I do, 
however, suggest that by exploring these two relatively crude macro- 
processes of change, inconsistencies across the Rule of Law Assumptions can 
be illuminated.   
Evolutionary change refers to a change that occurs in the way that the 
Rule of Law is conceived that necessarily relates to, follows on from, or 
expands a prior—but not only immediately prior—conception. Change in this 
way means the idea of the Rule of Law could be seen as a single 
diachronically conceived concept, the nature and meaning of which changes 
over time; earlier conceptions of the Rule of Law are necessarily relevant to 
subsequent conceptions. Within this idea, the Rule of Law could be seen in 
terms akin to the idea that the concept exists as a continuing tradition.52 
                                               
51 I return to, and reapply, these forms of change in relation to the change between 
Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule of Law-like ideas in the final chapter. 
52 It is in this sense that, in relation to the Rule of Law tradition, Martin Krygier applies 
the metaphor of the Argonauts’ ship remaining the Argonauts’ ship notwithstanding 
the fact that, over the course of a voyage, barely any original part of the ship 
survives. MARTIN KRYGIER, MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW TRADITION 11 (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2713610 (last visited Jul 23, 2018). In drawing this 
comparison, and relating the tradition of the Rule of Law to that of the Common Law, 
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Evolutionary change is, perhaps, best understood when contrasted with 
revolutionary change. Revolutionary change describes discreet, unrelated, 
iterations of the Rule of Law as paradigm shifting events: conceptual 
revolutions in thought that fundamentally alter or change the way a concept is 
perceived; subsequent ideas are not necessarily reliant on earlier ideas; later 
ideas implicitly or explicitly supplant earlier ones.53    
The conception of change as being either evolutionary or revolutionary 
covers the field in a binary sense. As evolutionary change necessarily relates 
to a previous idea, change is either evolutionary or it is not; it is not 
evolutionary without a necessary connection to prior ideas. Without a 
necessary connection ‘change’ would be revolutionary.54 Even without further 
consideration, it could be said that, should change be conceived as being 
revolutionary, there is no need to rely on prior ideas of the Rule of Law when 
                                               
Krygier extracts MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 84 
(1820). 
53 Here, I have in mind the Kuhnian idea that the defining characteristic of—for Kuhn, 
scientific—revolutions, relates to the rejection of a prior time-honoured theory, a shift 
in the nature of the problems available for scrutiny, and a transformation of the 
imagination. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 6 (4 ed. 
2012).   
54 Whilst this does not account for how to categorise the very first conception, this 
will not impact the assessment herein. 
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positing a new (revolutionary) Rule of Law idea; indeed, it may make little 
sense to do so if any subsequent position is adopted.55    
A brief—Rule of Law-relevant—example may assist here to illustrate what 
I mean by evolutionary change.56 This would mean, per my definition above, a 
necessary connection to a prior Rule of Law idea must exist between two 
conceptions. The most obvious sense of this would be where a subsequent 
thinker explicitly states that she is taking up, and modifying in some way, an 
earlier thinker’s Rule of Law position. There can also be an implicit necessary 
connection that would give rise to an evolutionary conception of change. In 
many senses, contemporary ‘thick’ versions of the Rule of Law—such as the 
version suggested by the United Nations (the U.N.)—could be seen to have a 
necessary connection to earlier ‘thin’ versions.  The U.N. idea of the Rule of 
Law includes: the separation of powers; fairness; and, a requirement for laws 
to be ‘consistent with international human rights norms and standards.’57 In 
                                               
55 In this respect, I have in mind something like Kuhn’s idea of irreconcilability. See 
KUHN, supra note 53. 
56 See also my comments regarding evolutionary change and innovation in relation 
to the Rule of Law in Chapter 1: Our Conceptual Toolbox. 
57 UN SECURITY COUNCIL, THE RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CONFLICT AND 
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES - REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 6 (2004), 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/2004%20report.pdf (last visited Jul 20, 2018). The 
U.N.’s reluctance to view the Rule of Law in formal—‘thin’—terms can be seen in its 
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structuring its thick idea of the Rule of Law, there must be a thin base—of 
whatever form that may take—upon which it sits.58 In this sense, there is a form 
of evolutionary change from the earlier thin ideas that stipulate the formal 
content of the Rule of Law into the U.N.’s thicker conception. 
Two things must be clarified. The first relates to the nature of 
(evolutionary change’s) ‘necessary’ connection. The second relates to 
variations ‘across’ a time period. In addressing the former, the necessary 
aspect relates to a connection that would result in a fundamentally different 
(subsequent) conception if the prior conception did not exist. Necessity, here, 
has two components that must be satisfied at separate times: first, is the 
requirement for a connection that is more than merely incidental—a canon’s 
mere use of the same language or turn of phrase would not be sufficient in 
this respect (whilst it may suggest their work relates to the same ideas as that 
                                               
2014 Addendum, where it is stated: ‘Devoid of the human rights framework, the rule 
of law is merely “rule by law”, a term describing legal or rule-based frameworks, 
without a normative underpinning to secure substantive justice. Worse, so-called 
rule of law, without respect for human rights, can be used as a tool for the arbitrary 
and oppressive exercise of power.’ UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
STRENGTHENING AND COORDINATING UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW ACTIVITIES - REPORT OF 
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL - ADDENDUM 15 (2014).  
58 I expand on this point in Chapter 3: Introduction and in Formally Framing the 
Discussion.  
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of the former thinker); the second requires that the connection be sufficient to 
have augmented the conceptual toolkit available to the subsequent canonical 
author.59 For example, the fact that Hobbes’s Leviathan temporally precedes 
Locke’s Two Treatises and the fact that Locke may have, or even did, read 
Leviathan is not enough to establish a necessary connection; neither fact 
necessarily relates to the creation or operation of Locke’s Rule of Law-like 
ideas.  
In relation to the augmentation / identification of a conceptual toolkit, 
the problems of establishing influence are well known.60 However, the 
methodology proposed here, and expanded throughout the other chapters, 
                                               
59 The question to be asked is whether the subsequent canon’s work could have had 
the same meaning if the former canon’s work had not been produced. Or, putting it 
another way, by asking whether the subsequent work’s meaning relies on the (prior 
author’s) augmentation of the subsequent thinker’s conceptual toolkit.  
60 One of the most well-known accounts regarding the difficulties of establishing and 
illustrating a level of influence by one thinker over another is provided by Skinner. 
Quentin Skinner, The Limits of Historical Explanations, 41 PHILOSOPHY 199–215 
(1966). However, Oakley provides a convincing exposition of the benefits of the idea. 
FRANCIS OAKLEY, POLITICS AND ETERNITY: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL AND EARLY-
MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 5 (1999). (‘Anxieties of Influence:’ Skinner, Figgis, 
Conciliarism and Early-Modern Constitutionalism). Oakley’s account is, in some 
sense, acknowledged by Skinner in later works. See QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF 
POLITICS 75 (2002). 
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avoids these. A detailed exegesis of conceptions sufficient to exemplify a true 
necessary connection is not possible in the space available in a thesis focused 
on other questions. Whilst this would be essential when more micro- level 
changes are considered, one is not required for the brief macro- changes 
explored.61 As my analysis considers both mechanisms of change, there is no 
need to consider or worry (at this stage) about which mechanism of change 
may have operated in individual conceptions. For this reason, in relation to 
this macro- examination, the basic, stipulative, definition of necessary 
provided above is, for now at least, sufficient to differentiate the two 
mechanisms as separate, opposing, mechanisms / binary methods of change 
that cover the field.   
One further thing requires clarification: the nature of variations ‘across’ 
a time period. Here, I mean only to describe the existence of two (or more) 
ideas at distinct points between which there is an intervening period. I do not 
mean to suggest the ideas must be related nor that there must be a 
                                               
61 Nevertheless, below in Is There a Solution?, I suggest and briefly explore 
contextualising the canons as one possible solution. This solution differentiates 
canons’ authors’ conceptions as being either a solution to that (author’s) period’s 
problems or whether, alternatively, the ‘solution’ is provided in response to or in 
consequence of something else.   
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conceptual connection between them.62 Instead, ‘across’ relates merely to a 
temporal separation between the ideas.   
Inconsistencies in the Assumptions 
Is there a difference in the Assumptions’ cogency if we categorise the 
change as being either evolutionary or revolutionary? Do the Assumptions 
make sense under both mechanisms? I suggest the former question should 
be positively answered but the latter should not; either mechanisms’ 
operation fundamentally impacts the nature, extent, and frequency of the 
inconsistencies in the Assumptions.  
If it is accepted that there has been some form of change in relation to 
the idea of the Rule of Law, the operative mechanism of change can impact 
the nature of inconsistency across the Assumptions. There are, conceivably, a 
number of different ways to explore inconsistencies across the assumptions. I 
do so via a two-stage comparison: the first considers whether the 
                                               
62 To do so would, of course, presuppose some form of necessary connection. In this 
sense, my suggestion shares some common ground with Armitage’s work: David 
Armitage, What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the Longue Durée, 38 HIST. 
EUR. IDEAS 493–507 (2012). See also, DAVID ARMITAGE, CIVIL WARS: A HISTORY IN IDEAS 
(2017). 
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Assumptions themselves are compatible. For example, whether Assumption 
One is consistent with Assumption Two, and whether Assumption Two is 
consistent with Assumption Three, etc. I describe these as Assumption pairs. 
The second stage considers whether the Assumption pairs’ consistency is 
impacted when considered in the two change mechanisms’ context. In taking 
this approach, I do not describe every possible pairing of Assumptions. I also 
do not deny there are various instances of consistency between Assumptions. 
I simply describe the most obvious inconsistencies and, then, outline the 
problems that follow to make apparent the scope of inconsistency. I illustrate 
that, regardless of the change mechanism’s operation, various inconsistencies 
subsist; yet, the nature and extent of inconsistency varies depending on the 
mechanism of change.  
In the following sections, I illustrate the essentiality of identifying the 
way in which change in the Rule of Law does occur or, more accurately, has 
occurred. I do not, however, suggest either change mechanism should be 
‘adopted’ simply because it results in a more compatible set of Assumptions.   
Assumption pairs: general compatibility 
Assumption pairs do not immediately contradict one another. This 
superficial compatibility should, in circumstances where the Assumptions are 
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so frequently invoked, be no surprise. For example, Assumption One and 
Assumption Four,63 can sit comfortably side by side; the Rule of Law can 
conceivably have existed for a long period whilst, over that duration, its 
precise boundaries have been contested. Notwithstanding this general 
compatibility, some tension can be identified between Assumptions One and 
Three.64 The existence of different Rule of Law ideas over time may suggest a 
lack of conceptual consistency; but this is not immediately reflected in the 
idea that the Rule of Law has existed for two millennia.65 Nevertheless, despite 
this minor tension, the various Assumptions are, at least, broadly compatible.     
Evolutionary change: no obvious inconsistency 
When individual Assumptions are considered in terms of the 
mechanism of evolutionary change there is no obvious inconsistency. For 
example, when considering Assumption Two,66 it is appropriate that there 
                                               
63 Assumption One: that the Rule of Law has existed for over 2000 years.  
Assumption Four: the Rule of Law is a highly or essentially contested concept. 
64 Assumption One: that the Rule of Law has existed for over 2000 years.  
Assumption Three: contemporary Rule of Law ideas differ from older ideas. 
65 This may be reconciled through differentiating the concept of the Rule of Law and 
various conceptions of the same. 
66 Assumption Two: a number of canons of the Rule of Law exist and are frequently 
cited. 
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would be citation of previous Rule of Law canons in circumstances where 
each Rule of Law idea necessarily relies on earlier ideas of the Rule of Law. 
The same can largely be said for each of the other Assumptions in relation to 
evolutionary change. The same result obtains when the Assumption pairs are 
considered in evolutionary change terms. By way of a brief example, when 
viewed this way, there is no immediate inconsistency between Assumptions 
Three and Four.67 The obvious way contestability—perhaps, even, essential 
contestability?—could arise is as a result of the evolution of ideas of the 
concept over time giving rise to competing ideas at a later stage that do not 
supplant completely the original idea.68 There is even one way in which 
consideration of the mechanism of evolutionary change can improve the 
Assumptions’ relative relationship: The slight tension between Assumptions 
One and Three noted in the paragraph above, appears to be either avoided 
or lessened. If the two millennia old Rule of Law has evolved and 
contemporary ideas differ to early ideas, differences would be expected. By 
pitching different conceptions at opposite temporal ends of a process of 
                                               
67 Assumption Three: contemporary Rule of Law ideas differ from older ideas.  
Assumption Four: the Rule of Law is a highly or essentially contested concept. 
68 Whilst this requires that the earlier ideas—or, at least, some aspects of them—are 
not completely debunked or overridden by subsequent ones, it is clear that this is 
something that has, undoubtedly, happened with certain ideas associated with the 
Rule of Law. 
The Problems and Solutions of Change in Conceptions of the Rule of Law 
 84 
conceptual evolution, there is some remedial effect by considering change in 
terms of an evolutionary mechanism.69 
Whilst there are no obvious inconsistencies, there is one, somewhat, 
strained relationship between evolutionary change and the Assumption pairs 
One and Four.70 The assumptions pull in (slightly) different conceptual 
directions, and evolution provides an unsatisfactory reconciliation. It is only if 
the Rule of Law is accepted as an overarching concept that it can be said to 
have existed for this extended time, yet the contest between ideas—especially 
if seen as essentially contested—suggests several ideas exist at the same 
conceptual moment. It could be suggested that the various contemporary 
and contemporaneous ideas of the Rule of Law may have resulted from the 
evolution itself; yet, there is some strain placed on that relationship. 
Nevertheless, there is, on the whole, an intuitively appealing link between the 
mechanism of evolutionary change and both the Assumptions and 
Assumption pairs. Any slight tensions, however, pale into insignificance when 
compared to those flowing from the revolutionary relationships.   
                                               
69 As will become apparent, this remedial effect is not something that occurs in 
respect of revolutionary change. 
70 Assumption One: that the Rule of Law has existed for over 2000 years.  
Assumption Four: the Rule of Law is a highly or essentially contested concept. 
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Revolutionary change: substantial inconsistency 
The overwhelming suggestion thus far is that there is compatibility or, 
at least, no substantial incompatibility between the Assumptions and 
Assumption pairs. Whilst this can be said for some relationships regarding the 
revolutionary mechanism, the majority of revolutionary change-relationships 
result in various forms of incompatibility: Two inconsistencies result from 
considering each of Assumptions One and Two individually; and further 
inconsistencies result from Assumption pairs: One/Two; One/Three; 
One/Four; and Two/Four.   
It is useful to first point to two additional ambiguities. I identify and 
differentiate them this way as a conflict may arise depending on the relative 
position adopted. Both ambiguities involve considering the Rule of Law as a 
contested concept (Assumption Four) in revolutionary change-terms. The first 
relates to the comparison of that Assumption alone; the second relates to its 
pairing with Assumption Three.71 It could be said that there is no 
incompatibility as a contested concept does not—in terms of revolutionary 
change—necessarily require a connection to prior ideas. However, it could 
also be said that there must be an overarching conceptual category in which 
                                               
71 Assumption Three: contemporary Rule of Law ideas differ from older ideas.   
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those conceptions exist. If the Rule of Law is viewed in these terms, there 
seems to be no revolutionary change in relation to any overarching ideal of 
the concept itself. In considering the Assumption pair (of Assumptions Three / 
Four) in revolutionary terms, there is an additional tension resulting from the 
requirement that contemporary ideas relate to an individual conception of the 
Rule of Law, whereas the contested notion points more toward the 
overarching concept or classification of the Rule of Law. Whilst these relative 
ambiguities could conceivably be explained away, some level of tension 
subsists.  
As to the inconsistencies themselves, the first relates to the individual 
Assumptions and revolutionary change. These particularly relate to the need 
to refer to or reference either the long-term existence of the Rule of Law 
(Assumption One), or the citation of canons (Assumption Two). If a Rule of 
Law conception has no necessary relationship to any previous conception, 
there is, pursuant to revolutionary change, no need to refer to things that 
have gone before. This does not mean that the mere mention of a history is, 
of itself, incorrect. The point is simply that in describing what the Rule of Law 
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is (in revolutionary change-terms) there is no need to do this and, hence, 
there exists a relative level of inconsistency.72   
A similar inconsistency occurs when various Assumption pairs—
including Assumption Four and, firstly, Assumption Two and, secondly, 
Assumption One73—are considered in terms of revolutionary change. The 
issues related to Assumption Four outlined above, are compounded by the 
association of the related ideas in Assumptions One and Two. When viewed 
in revolutionary terms, there is a fundamental inconsistency between 
asserting that an idea has existed for some time and that there is benefit in 
citing its canons. If the idea is not necessarily connected to what has come 
before the reference to an idea being old must relate to that idea and would 
have no conceptual relationship to any modern idea. Accordingly, there is, 
once again, little benefit or need for a thinker or commentator to relate their 
position to earlier ideas or conceptions that pre-date the particular one 
adopted. Two further inconsistencies arise in relation to revolutionary change. 
Both relate to pairings with Assumption One. The first with Assumption Two 
                                               
72 This forms a recurring theme throughout the inconsistencies more generally. 
73 Assumption Four: the Rule of Law is a highly or essentially contested concept.  
Assumption Two: a number of canons of the Rule of Law exist and are frequently 
cited.  Assumption One: that the Rule of Law has existed for over 2000 years.   
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and the second with Assumption Three. For the former pairing, once again, 
the purpose of citation of earlier canons seems irrelevant. In relation to the 
latter—the idea of a revolutionary change that comports with contemporary 
ideas being different to those in the past—the Assumptions could be seen as 
being largely inconsistent with the long-term existence of a single idea.   
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
What is apparent is that there are a number of inconsistencies. 
However, even if I have not provided a sufficiently convincing argument in 
respect of all of the instances of inconsistency, for the purposes of the 
problem identified below, all that needs to be established is that there is a 
relative difference in the nature and scope of the inconsistencies across the 
two change mechanisms. Regardless of the persuasiveness of my arguments 
in relation to particular inconsistencies, this relative difference is obvious.   
As a result of the differences in levels of inconsistency when change 
mechanisms are considered, the problem that exists in the Rule of Law 
literature is this: without the clear identification of the actual change 
mechanism that has operated across ideas of the Rule of Law—something that 
we do not yet have—there is no way to assess whether the Assumptions are, or 
can be, compatible with one another. The substantial inconsistencies are 
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largely, although not exclusively, clustered around the idea of revolutionary 
change. This is not to suggest that the evolutionary view of change should be 
considered the ‘correct’ idea or true reflection of the mechanism of Rule of 
Law change.74 What is, however, clear is that the way in which change is 
conceived is relevant to the relative correctness or appropriateness of the 
statement of the Assumptions in the literature. Identifying the mechanism of 
change will enhance the conceptual clarity in the Rule of Law literature and 
will assist in identifying which approaches and Assumptions should be 
abandoned. This chapter is not the place to solve this problem.75 I do, 
however, suggest in exceedingly brief terms one way this could be 
achieved.76 
  
                                               
74 This conclusion cannot follow from the macro- level change considered here.   
75 Solving the problem would require an assessment of the change in Rule of Law 
ideas over time to ascertain whether the change should properly be seen as 
evolutionary or revolutionary. One step in this process is taken in this thesis more 
generally: in identifying the change mechanism between Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule 
of Law-like ideas. However, more work on a much wider range of thinkers is 
necessary. I return to the further-research question in the concluding chapter.  
76 After briefly introducing the idea here, I expand upon the methodology in Chapter 
4, and then augment the idea further in Chapter 5.  
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IS THERE A SOLUTION? 
The solution to the problem posed at the start of this chapter—that the 
operation and extent of inconsistencies cannot be clarified without the 
relevant and operative mechanism of change being identified—can, 
obviously, be solved through identifying the mechanism of change that has 
occurred across various Rule of Law accounts. One way to do this is to identify 
precisely what (a particular conception of) the Rule of Law is (or, more 
properly, was) at the individual points in time under consideration; and then 
assess the difference between the individual points to define the boundaries 
of the operation of the mechanism of change. The Rule of Law literature 
spends surprisingly little time, and includes little analysis, in this regard. This 
absence is one of the reasons why the Assumptions, and the inconsistencies 
outlined above, exist. A contextual examination of canonical Rule of Law ideas 
will remedy this; it will illustrate exactly what the Rule of Law was (for each 
author) and, when compared to a subsequent canonical conception, will 
enable the mechanism of change—as a result of any necessary reliance on a 
prior idea—to be identified.    
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The methodology proposed below is not completely revolutionary,77 
but it is novel in its application to the Rule of Law. A detailed literature 
explores the context in which many of the texts that form the canon of Rule of 
Law were authored; yet this literature does not include focus on the Rule of 
Law itself. The two strands of literature—the contextualist examination of 
various periods and the impact on canonical authors, and the Rule of Law 
literature relating to the conceptual content of the Rule of Law—have not been 
brought together. This is to the detriment of the solution to the problem 
outlined in this chapter. To address this, the suggested contextualist 
methodology provides a new way to consider Rule of Law ideas in a way that 
will, hopefully, be appealing and intuitive. This is not to say that the operation 
of one process of change in the past requires the same to occur in the future, 
nor is it to say that only one mechanism of change has occurred across all 
conceptions of the Rule of Law. Nevertheless, identifying a particular change 
mechanism between individual pairs of accounts—especially those that follow 
one another in time—would be useful and would identify the change 
mechanism between those accounts. The individual consideration and 
identification of change mechanisms would be, in this limited respect, useful 
                                               
77 For a broadly similar idea and methodology regarding serial contextualism 
(relating to the concept of Civil War) see Armitage, supra note 61. 
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in bringing some conceptual clarity to the Rule of Law literature. If we fail to 
do this, we will be taken no further in addressing the problem identified. 
Change across the periods can only be considered—and, hence, the identified 
problem be answered—once this has happened. Two questions follow from 
this simple account: first, how can we assess—in terms of the Rule of Law—
exactly what the concept was for a particular canon at a particular time? And, 
second, how can we assess the nature of the change across different times?  
How can we Assess What the Rule of Law is / was for a Particular Canonical 
Author?   
I provide only one possible answer—briefly, and without making the 
bolder claim that this methodology is necessarily paramount—based on a 
single uncomplicated premise: a canonical author’s idea of the Rule of Law 
represents his or her solution to Rule of Law-relevant problems perceptible 
by the author at that time. The requirement that a mechanism of change be 
distinguished in order to enhance conceptual clarity imposes some 
(somewhat) unusual constraints on the choice of appropriate methodology.78 
                                               
78 For example, the contest surrounding the concept’s content, plus the absence of 
any accepted definition renders, in large part, the school of conceptual history 
(Begriffsgeschichte)—most frequently associated with Reinhart Kosselleck—difficult 
(though not impossible) to apply. The absence of the consistent use of the term ‘Rule 
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In adopting the methodology below, I use a number of broad based ideas to 
suggest a way to ultimately bring conceptual clarity to the problem 
associated with the identification of which Assumptions should be retained. 
The selective adoption of methodologies allows a clarity to be brought to the 
problem in a way that does not do violence to the methodological theorists’ 
original ideas.79 Should my methodology be criticised for cherry-picking, no 
real defence can be mounted other than to point to the usefulness of the 
methodology in addressing the problem identified. A further complication 
cannot be ignored: many of the canons of the Rule of Law did not use the 
phrase the Rule of Law. As this bars simple identification of a linguistic 
                                               
of Law’ across what are considered to be the canons of the Rule of Law results in 
many of that school’s practices being both limiting and limited. Whilst this is not the 
place for a detailed comparison of the relative pros and cons of the two schools, the 
ambiguity and contest associated with the term and the concept caused me to prefer 
the hybrid version of the Cambridge School of intellectual history detailed below. 
79 In adopting this methodology, I do not wholly endorse, or criticise any particular 
theorist’s method. For example, whilst Skinner’s various methodologies and his aim 
to establish what an author was doing are both relevant and useful, linguistic 
contextualism is not adopted in its entirety. In addition, whilst Collingwood’s logic of 
question and answers is of principal relevance, the wider gamut of his ideas is not 
endorsed.   
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concept through the identification of a particular phrase,80 I adopt a hybrid 
methodology. Nevertheless, I do not abandon fundamental ideas associated 
with contextualist historical approaches that may otherwise be useful.    
Through this approach, it is, then, the precise meaning, interpretation, 
and operation of the problem (in relation to that author) that necessitates an 
appreciation of the context in which the author’s solution is offered. The 
conception itself could be seen as part of a dialogue (of sorts) as the societal 
position and the Rule of Law conceptions exist as part of a problem / solution 
relationship.81 By considering canonical Rule of Law ideas as solutions to the 
                                               
80 In this sense, the charting of the transformation of a particular enunciated 
concept—for example, ‘liberty’ or ‘state’—requires a different examination to that 
which is required in relation to the Rule of Law literature.   
81 The Rule of Law has itself previously been described as a solution concept. 
Waldron, supra note 4 at 158. However, it should be noted that Waldron makes this 
assertion in terms where he considers the problem to be identifiable—of how to 
make law rule, rather than men—whilst it remains the case that we do not know how 
to solve it. I do not accept that this is actually—or, at least, solely—the problem to 
which the Rule of Law conceptions relate. See also Noel B. Reynolds, Grounding the 
Rule of Law, 2 RATIO JURIS 1–16, 5 (1989); Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law After the 
Short Twentieth Century: Launching a Global Career, in LAW, SOCIETY AND 
COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 327–346, 327 
(Richard Nobles & David Schiff eds., 2014). 
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author’s society’s problems, it is possible to illustrate more precisely what the 
Rule of Law was at the point of writing.  Collingwood helpfully puts it this way:  
If you cannot tell what a proposition means unless you know 
what question it is meant to answer, you will mistake its meaning 
if you make a mistake about that question. One symptom of 
mistaking the meaning of a proposition is thinking that it 
contradicts another proposition which in fact it does not 
contradict. No two propositions, I saw, can contradict one 
another unless they are answers to the same question.82    
In adopting this idea, it seems that we can only properly understand a 
(Rule of Law-relevant) solution if we understand the correlative (Rule of Law-
relevant) problem.83 This approach has the advantage of providing two 
perspectives from which to consider the nature of change: the solution’s, and 
the problem’s. This approach—which I will adopt throughout this thesis in 
order to clarify and disambiguate the meaning of Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule 
of Law-like ideas—facilitates refinement of any methodology based solely on 
consideration of the Rule of Law (as a solution sans problem) and provides 
increased precision in identifying the true nature and meaning of any 
                                               
82 ROBIN GEORGE COLLINGWOOD, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 33 (1939).   
83 This relates and refers to Collingwood’s characterisation in similar—but non-Rule of 
Law—terms in Id. at Chapter V. In relation to the importance of the idea of origins of 
the Rule of Law, see Chapter 1.  
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conception.84 Further, by identifying a meaning behind the text that extends 
beyond merely examining the words used we are more able to satisfy the 
basic hermeneutic idea, and to more finely differentiate the various Rule of 
Law ideas. By adopting the proposed methodology, it becomes possible to 
contrast two Rule of Law solutions, ostensibly postulated in the same terms, as 
a result of the fact that they respond to different problems. (It is as a result of 
this utility that I apply this methodology in the context of the exploration of 
Hobbes’s and Locke’s ideas in Chapters 4 and 5.)   
How can we Assess the Nature of Change Across Different Times? 
In locating change in evolutionary or revolutionary terms, it will be 
recalled that the key determinant is whether there is, in a subsequent 
conception, any necessary connection to a prior conception. Identification of 
this connection is paramount. My adopted ideas of evolutionary and 
revolutionary differentiate ideas on the basis that the connection must be 
more than merely incidental in terms that would result in a fundamentally 
different (subsequent) conception if the prior conception does not or did not 
exist. Change is relatively easy to assess in relation to a single well-defined 
concept or thing over time. Simple examination of a thing at t1 and t2 would 
                                               
84 This idea is also expanded upon in Chapter 6: Disambiguating Hobbes and Locke. 
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reveal the nature of the change—in the simple sense—across the two points. 
With a concept or idea that is notoriously ill defined and where the canons 
may not specifically discuss ‘the Rule of Law’, this is not so easy a proposition. 
However, putting aside for the moment any very real practical complications 
and difficulties that may inhere, the general categorisation of canonical 
accounts within the broad definition of the Rule of Law adopted here—that the 
Rule of Law relates to the normative force upon the exercise of power—would 
be possible (if not analytically ideal). So, in this sense, and in encompassing 
the idea of necessity expanded upon above, two separate ideas of the Rule of 
Law—at t1 and t2—can be compared and contrasted to establish whether a 
necessary connection exists. This will, in turn, establish whether the difference 
between the two can be conceived as being evolutionary or revolutionary.   
This comparison of multiple thinkers’ positions across greater periods 
of time could be conducted sequentially. However, it is accepted that, in 
doing so, an allowance must be made for the potential that any subsequent 
thinker could be influenced by any one of the prior thinkers; not only the 
thinker that immediately precedes him or her in time.85 In short, examining 
                                               
85 This approach, whilst covering an extended period, should not be conceived as a 
longue durée approach per se. However, the approach does share some common 
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pairs of Rule of Law accounts will yield substantial analytic benefits.86 
Sequential comparison of other canonical Rule of Law ideas, and the 
identification of the differences associated with necessary connections 
between each of those ideas, will enable the identification of the boundaries 
of the mechanism of change that operated across a wide spectrum of Rule of 
Law ideas.   
CONCLUSION 
The collective cogency of several fundamental assumptions within the 
Rule of Law literature has not previously been considered. When it is, a 
problem emerges that reveals substantial unclarity within the Rule of Law 
literature. The collective cogency of the Assumptions within the Rule of Law 
literature falters when they are considered in terms of different mechanisms 
of change, and the level of inconsistency varies when different mechanisms of 
change are considered. This results in unclarity. The majority of this chapter 
has been devoted to demonstrating the existence of this inconsistency and to 
illustrating that to avoid this inconsistency and, hence, the unclarity, it is 
necessary to identify the relevant mechanism of change across Rule of Law 
                                               
ground with the idea of serial contextualism described by Armitage. Armitage, supra 
note 61 at 497–499. 
86 For a drawback of not adopting a historical view, see Chapter 1.    
Chapter 2: The Rule of Lore in the Rule of Law 
 99 
ideas. I have suggested—in brief and relatively abstract terms—one way to do 
this: by viewing each canonical conception in the context of its authoring and 
as a solution to problems that can be associated with the society in which the 
canonical author was writing. Doing so ensures that the wider problem 
identified at the start of this chapter can be solved. Accordingly, to avoid 
ongoing reliance on potentially inconsistent Assumptions, and to enhance 
clarity in the Rule of Law debate, the assessment of Rule of Law ideas in a way 
that achieves this end is essential. 
Now that the problem has been identified, and the abstract solution 
has been suggested, all that remains is to add some practical flesh on the 
theoretical bones to provide (at least part of) the solution; accordingly, in 
Chapters 4 and 5, I expand upon and apply the problem / solution 
methodology outlined above in relation to Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule of Law-
like solutions. However, before that can be done, it is necessary to move 
beyond the basic definition of the Rule of Law that has been adopted thus far. 
It is to this definitional issue—and in order to enhance the conceptual clarity of 
the idea—to which I turn in Chapter 3.  
 
 





CHAPTER 3:  
THE RULE OF LAW:  
BEYOND CONTESTEDNESS1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I outline a novel—theory agnostic—elemental approach 
to identifying Rule of Law-like ideas.2 I argue that, by identifying common 
aims that undergird the most frequently cited conceptions of the Rule of Law, 
it is possible to look beyond the contestedness that is all too apparent in de-
bates regarding the Rule of Law’s conceptual content. In taking this approach, 
                                               
1 The vast majority of this chapter is comprised by my published article: Paul Bur-
gess, The Rule of Law: Beyond Contestedness, 8 Jurisprudence 480–500 (2017). Mi-
nor amendments have been made to facilitate the wider argument in this thesis. The 
article represented an expanded, amended and greatly refined statement of an idea 
first advanced in my LLM thesis. The argument’s use here is not only modified, but 
also is applied for a different purpose and in relation to a different field of study. 
2 In the published version of this chapter, the methodology introduced was focused 
on the initial identification of Rule of Law non-compliance. The idea, however, works 
equally well for both applications. For my original argument, see Id. 
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it is possible to identify two elements that reflect fundamental needs that are 
commonly held across all canonical conceptions.   
The Rule of Law is undoubtedly a contested concept.3 The conceptions 
themselves have been described as not only conflicting but also not infre-
quently rather confused.4 The Rule of Law’s contested nature is problematic 
for many reasons; not least of which are the potential analytical unclarity, con-
fusion, and loss of pragmatic benefit that follows the contest of such a widely 
cited concept. As was stated in the previous chapter, it is this uncertainty that 
motivates the thesis more generally. To look beyond the contestedness, it is 
necessary to look beyond the widely cited Rule of Law desiderata; to do this, 
it is necessary to identify the fundamental needs each thinker intended to sat-
isfy in formulating those desiderata. Through identifying the fundamental 
need that was being addressed, and by considering each of the most widely 
cited Rule of Law ideas, the identification of commonalities in the accounts is 
                                               
3 For a detailed summary of the debate, see Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an 
Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW PHILOS. 137–164 (2002). See also 
Chapter 2: Assumption Four: The Rule of Law is a Highly (or, even, essentially) Con-
tested Concept. 
4 Andrei Marmor, The Rule of Law and Its Limits, 23 LAW PHILOS. 1–43, 1 (2004).  
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possible. This allows the distillation of two Rule of Law elements:  Compre-
hension and Procedural Pellucidity. (The elements’ operation is not exclusive 
even though they exist, and overlap, on a spectrum between processes and 
outcomes: Procedural Pellucidity—at the processes end of the spectrum—re-
lates to norm-makers and appliers; and Comprehension—at the outcomes 
end—relates to norm followers.)5 The elements: are derived from within the 
DNA of canonical Rule of Law conceptions; can be identified across canonical 
conceptions; and, reflect the fundamental needs communicated by each ca-
nonical author. In consequence of the way that the elements are derived, sat-
isfaction of both elements is necessary for an account to be considered as be-
ing ‘Rule of Law-like’ regardless of which canonical conception is preferred or 
considered. Accordingly, should either be absent in the normative com-
mands of a sovereign power or in relation to the operation of a legal system 
more generally, Rule of Law-like-ness cannot follow. In these terms, the ele-
ments’ formulation enables the initial and immediate identification of Rule of 
Law-non-like-ness in any idea of the Rule of Law.  
Two questions follow. First, why is this important? And, second, why is 
this important in the context of this thesis?  The answer to the first can be 
                                               
5 I explore the nature of the overlap below in Elements of the Rule of Law: Summary 
and Objections.  
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readily stated. In circumstances where, despite the debate and the lack of any 
agreed definition of the concept, apex courts across the Common Law world 
frequently reference the Rule of Law’s importance,6 and as the level of con-
testedness seems capable of hindering research and the concept’s theoreti-
cal application,7 bringing clarity to the debate together with ease of applica-
tion of the concept is vital. The elements derived in this chapter address this 
problem by providing a new way to evaluate Rule of Law-like ideas through 
identification—at an early stage and in a theory-agnostic way—of Rule of Law-
like ideas that avoids the debate regarding the concept’s contestedness that 
is apparent in the literature.   
This is all well and good.  But, how about the second question: Why is 
this important in the context of this thesis? Any attempt to define the—or even 
a—meaning of the Rule of Law is ambitious and fraught with academic pitfalls. 
So, why take on such a challenge? The reality is that, despite the potential 
                                               
6 R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v. Lord Chancellor (Respondent), , 51 
UKSC (2017). Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, , 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
See also Bush v. Gore, , 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Regarding the US Supreme Court’s inter-
est and focus on the Rule of Law, see Paul Burgess, “[The Rule of Law]” in the US Su-
preme Court: the Elephant in the Court Room?, 8 HAGUE J. RULE LAW 421–428 (2016).  
7 Adriaan Bedner, An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law, 2 HAGUE J. RULE LAW 
48–74, 49 (2010); Ryan E. Carlin & Rodolfo Sarsfield, Rethinking the Rule of Law: Con-
cepts, Measures, and Theory, 33 JUSTICE SYST. J. 125–130 (2012).   
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drawbacks, the endeavour is both useful and necessary. It is useful because it 
enables both reader and writer to be certain that we are in understanding—if 
not agreement—as to what is being talked about. This prevents unclarity, am-
biguity, and uncertainty creeping in (or being smuggled in) later in the argu-
ment. It is necessary because, in circumstances where the wider thesis relates 
to the differences in the conceptual content of conceptions of the Rule of Law 
over time—and where the authors of the conceptions explored do not self-
identify their ideas with ‘the Rule of Law’ (as the phrase had not been popular-
ised at that stage)—there is a fundamental need to ensure that the theories 
that will be explored in the two chapters following this one can be sensibly 
and coherently described as being Rule of Law-like ideas. In this respect, I 
adopt—both in this chapter and in those that follow—the phrase ‘Rule of Law-
like’ to illustrate that the relevant conceptions fall within my definition of the 
Rule of Law without making the wider assertion that these are conceptions of 
the Rule of Law in all of the ways in which the idea can be conceived. In this 
sense, I sidestep the debate that reflects the contested nature of the Rule of 
Law. This is necessary in order to avoid becoming embroiled in the (poten-
tially) endless debates relating to the concept itself. The identification of a 
conception as being a Rule of Law-like idea is also necessary where the idea 
of an overarching—objectively correct—concept of the Rule of Law is not ac-
cepted. In this situation, the categorisation of ideas—Hobbes’s and Locke’s 
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ideas in the case of my argument—as Rule of Law ideas could be questioned 
especially where they are suggested as being impactful or influential on mod-
ern Rule of Law ideas. Accordingly, a fine line must be walked; the concept of 
the cart must not be put before the conception of the horse. By identifying a 
form of the Rule of Law that exists beyond the contestedness that exists in the 
Rule of Law literature, I create a way to identify Rule of Law-like ideas that 
does not require either self-identification of the idea by the theorist as a Rule 
of Law idea, and does not require the acceptance of an objectively correct 
idea of the concept of the Rule of Law into which thinkers’ ideas can be 
placed. More, however, must be said about my definitional strategy. 
In debates regarding the Rule of Law’s conceptual content it could be 
seen as being generally agreed that the concept, whatever else it may be, re-
lates to the imposition of a normative force upon the exercise of power. But 
this—overly broad generalisation—whilst useful in certain circumstances,8 
                                               
8 In subsequent chapters, and notwithstanding the breadth and general charge of 
potential over-inclusiveness, I will use this idea, in conjunction with the elements, to 
assist in delineating the extent and nature of Rule of Law-like ideas. In this respect, 
and as allued to in Chapter 1, in the chapters in which I seek to identify Hobbes’s and 
Locke’s Rule of Law-like ideas, I adopt a working definition of the Rule of Law (to 
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could be seen as being practically useless for assessing whether a conception 
is Rule of Law-like. Yet, when the concept’s canons’ authors’ more specific 
definitions are considered, the contest regarding the concept’s content be-
comes intense. This results in various contests regarding both the concept’s 
application and operation and its content that relate to, inter alia, whether the 
Rule of Law should be applied in an international sphere,9 or whether the Rule 
                                               
identify Rule of Law-like ideas) that is made up of the elements that I identify in this 
chapter or that is made up of the normative force idea of the Rule of Law. In this re-
spect, I do not use the elements and normative force idea in conjunction with one 
another to identify the Rule of Law-like ideas. Instead, I use both ideas in parallel in 
an attempt to cast a wide-net over as many Rule of Law-like ideas as possible. In ef-
fect, I use two ways of viewing the idea of the Rule of Law in order to—hopefully—
avoid missing anything in the works of Hobbes and Locke that could—sensibly—be 
conceived of as being a Rule of Law-like idea (whilst avoiding a presentist view of the 
concept.)  
9 Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. LAW 331–362 
(2008); Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International 
Rule of Law?, 22 EUR. J. INT. LAW 315–343 (2011). For a discussion of the way in which 
the conceptual debate outlined here generally and the international concept of the 
Rule of Law interact, see Paul Burgess, Deriving the International Rule of Law: an Un-
necessary, Impractical and Unhelpful Exercise, (FORTHCOMING).  
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of Law should be construed in formal or substantive terms.10  (Formal terms 
relate to the processes of enacting a law;11 substantive terms relate to other 
considerations including, for example, democracy, liberty, and freedom.) 
There are also fine grained debates regarding the concept’s content as some 
suggest a Rule of Law conceptual core exists,12 others consider it is an essen-
tially contested13 or, at least, deeply contested concept.14 The formulation of 
                                               
10 Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Raw an Analytical 
Framework, PUBLIC LAW 467–487 (1997). See also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF 
LAW HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91 (2004).     
11 See, for example, Raz’s desiderata: Joseph Raz. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: 
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 214–219 (2 ed. 2009).   
12 See for example, Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, 
SINGAP. J. LEG. STUD. 232–247 (2012). See also, PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1 
(Lisa M Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014). Further examples regarding the cen-
trality of arbitrariness and the exercise of power can be seen in Krygier’s work: Martin 
Krygier, The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology and Sociology, in RELOCATING THE RULE 
OF LAW (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009); Martin Krygier, Tempering 
Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: BRIDGING IDEALISM AND REALISM 
(Maurice Adams, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, & Anne Meuwese eds., 2017).  
13 Waldron, supra note 3; Richard H. Fallon Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1–56, 7 (1997).  
14 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV. 
781, 781 (1989). 
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the idea itself is frequently illustrated at the most basic level in the various 
‘laundry lists’ of desiderata. Whilst this practice has become popular,15 a con-
test remains as to which list (and criticisms of the same) to adopt. The ideas 
and conceptions of the usual suspects of the Rule of Law referred to in both 
Chapters 1 and 2 often conflict and generally overlap. In these circumstances, 
to assess whether an account is part of the concept of the Rule of Law, one is 
required to either have recourse to each and every canonical conception; se-
lect aspects of one or various ideas; or, alternatively, create a novel Rule of 
Law conception. However, each method poses a problem. Creating a pur-
pose built Rule of Law conception has the advantage of precisely delimiting 
the boundaries of the conception, but this is labour intensive and impractical 
for most projects.16 Hybrid laundry lists of (relatively) uncontroversial desider-
ata avoid this impracticality,17 but they may be criticised for cherry-picking de-
siderata tailored to support a desired conclusion. For these reasons, and as 
                                               
15 A non-exclusive list of protagonists would include: RAZ, supra note 11 at 214–219; 
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–94 (1964); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and 
the Rule of Law, 43 GA. LAW REV. 1 (2008).  
16 This statement remains the case even in relation to a PhD project that is fundamen-
tally aimed at exploring the overarching ideas of conceptual change within the Rule 
of Law.  
17 See Chesterman, supra note 9 at 342–3; Waldron, supra note 9 at 316–7. See also 
Stéphane Beaulac, An Inquiry into the International Rule of Law, 14 2007 EUR. UNIV. 
INST. WORK. PAP. MWP 1–29, 8–11 (2007). 
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there is no agreement regarding the correctness of any single theory, none of 
these approaches facilitate a practical solution beyond immediate criticism. In 
other words, the contestedness means there is no practical and pragmatic 
way to immediately determine if an action contravenes the Rule of Law in all 
of its most widely cited conceptions or in terms that are not open to immedi-
ate criticism. By being conceived at a greater level of abstraction, the Rule of 
Law elements I identify exist beyond the Rule of Law desiderata and the con-
test regarding these specific aspects of the ideas. In taking this approach—
and by focusing on what is common in the goals, and not just the canonical 
conceptions’ desiderata or the similarities in those desiderata—the problems 
that stem from the concept’s contestedness can be avoided and a way to 
identify non-compliance becomes apparent. In turn, the category that is cre-
ated can be used to identify aspects of a thinker’s thought that can be 
deemed Rule of Law-like.  
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My investigation in this chapter is heuristic,18 with an intent to distil the 
ends inhering in canonical thinkers’ conceptions and not on the intrinsic func-
tion the concept of the Rule of Law (as a concept) fulfils.19 I do not claim to 
identify what the Rule of Law is; as, in consequence of the methodology I 
adopt, that would necessarily require the canonical conceptions to be accu-
rate statements of what the Rule of Law is. In this respect, whilst describing 
the Rule of Law in terms of its elements is not new,20 my approach is novel. 
Two elements can be distilled from the common needs that undergird the 
most frequently cited canonical conceptions of the Rule of Law. The elements 
can be defined in these terms: 
Comprehension:  That an individual be able to comprehend the 
nature, content and operation of the rules to 
which he or she is subject.  
Procedural Pellucidity:  The creation and application of any rules must be 
in terms capable of being clear and obvious to all 
concerned.  
                                               
18 My methodology has much in common Bedner’s: Bedner, supra note 7. However, 
the meaning of ‘element’ differs. Bedner’s meaning is in terms of Rule of Law 'basics' 
or 'principles'. 
19 It is in this respect that the methodology I adopt differs from previously suggested 
teleological ideas of the Rule of Law. See, for example, Krygier, supra note 12; Martin 
Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW PHILOS. 237 (1986).  
20 See, for example, Tamanaha, supra note 12 at 232; Bedner, supra note 7; CHRISTO-
PHER MAY, THE RULE OF LAW: THE COMMON SENSE OF GLOBAL POLITICS 33 (2014). 
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The elements provide a clear conceptual lens through which to assess 
whether an account is Rule of Law-like in a way that avoids the concept’s con-
testedness. The failure to satisfy either or both elements is sufficient—but not 
necessary—for Rule of Law-like-ness to not follow. As the failure to satisfy the 
elements is not a necessary condition of non-Rule of Law-like-ness, this failure 
is not the only way non-like-ness may result. The elements are, however, nec-
essary—but not sufficient—for Rule of Law-like ideas.21 By virtue of their neces-
sary location in any Rule of Law-like compliant scheme (regardless of the ca-
nonical conception preferred), the elements provide—in relation to the prob-
lems referred to above—one way to pragmatically and practically—and without 
immediate criticism—assess Rule of Law-like-ness. The project could be de-
scribed as theoretical Esperanto:22 bringing together the existing theoretical 
languages of the various canonical Rule of Law ideas and translating their 
meaning into a new—derived—theoretical language capable of achieving the 
same ends as the original language in terms that remain agreeable to all. This 
process does not outline the only instances of Rule of Law-like-ness—as other 
                                               
21 I thank the anonymous reviewer of my original article for highlighting the im-
portance of clearly stating the full necessary and sufficient sides of this equation.  
22 I am grateful to Dan Carr of the University of Edinburgh for suggesting a term that 
so clearly illustrates my conceptual processes.   
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factors may determine or impact these outcomes—it merely facilitates imme-
diate identification of Rule of Law-like-ness. This small step is useful in ad-
dressing the problems outlined above. This process also enables, with a level 
of conceptual clarity that surpasses the cherry-picking of desiderata or the 
mere adoption of a single conception of the Rule of Law, the identification 
and location of an idea as being Rule of Law-like. In considering aspects of a 
thinker’s thought in terms of its satisfaction of these two elements, it is possi-
ble to say—where the elements are present—that the idea is a Rule of Law-like 
idea. I use this theoretical exploration of the Rule of Law in later chapters to 
identify aspects of Hobbes’s and Locke’s thought as being Rule of Law-like. 
 To frame the solution posed in this chapter, I first, in the next part, de-
lineate the boundaries of the study and the nature of the contest relating to 
the Rule of Law before outlining my methodology in more specific terms. 
Then, in the next part, I evidence the distillation of the elements from the ca-
nonical conceptions. In the penultimate part, I pre-empt some criticisms of 
the proposed scheme before concluding my argument in the fifth and final 
part. My aim, by the conclusion of the chapter, is to have a robust, theoreti-
cally agnostic, way of identifying Rule of Law-like ideas. 
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THE RULE OF LAW 
There is no real consensus on the form of Rule of Law contest. The ever 
growing number of conceptions result in varying levels and forms of contest-
edness across the Rule of Law ideas. The variety of ideas has been put in 
these terms: ‘… the rule of law may not be a single concept at all; rather, it 
may be more accurate to understand the ideal of the rule of law as a set of 
ideals connected more by family resemblance than by a unifying conceptual 
structure.’23  What is, nevertheless, clear is that there appears to be an ongo-
ing contest between the various Rule of Law ideas; across both time and 
place.24 As will already be familiar from the exposition of Common Assump-
tion four in Chapter 2, there are frequent suggestions that the Rule of Law is 
deeply contested,25 or even essentially contested (in the Galliean sense).26 In 
this chapter, I do not seek to challenge the question of essential contestability 
and the Rule of Law, nor do I need to. The distillation of the elements derives 
from beyond the contestedness—whatever form it may take—to identify a com-
                                               
23 Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS 120–147, 121 (1994).   
24 Chesterman, supra note 9 at 340. 
25 Radin, supra note 14 at 781.   
26 Waldron, supra note 3; Fallon, supra note 13 at 7. See Chapter 2: Assumption 
Four: The Rule of Law is a Highly (or, even, essentially) Contested Concept. 
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monality in the canonical authors’ apparent fundamental need. On this ap-
proach, the conceptions themselves are not linked and the contest between 
them—at the level of the conceptions’ desiderata—is not, nor does it need to 
be, resolved.  
Formally Framing the Discussion 
I adopt only a formal consideration of the Rule of Law. In explaining 
why this approach is adopted, it is useful to consider F. A. Hayek’s definition 
of the Rule of Law: 
[S]tripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all 
its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—
rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and 
to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.27 
Hayek’s statement has been described as one of the ‘most powerful 
formulations of the ideal of the rule of law’.28 It is difficult to conceive of a 
more succinct yet general exposition. Yet, this—formal (or ‘thin’)—idea could 
be criticised for excluding any substantive ideas and, relatedly, for failing to 
                                               
27 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 112 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007). 
28 RAZ, supra note 11 at 210.   
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prevent the enactment of evil laws. This arises in relation to the Hart-Fuller de-
bate and, in particular, when interpretations of Fuller’s view—that immoral 
laws should not have legal force29—are considered. However, the use of a for-
mal approach to Rule of Law consideration is not without merit30 as it avoids 
both the contamination of an examination by substantive considerations31  
and the muddying of conclusions by the inclusion of additional factors under 
the Rule of Law umbrella term (as occurs in substantive conceptions).32  Ac-
cordingly, in circumstances where the goal is to clearly identify the elements 
of the Rule of Law, it makes sense to start from a thin base. Further, as formal 
ideas of the concept provide a foundation for any substantive conception and 
as the elements I propose are necessary (but not sufficient) components of 
the formal conception, should the elements not be satisfied in its formal con-
ception, they could not be satisfied in or support any substantive conception. 
Putting this another way that relates to the way the idea will be used in the 
                                               
29 Waldron, supra note 15 at 18.   
30 Charles Sampford, Reconceiving The Rule of Law for a Globalizing World, in GLOB-
ALISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 9–31, 19 (Spencer Zifcak ed., 2005).   
31 See Chesterman, supra note 9 at 360. 
32 See Craig, supra note 10 at 469. (Summarising the argument made by RAZ, supra 
note 11.) In relation to the exclusion of democracy and human rights from Rule of 
Law ideas, see Tamanaha, supra note 12 at 233–236.    
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wider argument, the inability to identify the elements within a conception re-
sults in an inability to classify that conception as a Rule of Law-like idea re-
gardless of whether the target-conception is conceived in formal or substan-
tive terms. For these reasons, a formal conception is enough to address the 
problem—that, as a result of the contestedness of the concept, there is no 
practical way to assess when an idea may be a Rule of Law-like idea—raised in 
this chapter and, further, as is required for the wider argument in the thesis.  
Rule of Law Elements  
In this section, I suggest it is possible to infer from a canonical author’s 
choice of desiderata, and the author’s situation more broadly, the fundamen-
tal need that the Rule of Law theory was aimed at addressing. I describe the 
inference necessary to make the move from canonical Rule of Law laundry 
lists of desiderata to the elements of Comprehension and Procedural Pellu-
cidity. 
Tool analogies are popular in the Rule of Law debate (and in this the-
sis.33) After distinguishing one, I will use two to illustrate my point. Joseph Raz, 
                                               
33 In this respect, and in addition to this chapter, see Chapter 1. 
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famously in the Rule of Law context, suggests a knife is only a knife if it has 
some ability to perform its necessary function: for a knife, an ability to cut.34 
Raz considers the various virtues that may exist in relation to the satisfaction of 
a particular end. As the present enquiry considers there may be a number of 
potential ends, Raz’s analogy can only precisely relate if an idea is read into 
his proposition that there could be a number of other tools able to achieve 
the same ends: for Raz, cutting. However, in arguing that Margaret Radin’s 
portrayal of Fuller’s work as an instrumental conception of the Rule of Law 
may be mistaken, Jeremy Waldron provides a tool related analogy that does 
assist. As it is referred to throughout this chapter it is worth extracting in full: 
If one wanted to cut down a large tree with an axe, one would have 
to be sure that the axe was heavy and the head rigid.  Heaviness and 
rigidity in an axe are desiderata for doing things with axes, particu-
larly the things that axes are normally used to do. It does not follow, 
however, that the heaviness and rigidity of one’s tools are general 
desiderata for cutting down trees. For one might opt to use a two-
handed saw—and then maybe lightness and flexibility would be one’s 
instrumental virtues.  If the two-handed saw is a better tool than the 
                                               
34 RAZ, supra note 11 at 225–226.   
 
Chapter 3: Beyond Contestedness 
 119 
axe for chopping down some tree… then the fact that certain fea-
tures are desiderata in a good axe does not amount to a general in-
strumental justification for those features.35 
 Waldron suggests that ends alone do not justify Rule of Law theories 
and desiderata alone cannot provide definitive and general justification for 
the features. Two questions posed by Waldron reflect this: which tool is most 
efficacious for the goal in mind? and, given the selection of a certain kind of 
tool, what attributes of that tool best serve the goal?36 These questions do not 
preclude the inquiry that I propose: that the purpose and intent behind the 
choice of tool can be inferred from the tool’s attributes and the context of the 
situation more generally. Waldron’s questions illustrate the structure of any 
theorist’s formulation of a Rule of Law theory would differ based on that theo-
rist’s appreciation of the problem. This idea, of course, reflects the solution 
proposed to the problem that was explored in Chapter 2; I will return to the 
                                               
35 Jeremy Waldron, Why Law - Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?, 13 LAW PHILOS. 259–
284, 261–262 (1994). 
36 Id. at 262. See also RAZ, supra note 11 at 225–226.   
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problem / solution idea at several points throughout the thesis.37 That appre-
ciation would, in turn, impact the selection of the theory scheme (as a tool) 
and the associated Rule of Law desiderata (as the tool’s instrumental virtues).   
It would follow, where the Rule of Law is contested and a variety of laundry 
lists of desiderata exist, without knowing any theorist’s precise conception of 
the problem, a direct comparison (of tools or tools’ instrumental values) 
would render the examination subject to the same problem identified by Wal-
dron. In effect, comparing an axe with a saw, or an axe with an axe, or the in-
dividual characteristics of both axes and saws in circumstances where the in-
dividual theorist’s goal has not been identified in toto. This reflects, in a basic 
sense, the problems in the Rule of Law’s contestedness. These problems can, 
however, be avoided by focusing on what is common in the goals—and not 
just the desiderata or similarities in the desiderata—as each theorist’s solution 
to a particular problem. Together, the abstraction and commonality place any 
                                               
37 My perspective agrees with Waldron’s suggestion that the Rule of Law is a ‘solu-
tion-concept’: Waldron, supra note 3 at 158. Chapter 2 has already introduced the 
idea of a problem / solution based methodology. I expand and apply it to both 
Hobbes and Locke, in the next two chapters.  
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distilled element beyond the concept’s contestedness. By taking this ap-
proach, the problems can be avoided.   
To say something more about my rationale, expanding the metaphor is 
useful. Theodore Levitt characterises customers’ attendance at a hardware 
store seeking to purchase a drill bit in these terms: ‘People don’t want to buy 
a quarter-inch drill. They want a quarter-inch hole’.38 This sentiment expresses 
a customer’s need behind the need. I will call this the Fundamental Need. 
Here I use ‘fundamental’ as relating to a necessary base or a core or, alterna-
tively, relating to central importance.39 The use of the definitive ‘the Funda-
mental Need’ needs explanation. It is used despite, as will become apparent 
below, the potential to abstract further.40 It could be argued that abandoning 
‘Fundamental’ or removing the definitive ‘the’ may be more appropriate. This 
would, however, increase ambiguity: it would not be clear which need is be-
ing referred to. Accordingly, for clarity, and whilst the potential for further ab-
straction is recognised, I use ‘the Fundamental Need’ or ‘Fundamental Need’ 
to refer to that which is identifiable as the level of abstracted need capable of 
                                               
38 Clayton M. Christensen, Scott Cook & Taddy Hall, Marketing Malpractice: The 
Cause and the Cure, 83 HARV. BUS. REV. 74–83, 76 (2005).    
39 See, Definition of “fundamental,” OXFORD DICTIONARIES | ENGLISH, https://en.ox-
forddictionaries.com/definition/fundamental (last visited Jul 20, 2018).   
40 See the penultimate part of this chapter: Why not abstract further? 
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being held in common across conceptions. This represents, in effect, the 
point at which maximum practical and pragmatic benefit is obtained. 
Whilst Levitt’s business / marketing concept is far removed from legal 
theory, it can be directly applied to the task at hand. Statements of common-
ality in canonical desiderata merely express a potential solution to an initial 
need (but not the Fundamental Need). They reflect a way to solve a problem 
and not an expression of the problem itself. This will, therefore, not provide a 
useful comparison as the desiderata alone will amount to no more than the 
identification of a commonality of functional or instrumental approach or pro-
cess. Bedner’s suggestion that it will be impossible to find a definition pleas-
ing to all as any common ground for the ideas of the Rule of Law is thin41 is 
undoubtedly true unless a mere aesthetic of commonality is sought; for exam-
ple, through basic similarities like the preponderance of calls for ‘predictabil-
ity’. However, exposing a common background purpose as a Fundamental 
Need would be meaningful. This would allow superficially similar surface ex-
pressions to be disambiguated and different surface expressions could be 
                                               
41 Bedner, supra note 7 at 53.   
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separately aggregated.42 Identification of a common Fundamental Need in 
canonical Rule of Law conceptions would represent an element—common to 
all ideas—of the Rule of Law that exists beyond the concept’s contestation.  
The common elements—that reflect the Fundamental Need—can be 
identified through the inference of intent or purpose: the common sharpness 
of both an axe and saw, when combined with the general nature and possible 
applications of those tools, suggests the goal is cutting; or, more specifically, 
cutting wood. From two individuals’ selection of these two different tools, an 
open inference is that they both wish to cut wood. This is the—commonly 
held—Fundamental Need (as expressed through their individual tool selec-
tion). Rule of Law elements can be identified in the same way. By considering 
a canonical author’s formulation of a Rule of Law conception, the end to 
which the conception is directed can be inferred. This represents that 
thinker’s Fundamental Need. Commonality across the Fundamental Needs of 
each canonical author provides the basis for the identification of the elements 
                                               
42 Further to this point, the disambiguation of various Rule of Law desiderata and 
conceptions’ characteristics reflects a function of the application of the problem / so-
lution methodology in the next two chapters. The disambiguation of common terms, 
thus, can be seen to be an essential part of both identifying the nature of concep-
tions of the Rule of Law as well as the identification of conceptions of the Rule of Law 
themselves. 
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of the Rule of Law. As already noted, I do not intend to suggest that the Fun-
damental Need represents the most basic, or absolute, need that can be in-
ferred from the conceptions contained in the Rule of Law canons. Cutting 
wood is not the only need that may be inferred from the tool’s selection; a 
more abstract need would be to make firewood or to generate heat (from 
burning the cut wood). In taking this further abstracted step any commonality 
of purpose may, however, be lost.43 With commonality as the key ingredient 
in the Fundamental Need, the Rule of Law elements only—and specifically—re-
flect the commonly held Fundamental Need. By virtue of the elements being 
derived in this way, the elements—as a reflection of the Fundamental Need—
are necessary for Rule of Law-like-ness across all Rule of Law canonical con-
ceptions. 
In taking a small step back, a basic question remains.  How can we 
identify the Fundamental Need? When taken with theorists’ stated goals, Rule 
of Law desiderata will inform the Fundamental Need. Rule of Law desiderata 
are useful as signposts of the theorists’ intent; eschewing the relevance of 
these would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater as they are an em-
                                               
43 I consider the question of additional abstraction in Why not Abstract Further?, be-
low. 
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bodiment of the theorists’ solution to a problem and are, therefore, sugges-
tive of the ultimate goal: the selection of an axe or saw (that each have sharp-
ness as a characteristic) rather than a hammer (with dullness as a characteris-
tic) suggests the goal is cutting rather than striking. However, it is only in con-
sidering a tool’s characteristics in conjunction with the general nature of its 
circumstantial uses that the purpose—of cutting wood in this example—can be 
inferred. Accordingly, holistic consideration of canonical theories and desid-
erata will be apposite.  
To avoid simply re-stating the broad rationale for the existence of the 
Rule of Law, and to provide some analytical benefit, the Fundamental Need 
must be a more specific ideal than the mere avoidance of arbitrary power or 
the limitation of government interference. Whilst I argue the two elements 
identified in the following part express the Fundamental Need, I do not sug-
gest this is the only way in which this may be conceived; again, I am not sug-
gesting the only purpose to be inferred from an axe or tool’s sharpness is cut-
ting wood. Whilst I will return to this point later, it suffices to say simply that 
cutting wood is an inference that can be made and, crucially, it is one that is 
common across the considered uses. For the validity of my argument, any fur-
ther claim to exclusivity of purpose is unnecessary. 
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DISTILLING THE ELEMENTS  
In this part, I survey canonical conceptions of the Rule of Law to identify 
the elements defined in the opening pages of this chapter: Comprehension 
and Procedural Pellucidity. As simply listing the canonical Rule of Law con-
ceptions in attempting to distil the elements would be uninteresting and un-
helpful, I propose each element and support that element’s existence 
through recourse to any relevant canonical conceptions. 
Comprehension as an Element of the Rule of Law  
Comprehension44 as an element of the Rule of Law requires that an in-
dividual be able to comprehend the nature, content, and operation of the 
rules to which he or she is subject. Two aspects are encompassed in this for-
mulation: that an individual must, first, receive and, second, process rules as 
part of an endeavour shared with another individual or entity. This reflects the 
two components of the dictionary definition: first, the ability to understand 
                                               
44 Hereinafter ‘Comprehension’ (with a capital ‘C’) refers to the element of the Rule of 
Law.   
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something45 or the faculty of grasping with the mind and the capacity to un-
derstand fully;46 and, second, the capability of including or inclusion.47  
General communication can be used to evidence the way in which 
Comprehension is an element of the Rule of Law. The necessity of compre-
hension (in communication generally) has an obvious synonymy with canoni-
cal conceptions of the Rule of Law and their associated Rule of Law desider-
ata. Communicating through writing and speech includes fundamental pre-
requisites to understanding and, therefore, comprehension. For example, 
parties must adhere to the same rules. This includes the adoption and ac-
ceptance of common meanings of words and phrases within the chosen lan-
guage and the mutual agreement to communicate in the same language (or 
at least in a way that both parties know can be understood by the other). Fur-
thermore, parties must know in advance that each will continue to conform to 
these rules. In effect, there must be a practical ability to understand the form 
of the communication. There will not, for example, be actual communication 
                                               
45 Definition of “Comprehension,” OXFORD DICTIONARIES | ENGLISH, https://en.ox-
forddictionaries.com/definition/comprehension (last visited Jul 20, 2018).  
46 Definition of “Comprehension,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/comprehension (last visited Jul 20, 2018).   
47 Id.; Definition of “Comprehension”, supra note 45.     
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in the broad sense, never mind comprehension, on the expression of a senti-
ment out of the earshot of the other party or if it follows a structure that makes 
no grammatical sense. These final categories are vital, as adherence to all of 
the other requirements would not, otherwise, facilitate comprehension. This 
suggests comprehension generally requires more than the exchange of prop-
ositions and the processing of an external input. It requires that there be a 
level of understanding or appreciation of what and how information is being, 
and will be, communicated. It also requires internal processing of a proposi-
tion through adherence to a set of commonly known and understood norms 
of conduct that assist the internal act of processing, and the formation and 
structuring of the appropriate outputs.   
Comprehension, as a Rule of Law element, reflects these internal and 
external aspects. Both must be satisfied to facilitate Comprehension. The in-
ternal aspect—which I outline in more detail shortly—relates to an individual’s 
ability to understand the nature, content, and operation of the rules to which 
he or she is subject. The external aspect relates to the way in which the party 
receives or becomes aware of various norms. These can be simply stated by 
listing some of the obvious expressions of relevant Rule of Law conceptions’ 
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desiderata that include calls for clarity,48 consistency or congruence,49 free-
dom from contradiction,50 or communication/promulgation.51 These relate to 
facets of norm formation external to an individual’s control; in other words, 
they relate to the creation and packaging of a norm before it is received by 
the individual.  
Comprehension as the Fundamental Need behind these requirements 
provides a realistic expression of the purpose common in each of these ca-
nonical statements. A party’s (internal) awareness of rules facilitates Compre-
hension of both the existence and application of the rule as well as the rule’s 
relevance to the party. The fact that there must be rules and they must be 
general appears to be the least controversial of all Rule of Law desiderata. 
                                               
48 RAZ, supra note 11 at 214–5; FULLER, supra note 15 at 63.   
49 FULLER, supra note 15 at 81. 
50 Id. at 65.  
51 Regarding the requirement that rules be announced beforehand: Id. at 49.; HAYEK, 
supra note 27 at 112. Regarding the requirement that an individual have an aware-
ness of the laws of the state in order to modify one’s action: FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 210 (1960); Solum, supra note 23 at 122; NOEL MAL-
COLM, THOMAS HOBBES: LEVIATHAN 26 (2012).   
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Fuller includes this as his first requirement;52 it is also a requisite in formula-
tions by and Raz,53 Solum,54 and Hayek.55 A requirement for rules by way of 
written, albeit potentially changeable, laws expressed in general terms has 
also been stated as being fundamental to the classical conceptions of the 
Rule of Law.56 For Radin, this requirement formed the first of two basic princi-
ples of the Rule of Law.57 Dicey’s Rule of Law also reflects the requirement that 
there be rules and that they be in general terms applicable to all.58 Whilst 
both striking and interesting, mere similarity of expression achieves and re-
veals little; this represents only the commonality of desiderata referred to in 
the previous part. Comprehension—as a requirement that an individual be 
able to comprehend the nature, content, and operation of the rules to which 
he or she is subject—is also evidenced across these ideas related to generality 
                                               
52 As the principle of ‘Generality’, see FULLER, supra note 15 at 46.    
53 RAZ, supra note 11 at 213 and 216. 
54 Solum, supra note 23 at 122.  
55 HAYEK, supra note 27. See also HAYEK, supra note 51 at 218–219. 
56 For the often cited statements of Aristotle, see ARISTOTLE, T. SINCLAIR & TREVOR J. 
SAUNDERS, THE POLITICS 1285b33, 1287a23 (1981).  
57 Radin, supra note 14 at 785. 
58 A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202–203 
(10 ed. 1979).   
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as individuals must understand that rules properly made and expressed in 
general terms will undoubtedly apply to him or her.59   
Predictability, stability and constancy are also frequently included 
within canonical Rule of Law formulations.60 When considered in prima facie 
terms they simply represent one small bundle of virtues that, notwithstanding 
their frequent invocation, relate to one way of achieving a goal in a particular 
Rule of Law theory; an idea that is akin to the sharpness of a saw or heaviness 
of an axe. The reflection of the Fundamental Need in these desiderata be-
comes apparent when we conceive the desiderata as requiring an individual 
to know the rules he or she is subject to in advance, and to expect they will re-
                                               
59 See Jeremy Waldron, Principles of Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE 
ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 15–32, 21 (Richard W. Bauman & 
Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).    
60 See for example, ARISTOTLE, SINCLAIR, AND SAUNDERS, supra note 56; RAZ, supra note 
11 at 215; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 350–352 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Student ed. 1988); FULLER, supra note 15 at 79; HAYEK, supra note 27 at 114; HAYEK, 
supra note 51 at 210. However, Hayek’s views in relation to the operation, but not 
the necessity, of predictability later changed: FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLA-
TION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 115–8 (1979).   
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main in force in the form in which they currently exist. Both relate to the par-
ties’ background understanding and beliefs. In this way, these desiderata are 
of similar effect to the common desideratum that stipulates the necessity for 
prospective laws and rules.61 These desiderata are individually and collec-
tively aimed at ensuring parties are put in a position to know, understand and 
trust the continued operation of the rules and are able to predict, with some 
degree of certainty and confidence, the rules that will result in the imposition 
of sanctions. Raz puts it this way: 
The violation of the rule of law can take two forms. It may lead to 
uncertainty or it may lead to frustrated and disappointed expec-
tations. It leads to the first when the law does not enable people 
to foresee future developments or to form definite expecta-
tions…62 
The internal processing of information by (and the external transmis-
sion to) a party are represented by the need described by Radin and Fuller in 
relation to knowable desiderata. For Radin, the requirement of ‘knowability’ 
                                               
61 See for example, FULLER, supra note 15 at 51; RAZ, supra note 11 at 214; HAYEK, su-
pra note 27 at 112; LOCKE, supra note 60 at 353; HAYEK, supra note 51 at 210.   
62 RAZ, supra note 11 at 222.  
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included requirements that rules be public, congruent, non-contradictory, 
clear, and relatively stable.63 Fuller too prefaces various aspects of his Rule of 
Law conception with a necessary requirement for knowledge:   
This lies in a quality shared by both, namely, that they act by known 
rule. The internal morality of the law demands that there be rules, 
that they be made known, and that they be observed in practice by 
those charged with their administration. These demands may seem 
ethically neutral so far as the external aims of law are concerned. 
Yet, just as law is a precondition for good law, so acting by known 
rule is a precondition for any meaningful appraisal of the justice of 
law. "A lawless unlimited power" expressing itself solely in unpre-
dictable and patternless interventions in human affairs could be 
said to be unjust only in the sense that it does not act by known 
rule.64    
Radin also considers the ‘perform-ability’ of desiderata as being in a 
separate, albeit related, category to know-ability.65 This approach is not incor-
porated—save by implication—into the concept of Comprehension. Explicit in-
clusion of any impossibility desideratum within Comprehension is not re-
quired. The idea that a law or rule is required to be capable of performance 
                                               
63 Radin, supra note 14 at 786.   
64 FULLER, supra note 15 at 157–8 (emphasis added).  
65 Radin, supra note 14 at 786.   
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could be associated with a party’s Comprehension only in terms where the 
party is capable of compliance in any event: a law that requires the impossi-
ble would be no law.66 In these terms, Comprehension (in broad terms) also 
incorporates—in addition to the purposive intent included in the other desid-
erata outlined above—the requirement that a law must be performable or, at 
least, not impossible.   
Procedural Pellucidity as an Element of the Rule of Law  
The second Rule of Law element—Procedural Pellucidity—requires the 
creation and application of any rules to be in terms capable of being clear 
and obvious to all concerned. In this regard, the process must be transparent 
and clear, affected in a careful and determined way following a process of 
evaluation, and the resulting norms and decisions must be expressed clearly 
by the decision maker (as the norm creator or applier). As Jeremy Waldron 
has recently been the most outspoken and visible advocate for the inclusion 
of procedural aspects into the Rule of Law, and as his statements closely re-
late to Procedural Pellucidity, I explore his work in some detail in this section.   
                                               
66 FULLER, supra note 15 at 70.  
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I begin, however, with some boundary setting. In reflecting the Funda-
mental Need behind the various canonical conceptions of the Rule of Law, 
Procedural Pellucidity has two prongs. Any decision or decision-maker must 
clearly and apparently demonstrate both. These prongs require that, first, a 
decision-maker consider various issues and, second, there be clear communi-
cation of the resultant decision. Procedural Pellucidity may apply to any rule-
maker or decision-maker (whether a judge, legislator, or any other power 
wielding decision-making agent of the government).67 A further instance of 
boundary setting is also required. The definition of Procedural Pellucidity, 
suggests an overlap between the second prong of Procedural Pellucidity—
that there be clear communication of a decision—and the aspect of Compre-
hension that requires an individual to be able to comprehend the nature, con-
tent, and operation of the rules. Although the overlap is not fatal—or even 
problematic in the terms of this assessment or the formulation of the ele-
mental scheme generally—in the hope that the existence of Procedural Pellu-
cidity can initially be considered on its own merits, I defer discussion of the 
overlap until the next part.    
                                               
67 This is not to rule out the potential operation of the Rule of Law in private law. See 
PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 12 at 1. 
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The first prong—that a decision-maker consider various issues—is appar-
ent across canonical conceptions. Whilst procedural values have recently 
gained wide acceptance following the inclusion—either directly or by implica-
tion—of procedural components in conceptions by, inter alia, Lon Fuller, Jo-
seph Raz, and Jeremy Waldron,68 the concept is not new. Aristotle, by way of 
decrying the making of hasty and emotion-fuelled decisions, refers to the re-
quirement for the inclusion of some form of (what would now be deemed) 
legislative due process.69 Whilst care should be taken in interpreting Aristo-
tle’s comments in the modern Western tradition, it is apparent there is some 
call for a level of ‘cool headedness’ and the avoidance of impassioned deci-
sion making. Dicey famously propounded a similar due process requirement 
through the sentiment that ‘no man is punishable or can lawfully be made to 
suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the 
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land’.70 Whilst this 
view has not escaped criticism,71 and although his insistence on the courts 
                                               
68 See n 77 below and accompanying text. See also, RAZ, supra note 11 at 214–217.    
69 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1 ch 1 (W. Rhys Roberts tran., 2004).  
70 DICEY, supra note 58 at 188.   
71 See for example, KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY IN-
QUIRY. 35 (1969). 
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alone as an enforcement mechanism may have been short-sighted, it is ap-
parent the conception is formal72 and the broad aim is clearly procedural. 
Ronald Cass concludes that  ‘[a]dherence to the rule of law slows down 
changes in the system, increases the foreseeability of change, makes change 
less the product of one individual’s will than of the more regularized and intri-
cate interweaving of different wills and priorities.’73 Cass Sunstein also imports 
a similar function together with requirements for: the separation of law-mak-
ing and adjudicative processes and minimal due process requirements; hear-
ing rights and availability of review by independent adjudicative officials; a 
separation between law-making and law-implementation; and the prevention 
of rapid changes in laws’ content.74 Raz’s laundry list of desiderata echoes this 
common procedural function by requiring that the making of laws be guided 
by clear and transparent rules and that natural justice is to be observed within 
                                               
72 Craig, supra note 10 at 470. (Here, ‘formal’ is used in a sense opposite to substan-
tial and not in the more limited sense as relating solely to the way in which a law is 
made.) 
73 Ronald A. Cass, Property Rights Systems and the Rule of Law, in THE ELGAR COMPAN-
ION TO THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS , 226 (Enrico Colombatto ed., 2004). 
74 Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (Program in Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 27) 1–72, 15–6 (1994).  
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courts that are easily accessible.75 Waldron, following a consideration of the 
Diceyean approach, concludes that of ‘[t]he legislature, the judiciary, and the 
executive--each must have its separate say before power impacts on the indi-
vidual.’76 He also identifies procedural elements in the work of Raz and Dicey 
and a procedural component to the work of E. P. Thompson.77 Fuller’s con-
ception, Waldron suggests, ‘has to do with legislative form, not judicial proce-
dure…’78 and, augmentation of Fuller’s desiderata with a further extensive set 
of procedural requirements is necessary else we ‘radically sell short the idea 
of the Rule of Law’.79  
Waldron also advocates procedural ideas—legislative and judicial—in 
his own work. In relation to legislative law making, he suggests a list of proce-
dural principles of legislation that require, inter alia, disagreement must be al-
lowed, a forum must give voice and general consideration to issues raised, 
deliberation and debate be engaged in, and due care must be taken.80 The 
                                               
75 RAZ, supra note 11 at 214–217. 
76 Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, BOSTON COLL. LAW 
REV. 433, 459 (2013).    
77 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in GETTING TO 
THE RULE OF LAW 3–31, 10–11 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011).   
78 Id. at 9.    
79 Id. at 6–7.  
80 Waldron, supra note 59 at 18.   
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distinction here appears to be one between formal in a narrow sense (relating 
only to the rules regarding making a law) and the process of applying the law; 
Waldron accords procedure only the narrow interpretation. (Although proce-
dural is conceived of in a slightly broader context in the present investigation, 
there seems to be little that ultimately turns on this differentiation.) One read-
ing of Waldron’s desiderata could be restricted to the operation of a hearing 
before some form of tribunal. On this—more restrictive—interpretation, the de-
siderata largely reflect a list of due process requirements. This appears to be 
conceded in a later piece where he states ‘[t]he point is that there is very little 
about due process or courtroom procedure in Fuller’s account of law’s inter-
nal morality…’81 The other desiderata suggested by Waldron, also largely re-
late to the narrowly defined requirements of due process.82 In this respect, it 
is no surprise that Waldron’s conception of procedure is narrower than that 
representing the Fundamental Need encompassed by Procedural Pellucidity. 
Waldron has also suggested a wider interpretation. It is not enough, he says, 
                                               
81 Waldron, supra note 77 at 8.  
82 Id. at 6. (These include: rights to a hearing before a trained judicial officer; to legal 
representation; to present evidence and arguments; to confront witnesses; and, to 
be present at critical stages of the proceeding.)    
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to simply state ‘plaintiff wins’, as satisfaction of the Rule of Law may require ar-
ticulation of exactly why that party has won; and this could extend to the exist-
ence of a right to reasons for a decision.83 These aspects are reflected in Pro-
cedural Pellucidity as satisfaction requires there to be clear communication of 
reasons for any decision and that there must be consideration of the argu-
ments presented. Where the idea of procedure is being applied to the wider 
process of law making—relating to the contact of all wings of the government 
referred to by both Dicey and Waldron84—it is not anticipated that the mean-
ing and description of ‘procedural’ will be stretching the concept too far. 
Each of these ideas of the Rule of Law suggest a commonality of purpose that 
requires there to be careful, and obvious, consideration of decisions during 
decision-making or in affecting rules. These are reflected in the first prong of 
Procedural Pellucidity.   
The second aspect—that there be communication of any decision—can 
be very briefly stated. This is both explicitly part of the various procedural 
conceptions already noted as well as a necessary implication in circumstances 
                                               
83 Id. at 6.; Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: a Layered Approach, 
111 MICH. LAW REV. 1, 17 (2011). 
84 See n 70 and 76 above. 
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where, as has already been demonstrated, there is a frequently stated re-
quirement for the Rule of Law to be promulgated.85    
As will be apparent from the exploration of these procedural ideas of 
the Rule of Law, there is a requirement that there be clarity in both processes 
of evaluation and determination and in the expression of those norms. This 
brief review suggests Procedural Pellucidity as a reflection of the Fundamen-
tal Need—that the creation and application of any rules must be in terms ca-
pable of being clear and obvious to all concerned—is held in common 
across and can be inferred from the various canonical conceptions of the Rule 
of Law. 
ELEMENTS OF THE RULE OF LAW: SUMMARY AND OBJECTIONS   
Through their ready identification within—or at least behind—the canon-
ical conceptions referred to above, Comprehension and Procedural Pellucid-
ity are elements of the Rule of Law that—given the theoretically agnostic pro-
cess of distillation and their reflection of the Fundamental Need expressed in 
canonical conceptions—provide a way to identify Rule of Law-like ideas re-
gardless of the canonical conception preferred. In addition, and as outlined 
                                               
85 See n 51 above and associated text. 
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below, they can also provide a way to identify Rule of Law-like ideas in a way 
that avoids many of the criticisms associated with various other methodolo-
gies. Where Comprehension and Procedural Pellucidity (respectively) require 
an individual to be able to comprehend the nature, content, and operation of 
the rules to which he or she is subject ,and require the creation and applica-
tion of any rules to be in terms capable of being clear and obvious to all con-
cerned, it is apparent that both processes and outcome are critical to Rule of 
Law-like-ness. By way of a quick ‘sense check’, this does not immediately con-
tradict popular or intuitive ideas of what the Rule of Law is. In this respect, the 
elements provide a pragmatic solution to the problems highlighted at the 
start of this chapter. They enable identification of whether a thinker’s theory is 
capable of being considered as Rule of Law-like without having recourse to 
each conception individually, having to select a hybrid model, or having to 
formulate a novel Rule of Law conception. Furthermore, given the way in 
which the elements have been identified—as a reflection of the commonly 
held Fundamental Need across canonical conceptions—they exist beyond the 
concept’s current state of contestedness. Before I illustrate exactly how these 
derived elements can be used in the context of this thesis, I attempt to pre-
empt some objections, by posing and briefly answering five questions.   
 
Chapter 3: Beyond Contestedness 
 143 
Can the Elements Unify the Conceptions / Remedy the Contestedness?  
Given the contestedness of the Rule of Law—and if it is correct that the 
Rule of Law is, as is widely accepted to be the case, an essentially contested 
concept—wouldn’t the existence of any element (as defined herein) be a mis-
nomer and an irrelevance as there can be no such unifying principle between 
conceptions?86 Should it be asserted that Comprehension and Procedural 
Pellucidity operate as a direct bridge between various conceptions this objec-
tion could not be denied. However, that is not the claim. Should that be the 
claim, it would be like stating an axe is actually a saw. Or, more specifically, 
like stating that an axe can be conceived of as being conceptually and funda-
mentally a saw simply by virtue of the purpose to which the tool is being put. 
Care has been taken to avoid this position. The elements proposed reflect a 
common Fundamental Need. This need does not bridge between concep-
tions—or even the contest between them—but, instead, looks to the purposive 
intent behind the conceptions. The connection is one of purpose alone; as 
                                               
86 This question could be considered as making a straw man out of Gallie’s idea of 
essential contestability. I do not take issue with that suggestion. However, I retain the 
question as an objection as it usefully highlights the operation of the elemental 
scheme as the objection could also be raised absent essential contestability.  
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the purpose is the Fundamental Need that the canonical author seeks to ad-
dress by providing his / her Rule of Law conception as a solution to a prob-
lem. In terms of the axe / saw analogy, these are tools useful in the act of cut-
ting down a tree. This is not to suggest these are the sole uses for either tool 
or that they are the only tool for the job; after all, a saw can also be used for 
cutting timber or as a musical instrument, and an axe can be utilised as a 
weapon of war or be used—perhaps, by either a fire fighter or Jack Nichol-
son’s character in the Shining—to gain access to a locked room. For these rea-
sons, identification of the Fundamental Need does not suggest the elements 
provide a unifying theory of the Rule of Law. In fact, the suggestion is pre-
cisely that the elements—by simply indicating commonality of purpose—avoid 
having to determine or state these things. Further, as the elements exist at a 
state of abstraction removed from the plane on which the contest currently 
takes place, the contest—whether properly characterised as being essentially 
contested or not—cannot directly be solved through the proposed methodol-
ogy. As already noted, I aim only to solve the problems outlined at the start of 
this chapter by going beyond the contest itself.  
 
 
Chapter 3: Beyond Contestedness 
 145 
Does the Overlap Between the Elements Result in a Problem?  
The cohabitation of the same conceptual terrain by the two elements 
does not represent a conflict in the true sense of the word, as the elements’ 
operation is not exclusive. As alluded to already, both processes and out-
comes are crucial to Rule of Law-like status. The two elements exist on a sin-
gle spectrum flowing between processes and outcomes. Procedural Pellucid-
ity is exclusively situated at the processes end of the spectrum as a conse-
quence of its role in the making of norms; Comprehension exclusively occu-
pies the outcomes end of the spectrum as a result of its relation to the internal 
processing of information (provided by the norms). In the middle, is the ‘over-
lap’ where there is a dual concern between the elements regarding the ex-
pression or communication of norms. This ‘overlap’, however, does not result 
in a mixing of the elements’ function. The two elements relate to different 
sources: Procedural Pellucidity to norm-makers and appliers; and Compre-
hension to norm-followers. It is due to this exclusivity of source application 
that the two elements cannot, and should not, be collapsed together.   
What would it mean if an action facilitates Comprehension but not Pro-
cedural Pellucidity (or vice versa)? The answer is deceptively straightforward: 
non-satisfaction of either one of the elements means Rule of Law-like status 
does not follow and neither does the identification of an idea as being a Rule 
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of Law-like idea. This result obtains as both elements are necessary (but not 
sufficient) elements of the Rule of Law conceptions. Although a small area of 
‘overlap’ may exist, neither element covers the entire field. An action that sup-
ports only one element would leave a substantial necessary area of the Rule 
of Law unsatisfied. It is only together that the elements facilitate Rule of Law-
like ideas; non-satisfaction of either element is sufficient to result in Rule of 
Law non-likeness; the absence of either precludes an idea being conceived 
as a Rule of Law-like idea.   
Why not Abstract Further? 
Further abstraction is, of course, possible. However, in considering two 
instances of further abstraction, abstracting beyond the Fundamental Need 
results in a loss of pragmatic benefits or practical application of the elemental 
scheme. In other words, altering the level of abstraction—in either direction 
from the Fundamental Need—can result in a less desirable solution to the 
problems outlined at the start of this chapter. In this respect, the line in the 
sand drawn by the elements I propose represents an attempt to achieve the 
maximum pragmatic benefit.  
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The first instance of further abstraction beyond the Fundamental Need 
has already been mentioned above. This would—in tool related terms—sug-
gest the purpose to be inferred from the use of an axe is firewood or heat, 
and not merely cutting down a tree. To accurately abstract to each canonical 
author’s specific goal would require a complete appreciation of the precise 
intentions and motivations resulting in the formulation of the Rule of Law con-
ception. Even if an exhaustive study of each canonical author were under-
taken, the result would remain speculative. The less abstract the inference—
and the closer to the conception communicated in the canons—the less spec-
ulation is required. In addition, as each author’s ultimate aim may have dif-
fered slightly as a result of each conceiving of the problem in slightly different 
terms, it seems likely that a divergence in those goals would occur when fur-
ther abstraction is considered. Accordingly, consideration of the more ab-
stract goal makes convergence and commonality of purpose less likely to be 
achieved or identified. For these reasons, attempts to divine a more abstract 
purpose appears to be both impractical and fruitless.  
 There is a second, and different, instance of abstraction. Couching a 
general conception of the elemental content of the Rule of Law in more ab-
stract terms is possible via recourse to the, largely uncontroversial, overly 
broad idea of the Rule of Law referred to at the start of this chapter: that the 
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Rule of Law is nothing more than some level of normative force that acts on a 
rule-maker in a way that, ultimately, prevents the exercise of arbitrary power.87 
At some stage along the continuum of abstraction toward this ‘ultimate’ posi-
tion, the act of abstraction itself becomes pointless; the level of abstraction 
results in the idea becoming, in practical terms, devoid of meaning. Of 
course, the same result obtains in the opposite circumstance: abstracting less 
results in the non-avoidance of the instant issue of contestedness and, hence, 
the assessment would provide no benefit. For all of these reasons, a line in 
the sand is required. The intention behind the line-placement suggested by 
the elemental conception proposed herein seeks to bisect the problems 
raised by the titular questions posed below—Are there pragmatic benefits? 
and, Why not use another conception?—and the concept’s general state of 
contestedness.   
 
 
                                               
87 As will be seen in the subsequent chapters, consideration and, to some degree, 
application of this form of conceptual identification / definition does—notwithstand-
ing the criticism here—remain. Its retention, whilst providing a relatively familiar posi-
tion to those familiar with the Rule of Law literature, does not dull the criticism.  
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Are there any Real Pragmatic Benefits? 
In order to evidence the elements’ utility as identifiers of Rule of Law-
like ideas in the remainder of this thesis, I provide two brief examples to illus-
trate that the elements—though abstract—do still provide pragmatic benefits. 
The elements are necessarily more abstract than the conceptions from which 
they are distilled, but they are not so broad as to be irreconcilable with any 
Rule of Law-relevant example.   
There is little doubt that aspects of the Nazi regime would not pass the 
elemental Rule of Law muster. In considering the Roehm Purge88 it is clear 
there would be a complete failure of Procedural Pellucidity. This means the 
events and actions could not be said to satisfy the Rule of Law in any canoni-
cal conception. However, this extreme example alone provides little benefit 
regarding the location of the metaphorical line in the sand. If the elemental 
                                               
88 The Roehm Purge occurred when Hitler ordered, and retroactively authorised, 
mass murders before stating that the court of Germany had consisted of himself. See 
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. LAW 
REV. 630–672, 650–2 (1958).    
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scheme is to have any value it must at least have some potential in determin-
ing, or, at least, not excluding, the ‘hard’ cases. A second example that is intu-
itively more ambiguous will assist. An Australian Prime Minister announced 
the next sitting parliament would retrospectively criminalise a particular act 
from the date of the announcement.89 The making of the announcement argu-
ably—in some conceptions of the Rule of Law—may negate the retrospectivity 
that would ordinarily be fatal (in criminal matters). Of the various conceptions 
that vehemently oppose retrospectivity, Fuller’s is one of the best known: 
‘Taken by itself, and in abstraction from its possible function in a system of 
laws that are largely prospective, a retroactive law is truly a monstrosity.’90 Alt-
hough space does not afford opportunity to provide a detailed examination 
regarding the elements, a cursory consideration suggests two issues of note. 
First, the Prime Minister’s announcement may be able to obviate invalidity 
                                               
89 This example has previously been applied by Waldron. See Jeremy Waldron, Ret-
roactive Law: How Dodgy was Duynhoven?, 10 OTAGO LAW REV. 631–654, 634–636 
(2004). The act in question related to the making of hoax threats of Anthrax having 
been posted to institutions. Although Waldron uses the example to differentiate ret-
roactive and retrospective legislation, the illustration works equally well here.  
90 FULLER, supra note 15 at 53.  
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due to retrospectivity as Comprehension may be facilitated through the man-
ner, nature, and content of the announcement (notwithstanding the specific 
legislative steps necessary to criminalise an act).91 Procedural Pellucidity 
would substantially be satisfied on the passing of the Act in the normal course 
of parliamentary procedures. But, it seems, there would be no Rule of Law-
like-ness at the point of the announcement; this is only achieved through the 
two acts separated in time. However, and this is the second point, it is not im-
mediately apparent there is a slam-dunk answer as there remains some wig-
gle room in relation to the application and precise terms of the internal and 
external operation of Comprehension in the given example.   
These examples—in circumstances where the elemental scheme is in-
tended only to operate as a shorthand way to identify Rule of Law non-like-
ness and to flag instances of Rule of Law-like ideas—suggest the line in the 
sand is in a position that retains some analytic value and does not create a 
category that is either too broad to be devoid of purpose or too narrow so as 
to exclude any potential application; in this sense, in the second of these two 
functions, the idea can be seen to be capable of culling some wheat from the 
chaff. The elemental scheme can be seen to be doing some work in two 
                                               
91 Putting aside the obvious issue that the mere words of a Prime Minister are not 
constitutive of a legally binding norm.  
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senses: first, it disposes of the relatively clear Nazi example; and second, it 
leaves open the somewhat ambiguous example for further examination. On 
this basis, the line in the sand appears to be in broadly the right place for the 
immediate identification of non-Rule of Law-like-ness. In other words, the 
scheme is able to provide the pragmatic benefit of being able to rapidly and 
easily determine an instance of non-Rule of Law-like-ness without having re-
course to all canonical conceptions separately and it is capable of providing a 
way to distinguish one form of (non-Rule of Law-like) idea from another Rule 
of Law-like idea. Furthermore, the theoretical agnosticism inherent in this ap-
proach results in the ability to draw both a more robust conclusion to any 
analysis and to distinguish and differentiate ideas that are Rule of Law-rele-
vant from those that are not. 
Why not use an Existing Conception? 
The immediate response to this question harks back to the issues 
posed earlier in the chapter: in terms where the content of the Rule of Law is 
not settled, adoption of a single or hybrid methodology is open to immediate 
criticism. However, the question could also relate to the criticism of the use of 
the elemental scheme in a way that supplants existing canonical Rule of Law 
conceptions. Should this be the thrust of the question, the response is that 
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there does still remain a need to use the existing canonical conceptions. I am 
not suggesting the elemental conception supplants, replaces, or is superior 
to those conceptions. Indeed, that cannot be the case where the elements—as 
necessary and not sufficient aspects of the Rule of Law—are limited to identify-
ing only non-like-ness or are used in order to identify Rule of Law-like ideas 
that include various canonical conceptions.    
CONCLUSION 
I have argued two elements of the Rule of Law can be distilled from ca-
nonical Rule of Law conceptions and that these provide a theory agnostic way 
to identify Rule of Law-like ideas. It is in relation to this second function that 
the ideas contained in this chapter will be principally applied in this thesis. 
The Fundamental Need behind Rule of Law canonical conceptions represents 
a commonality of thinkers’ purpose and this commonality is reflected in the 
elements. The two necessary Rule of Law elements (although there may be 
more) can be used to identify Rule of Law-like ideas in a way that satisfies all 
canonical conceptions and does not put the conceptual cart before the con-
ceptions’ horse; in short, by taking this approach, it is possible to generate a 
general idea of ‘the Rule of Law’ concept—that agrees fundamentally with all 
of the conceptions that are accepted as being ‘canonical’—in a way that avoids 
the many, varied, and valid criticisms associated with the identification of a 
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meaning of the concept in circumstances where the very idea is so deeply 
contested. This approach avoids the problems and criticisms associated with 
the adoption of part or all of one or many canonical conceptions or the logis-
tical impracticability associated with the generation of a bespoke complete 
Rule of Law theory. In this way, the elemental approach facilitates a robust 
and practical methodology for identifying Rule of Law-like ideas that can be 







THE LEVIATHAN’S RULE OF LAW:  
HOBBES’S SOLUTION TO THE PAMPHLETEERS’ PROBLEM 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Rule of Law debate, historical authors’ texts are frequently cited 
to illustrate what the concept is. However, as little more than a caricature of 
these usual suspects’ conceptions is generally adopted, this use leads to the 
well-known conceptual contest that is based on a broad yet relatively 
superficial assessment of the accounts’ disagreement. In this chapter, by 
examining one—frequently caricatured—account, and by suggesting we can 
only properly understand a Rule of Law-solution if we understand the 
correlative Rule of Law-problem, I consider exactly what Hobbes was doing in 
positing his Rule of Law-solution in Leviathan. In doing this, I change the focus 
of my argument from a theoretical exploration to a practical application of the 
theoretical ideas explored thus far. The aim of this chapter is to clearly 
identify the Rule of Law-like idea that was provided by Hobbes and, in doing 
so, differentiate it from the caricature that is generally taken to exist. (This 
process is replicated in Chapter 5 with the focus on Locke.) I take the aspects 
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of Hobbes’s thought in Leviathan that can—in accordance with my argument 
in Chapter 3—be considered as being Rule of Law-like ideas, and consider 
them in the context of their authoring in order to obtain a clearer idea of their 
meaning and implications on the contemporary Rule of Law ideas that they 
influence. In accordance with my conclusion in Chapter 2, I contextualise 
Hobbes’s ideas through considering them as solutions to—generally un- or 
under-considered—Rule of Law-relevant problems. Whilst I defer 
consideration of the implications of viewing Hobbes in this way until the 
chapter following my exploration of Locke’s ideas, they are hinted at in this 
chapter.  
It is, perhaps, useful that I expand on this idea and put it in a slightly 
different way: To identify the problems perceivable by Hobbes, I explore Rule 
of Law-relevant popular pamphlets from the period in which Hobbes was 
writing Leviathan (1646-1651) in order to illuminate Hobbes’s Rule of Law-
solution and enable a more fine-grained understanding of his Rule of Law to 
be developed; this enables differentiation of Hobbes’s ideas from the relative 
caricature that is frequently adopted in the Rule of Law literature. By taking 
this approach, it is possible to refine our understanding of Hobbes’s Rule of 
Law and illustrate a methodology that brings clarity to the Rule of Law debate 
more generally. 
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The structure adopted to illustrate this point is simple. Yet the 
execution is, necessarily, lengthy as a result of trying to bring together various 
strands of intellectual endeavours.1 In its simplest terms, I first outline the 
caricatures of both Hobbes and the Rule of Law that are commonly applied, 
before detailing why it is important to view both of these in context and, more 
particularly, in the problem / solution terms that I advocate. Then, I apply 
these ideas to Hobbes’s context and his work in Leviathan and conclude that, 
by taking a contextual approach to Hobbes’s work, it is possible to identify—
far more clearly—the meaning of the Rule of Law-like solution that Hobbes 
proposed.   
Given the lengthy nature of this chapter, it is useful to set out, in a little 
more detail, the relative structure that I adopt. In the next part, I argue that, 
notwithstanding a trend in the Rule of Law debate that would suggest 
otherwise, Hobbes can be considered as contributing to ideas associable 
with the concept of the Rule of Law. This is, in part, due to the broad 
definition of the concept that I adopt (to avoid viewing the concept through a 
presentist lens). I also illustrate two caricatures frequently adopted in the Rule 
of Law debate; the first relates to the concept of the Rule of Law, and the 
                                               
1 The lengthy exposition in this chapter does, however, provide a methodological 
base upon which the next chapter can rest. 
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other to Hobbes’s sovereign. Whilst I return to the caricatures throughout the 
chapter, I initially raise them to both show that the caricatures alone should 
not be used to invalidate consideration of Hobbes as having Rule of Law-like 
ideas and, crucially, to illustrate a contemporary disjunction in Hobbesian 
analysis: although consideration of Hobbes in Rule of Law-terms has 
increased in recent times, the views regarding his relevance to the Rule of 
Law have markedly diverged. Where Hobbes’s text and meaning has not 
altered, but our views in relation to the Rule of Law-relevance of his account 
have, I suggest it is, in fact, our understanding of the Rule of Law that has 
changed; and, it is for this reason that we should not simply admit any 
presently accepted conception as being objectively correct. 
Then, in the next part, I illustrate the importance of going beyond the 
caricatures and considering Hobbes’s ideas in context. Here, after 
introducing the idea in Chapter 2, I expand the problem / solution 
methodology—to suggest that we can only properly understand a Rule of 
Law-solution if we understand the correlative Rule of Law-problem—before 
arguing this justification also holds in relation to Hobbes’s ideas. To do this, I 
outline the nature of Hobbes’s context when writing Leviathan and consider 
whether exploring Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like ideas actually adds anything. My 
conclusion is that appreciation of the problems perceivable by Hobbes is 
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both fundamental to any contextual analysis and is also under-appreciated in 
discussions of the Rule of Law.   
The second-half of the chapter commences with a part, appropriately, 
entitled: Hobbes’s Rule of Law in Context. Here, I step away from theory and 
consider the problems that were actually perceivable by Hobbes. Through 
recourse to arguments contained in pamphlets that were popular during the 
period Hobbes was writing Leviathan, I identify six forms of problem that 
were immanent concerns of society during the authoring period. I then 
argue—notwithstanding the view that would follow from the caricature of 
Hobbes’s account that only one of the problems is being responded to—that 
Hobbes’s Leviathan not only does respond to all six, but also that it would be 
highly desirable to refine our understanding (or appreciation) of his ideas in 
the context of these problems. When this approach is adopted, constraints on 
a sovereign’s powers emerge that enable Hobbes’s account to be 
categorised as being Rule of Law-relevant. Unsurprisingly, I end the chapter 
with some brief conclusions. 
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One final introductory comment is apposite.  In making my point, I am 
conscious that I do not provide a detailed account of Hobbes’s Leviathan.2 
Given my argument—that analytical benefits will flow following the 
consideration of his account in terms of a problem / solution approach—I do 
not need to set out his whole account; I merely need to illustrate that 
additional clarity follows from this approach. Nevertheless, in what follows I 
do, where necessary, provide some (brief) additional details in relation to 
Hobbes’s account. Instead of providing a single abstract explanation of 
Hobbes, I do this in the context of each point.   
HOBBES’S RULE OF LAW: SUBSEQUENT CONCEPTIONS 
In this part, I answer the question: how is Hobbes, generally, 
understood in relation to the Rule of Law? Whilst much of the earlier 
commentary of Hobbes in Rule of Law discussion is in negative terms—
suggesting that Hobbes is not relevant to the Rule of Law—contemporary 
discussion about Hobbes and his relationship to the Rule of Law has been on 
the increase. In short, there is simply more discussion of Hobbes—in both 
negative and positive terms—in relation to the Rule of Law in contemporary 
                                               
2 For a detailed contemporary account of Leviathan, see NOEL MALCOLM, THOMAS 
HOBBES: LEVIATHAN (2012). 
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times. In order to address this disjunction, I propose contextual analysis to 
enhance analytical clarity.   
Hobbes and the Rule of Law: Caricatures in the Rule of Law debate 
If the Rule of Law is a concept that opposes the imposition of arbitrary 
power, then Hobbes’s Leviathan is, some would suggest, largely opposed to 
the very idea of the Rule of Law. Hobbes may, therefore, appear to be a 
peculiar choice of subject to explore the Rule of Law. This could be borne out 
by the fact that Hobbes has little or no mention in many of the most well-
known Rule of Law accounts.3 Hobbes’s conception should, however, be 
considered in Rule of Law terms. To illustrate this, I outline two caricatures—
one relating to the concept of the Rule of Law, and the other relating to 
Hobbes’s sovereign—and suggest the first can, in some respects, be seen as 
                                               
3 For example, there is no mention of Hobbes in LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
(1964); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (2 ed. 2009). 
Further, there is no mention in these general texts: JØRGEN MØLLER & SVEND-ERIK 
SKAANING, THE RULE OF LAW: DEFINITIONS, MEASURES, PATTERNS AND CAUSES (2014); 
CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE RULE OF LAW: THE COMMON SENSE OF GLOBAL POLITICS (2014); 
TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2010). There is only brief—non-foundational—
mention in other sources, for example: GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA & NEIL WALKER, 
RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 4, 176–177 (2009); FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 243 (1960). A little more detail is provided in BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 47–48, 57 (2004). 
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being under-inclusive and can be usefully extended in more abstract terms, 
whilst the second caricature’s utility is enhanced by an additional level of 
nuance. The caricatures, however, merely provide a starting point and should 
not be used to preclude further consideration that may contradict their basic 
positions. In short, my aim is to dispel, at this early stage, any suggestion that 
preconceived notions of Hobbes’s relationship to the Rule of Law—as 
reflected in the caricatures—may conspire to invalidate my examination of 
Leviathan. 
The arbitrariness caricature in the Rule of Law 
It is frequently stated—and is a Common Assumption—that the Rule of 
Law is a contested (or, even, an essentially contested) concept.4 In the 
debates regarding the concept’s content, the varying conceptions could 
accurately be described as being ‘often conflicting and not infrequently 
rather confused’.5 The nature of the fundamental contestedness relating to 
the conceptual content of the concept of the Rule of Law, and the various 
nuances of the ongoing debate, is also well known.6 Whilst it remains the case 
                                               
4 For this and the other Assumptions of the Rule of Law, see Chapter 2. 
5 Andrei Marmor, The Rule of Law and Its Limits, 23 LAW PHILOS. 1–43, 1 (2004). 
6 For a summary of these debates, see Chapter 3. 
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that there is no universally accepted formulation of the concept, a frequently 
stated—abstract and conceptually very broad—idea is that the Rule of Law 
restricts the imposition of arbitrary power. This formed one of Dicey’s 
desiderata, was important in Locke’s ideas, and has also been attributed to 
Aristotle.7 If any, simple and briefly stated, caricature of the Rule of Law—that 
relates both to purpose and function whilst not contradicting a substantial 
number of the most frequently cited conceptions—could be suggested, it 
would, undoubtedly relate to the Rule of Law’s role in preventing the exercise 
of arbitrary power (the ‘arbitrariness caricature’).   
Yet, the arbitrariness caricature—notwithstanding its conceptual 
breadth—could be seen as being too narrow and under-inclusive. Whilst my 
focus remains on ‘thin’ or formal Rule of Law ideas generally considered in 
conceptual analysis,8 I do not mean that ‘thick’ Rule of Law ideas—like 
                                               
7 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §135 (Peter Laslett ed., Student ed. 
1988); A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188–
198 and 202–203 (10 ed. 1979); ARISTOTLE, T. SINCLAIR & TREVOR J. SAUNDERS, THE 
POLITICS 1287aI (1981). 
8 For a general overview of the ‘thin’ / ’thick’ association, see Paul Craig, Formal and 
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Raw an Analytical Framework, PUBLIC LAW 
467–487 (1997). For an explanation of my rationale behind adopting a solely thin 
view, see Chapter 3: Formally Framing the Discussion.          
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democracy and human rights9—should be included. What I mean is that 
restricting analysis of the Rule of Law to simply reflecting the idea of ‘non-
arbitrary rule’ may simply reflect our own contemporary biases;10 a boundary 
reflecting only arbitrariness risks excluding ideas that could relate to the Rule 
of Law if conceived more broadly. This risk may be heightened where an 
examination, as is the case here, is substantially historical. To avoid the 
assumption reflected in the arbitrariness caricature, an expansive view of the 
concept’s potential meaning could be taken. Accordingly, I take the Rule of 
Law, whatever else it may be, to be a concept relating to the imposition of a 
normative force upon the exercise of power (‘the normative force 
conception’). Of course, this could be seen as being overly simplistic and 
overly broad. But this slight expansion over the arbitrariness caricature seems 
capable of retaining some analytical benefit whilst avoiding the importation 
of what could be seen as a contemporary bias. Furthermore, as a broader 
‘catch-all’ idea that avoids attempting to narrow the definition’s focus or to 
argue for the accuracy of a particular conception, the normative force 
                                               
9 See, for example, the United Nation’s ‘thick’ version in UN SECURITY COUNCIL, THE 
RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES - 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 4 (2004), 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/2004%20report.pdf (last visited Jul 20, 2018). 
10 See Chapter 1. 
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conception provides a working definition that—whilst not intuitively abhorrent 
to the Rule of Law—avoids the need to adopt particular desiderata that are not 
endorsed by all theorists. However, in order to ensure a comprehensive 
approach, I also use the two elements of the Rule of Law from Chapter 3: 
Comprehension and Procedural Pellucidity (the ‘Rule of Law elements’).11 I 
consider any idea that satisfies either the normative force conception, or 
contains the Rule of Law elements, as being a Rule of Law-like idea. 
Identification of Rule of Law-like ideas in this way avoids imposing an overly 
specific presentist conception of the Rule of Law whilst, at the same time, 
ensuring that ideas related to the Rule of Law can be located. 
The sovereign’s caricature in Hobbes’s Leviathan   
Many simply fail to see Hobbes as a Rule of Law thinker at all.12 Whilst 
taking a restrictive view of the historical conceptual content of the Rule of Law 
risks conceptual impoverishment,13 Hobbes’s sovereign in Leviathan is, for 
                                               
11 These require, respectively, that: an individual be able to comprehend the nature, 
content and operation of the rules to which he or she is subject; and, that the 
creation and application of any rules must be in terms capable of being clear and 
obvious to all concerned.   
12 See, for example, Jean Hampton, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS 13–
44 (1994). See also my comments above at note 3. 
13 See Chapter 1. 
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those who conceive of the Rule of Law in terms akin to the arbitrariness 
caricature, not immediately associated with the Rule of Law.14 Hobbes’s 
sovereign is often drawn as being a ruler exercising largely arbitrary and 
unlimited power and is, perhaps even most frequently, caricatured—in terms 
where there can be no higher power to which the sovereign is subject—as 
fundamentally opposing the idea that law can rule.15 In fact, Hobbes’s idea is 
sometimes seen as epitomising the problem to which the Rule of Law 
                                               
14 As I will provide a more detailed exegesis of Hobbes’s position in the following 
parts, here I simply report and comment on the general approach apparent in the 
literature. 
15 For example: Richard Bellamy, The Rule of Law and the Rule of Persons, 4 CRIT. REV. 
INT. SOC. POLIT. PHILOS. 221–251, 232 (2001); Hampton, supra note 12; Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, Matthew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, The Rule of Law Unplugged, 
59 EMORY LJ 1455, 1464 (2009); Chesterman, supra note 8 at 335; RONALD A. CASS, 
THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 3 (2001).   
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responds.16 Where the sovereign is seen as exercising absolute authority,17 it 
is frequently stated that Hobbes’s sovereign and the theory generally 
represents Rule by Law.18 Hobbes’s sovereign is, according to this caricature, 
                                               
16 Richard H. Fallon Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1–56, 7 (1997); Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles About the Rule of 
Law: Why, What, Where? And Who Cares?, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 64–104, 94 
(James Flemming ed., 2011); Augusto Zimmerman, Waiting for the Rule of Law in 
Brazil: A Meta- legal Analysis of the Insufficient Realization of the Rule of Law in Brazil, 
38 in THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE (RECHTSSTAAT) , 
332 (James R. Silkenat, James E. Hickey, & Peter D. Barenboim eds., 2014); Mortimer 
Sellers, What Is the Rule of Law and Why Is It So Important?, 38 in THE LEGAL 
DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL STATE (RECHTSSTAAT) , 8 (James R. 
Silkenat, James E. Hickey, & Peter D. Barenboim eds., 2014); Martin Krygier, The Rule 
of Law: Pasts, Presents, and Two Possible Futures, 12 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI., 15 
(2016); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 BOSTON UNIV. LAW 
REV. 781, 788 (1989). A related idea is that the Rule of Law takes us beyond the 
Hobbesian position. See, for example, Sampford, supra note 8; Jeremy Waldron, 
The Rule of Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
Fall 2016 ed. 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/ (last visited Jul 20, 
2018). 
17 W. Burnett Harvey, The Rule of Law in Historical Perspective, 59 MICH. LAW REV. 
487–500, 489–90 (1961); Krygier, supra note 16 at 9; Emilio Santoro, The Rule of Law 
and the “Liberties of the English”: The Interpretation of Albert Venn Dicey, in THE RULE 
OF LAW: HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM 153–200, 170 (Pietro Costa, Danilo Zolo, & 
Emilio Santoro eds., 2007). 
18 PALOMBELLA AND WALKER, supra note 3 at 133; Waldron, supra note 16; Gerald 
Postema, Fidelity in Law’s Commonwealth, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 17–
40, 36 (Lisa M Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014). 
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antithetical to the Rule of Law by virtue of the arbitrary and absolute nature of 
the power wielded (the ‘sovereign’s caricature’).   
The sovereign’s caricature is, however, not adopted by all. Some have 
sought to expose problems with the application, use, or relevance of the 
idea.19 Some positively oppose the idea that Hobbes is not a Rule of Law 
thinker by suggesting, instead, that Hobbes’s theory: is capable of providing 
a rudimentary idea of the Rule of Law; does include Rule of Law relevant 
aspects; is—if it is about anything—about the Rule of Law; or, pioneers the 
modern account of the concept.20 In taking these views into account, 
conceiving of Hobbes in Rule of Law terms is far from unprecedented. 
Wholesale abandonment of Hobbes as a Rule of Law thinker should, 
therefore, not be too hastily adopted simply because the sovereign’s 
caricature does not immediately tally with the arbitrariness caricature. By 
adopting a broad idea of the Rule of Law—as a normative force upon the 
                                               
19 Michael P. Zuckert, Hobbes, Locke, and the Problems of the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS 
63–79 (1994); David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law, 20 LAW PHILOS. 
461–498 (2001). 
20 LARRY MAY, LIMITING LEVIATHAN HOBBES ON LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 107 
(2014); Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, BOSTON 
COLL. LAW REV. 433, 449 (2013); Zuckert, supra note 19; Ryan E. Carlin, Rule-of-Law 
Typologies in Contemporary Societies, 33 JUSTICE SYST. J. 154–173, 156 (2012); 
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 161–178 (1999). 
Chapter 4: The Leviathan’s Rule of Law 
 
169 
exercise of power, or in considering the satisfaction of the Rule of Law 
elements—there is no reason not to consider Hobbes in terms of the Rule of 
Law; after all, Hobbes does admit of some restraints on the sovereign.21 These 
restraints are not unacknowledged in accounts that view Hobbes’s sovereign 
as not being bound by law,22 as well as in more nuanced—Hobbes-centric—
positions that suggest the sovereign: is not constrained by law but also 
cannot exercise arbitrary power; is bound by law; or, is conceived as a law 
maker within the idea of the Rule of Law.23 In this sense, whilst the caricature is 
merely doing what a caricature is intended to do—illustrating the simplified, 
and most prominent, features of the thing being scrutinised—it is not a useful 
or beneficial formulation to adopt in relation to the Rule of Law.    
It seems to be no coincidence that the differences in view—between 
those that largely exclude the possibility of Hobbes contributing to Rule of 
Law ideas, and more nuanced views that appear more open to Hobbes’s 
inclusion—broadly reflect the level of focus on and space afforded to 
consideration of Hobbes. Putting this another way, studies that are more 
                                               
21 I expand upon this point across the next two parts. 
22 As suggested, for example, by Waldron, supra note 16; Zuckert, supra note 19. 
23 Martin Loughlin, The Political Jurisprudence of Thomas Hobbes, in HOBBES AND THE 
LAW , 16 (David Dyzenhaus & Thomas Poole eds., 2012); Dyzenhaus, supra note 19; 
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, HOBBES ON CIVIL ASSOCIATION 66 (2000). 
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Hobbes-centric (and less Rule of Law-centric) seem more inclined to identify 
Hobbes as making a positive contribution to Rule of Law ideas.24 This may be 
unsurprising. It could occur, perhaps, because a lack of space may, 
effectively, force authors of Rule of Law-centric works to adopt a caricature; 
alternatively, and more cynically, it could occur because authors of Hobbes-
centric studies may be looking for concepts that can be attributed to Hobbes 
(as a form of confirmation bias). The more charitable view, and the one that I 
take, is that a more nuanced and detailed appreciation affords and increases 
the prospect of Hobbes’s ideas reflecting some form of Rule of Law-positive 
viewpoint. Or, putting this another way, a deeper appreciation of Hobbes 
may reveal ties to the Rule of Law that the sovereign’s caricature fails to 
identify. It is, therefore, useful to consider which / whether aspects of 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, when considered broadly, can be useful or relevant to 
the Rule of Law debate.   
Taking a more nuanced view of the sovereign’s caricature—and 
expanding the arbitrariness caricature—may yield analytical benefits that 
                                               
24 I expand on this point in the next section. However, I am not blind to the ‘other’ 
perspective or way to view this stated position: that studies that are more focused on 
the Rule of Law are less likely to consider Hobbes as being a contributor to the 
concept. As nothing fundamental turns on the point, I have chosen to express the 
point in positive terms. 
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support, or at least do not oppose, exploring the idea of the Rule of Law in 
terms of Hobbes’s Leviathan. Consideration of a Hobbesian account of the 
Rule of Law is, then, not as untoward as it may initially appear if the two 
caricatures are viewed in isolation. Hobbes may, therefore, be considered as 
being an author of Rule of Law-like ideas. In what follows, I use this basic 
position to argue for further nuance and suggest that consideration of the 
context of Hobbes’s ideas allows us to shed light on the meaning that should 
be attributed to his idea which is, in turn, capable of illuminating the concept 
of the Rule of Law more generally.  
Hobbes’s Rule of Law: Who Said What (and When) 
In this section, I illustrate in more detail that, whilst Hobbes’s work is, in 
the contemporary literature, generally not considered as relating to the 
concept of the Rule of Law, there has also been a contemporary increase in 
the number of accounts that do associate Hobbes with the Rule of Law. This 
relative disjunction in Hobbesian Rule of Law analysis requires more 
clarification than that offered above. Whilst the caricatures provide general 
guidance, a more nuanced understanding is necessary to draw out the 
positive aspects and to expose the way that Hobbes is presently understood, 
and what he is taken to mean, in this context.     
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Hobbes’s relevance to the Rule of Law has in both positive and 
negative senses increased in the contemporary literature. I do not intend to 
make an empirically verifiable claim here; and I also do not claim to have 
reviewed every single Rule of Law work or to have identified each mention of 
Hobbes within each of the works identified. My aim is far simpler: to illustrate 
that, at least in the contemporary Rule of Law-centric literature, Hobbes’s 
association with the Rule of Law is generally seen in negative terms. This 
occurs both through intention and omission. An intention-related account 
would actively suggest he is not a Rule of Law thinker (for example, by stating 
his theory relates to Rule by Law). An omission-related account would suggest 
Hobbes is not a Rule of Law thinker by failing to mention Hobbes in basic 
accounts of what the Rule of Law is.   
Broadly speaking, omission- and intention-related accounts are 
reflected, respectively, in older and more contemporary positions. Whilst 
various popular early Rule of Law accounts by Locke and Dicey omit mention 
of Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like ideas,25 this is to be expected where there is no 
scholarly tradition of citation or where there was no specific nomenclature 
upon which to fasten ideas. A stronger indication of the omission-related 
                                               
25 LOCKE, supra note 7; DICEY, supra note 7. These accounts were first published in 
1690 and 1885 respectively.  
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negative treatment of Hobbes, comes from the host of Rule of Law usual 
suspects together with lesser known works across the 20th century, and early 
21st century.26 The omission of any mention of Hobbes in these works is clear. 
But what of the intention-related negative treatment? Hobbes’s ideas are 
frequently related to the problem to which the Rule of Law responds by; 
placing him in opposition to a Rule of Law;27 reflecting Rule by Law;28 or, 
stating that Hobbes favours absolutism.29 In this sense, and with broad 
                                               
26 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007); FULLER, 
supra note 3; RAZ, supra note 3; James Routh, The Classical Rule of Law in English 
Criticism of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 12 J. ENGL. GER. PHILOL. 612–
630 (1913); H. W. Arndt, The Origins of Dicey’s Concept of the “Rule of Law”, 31 
AUST. LAW J. 117 (1957); JOHN P. REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN 
THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES (2004); MØLLER AND SKAANING, supra 
note 3. 
27 For examples, see supra note 16. A related idea is that the Rule of Law takes us 
beyond the Hobbesian position. See, for example, Sampford, supra note 8; Waldron, 
supra note 16. 
28 PALOMBELLA AND WALKER, supra note 3 at 133; Waldron, supra note 16; Postema, 
supra note 18 at 36. 
29 See, for example, Bellamy, supra note 15 at 232; Krygier, supra note 16 at 9; 
Waldron, supra note 16; TAMANAHA, supra note 3 at 47; Hampton, supra note 12 at 
13–44; Eric Heinze, Power Politics and the Rule of Law: Shakespeare’s First Historical 
Tetralogy and Law’s ‘Foundations’, 29 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 139–168, 142 (2009). For a 
slightly older mention in relation to the history of the Rule of Law, see Harvey, supra 
note 17 at 489. 
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reliance on the arbitrariness caricature, Hobbes’s account is seen as being 
antithetical to, or simply not being, the Rule of Law.  In broad terms, despite 
the assertion that both intention- and omission-related accounts explore the 
same concept, intention-related accounts reflect a contemporary—albeit 
negativing—interest in Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like idea; yet, older approaches 
simply fail to include Hobbes as a Rule of Law-relevant thinker.    
In what may initially appear to be a contradictory statement, 
contemporary accounts also reflect positive treatment of Hobbes in relation 
to the Rule of Law. Mention of Hobbes in relation to the Rule of Law has, in 
recent years and in both positive and negative terms, increased; this negative 
/ positive divide broadly maps, respectively, onto works primarily focused on 
the concept of the Rule of Law, and those primarily focused on Hobbes. 
Contemporary works focused on Hobbes (and not on the concept of the Rule 
of Law) frequently portray Hobbes as a Rule of Law thinker. Several of the 
most influential have been produced in the years since 2010,30 several more 
have since the turn of the millennium,31 and various others within the last 35 
                                               
30 Loughlin, supra note 23; MAY, supra note 20; Waldron, supra note 20; Ryan E. 
Carlin & Rodolfo Sarsfield, Rethinking the Rule of Law: Concepts, Measures, and 
Theory, 33 JUSTICE SYST. J. 125–130 (2012). 
31 Dyzenhaus, supra note 19; OAKESHOTT, supra note 23. 
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years.32 Prior to this, positive acknowledgement—or, indeed, any 
acknowledgement—of Hobbes’s Rule of Law-relevance is scarce.33 As 
Hobbes’s account in Leviathan has not changed, yet the broad-based nature 
of the accounts relating to it have, I make the suggestion—and, for the 
moment, it can be no more than this—that the move toward the 
understanding or acceptance of the conceptual content of the Rule of Law 
has changed over time.34 It is this change that I wish to explore.  
The reason for increased Rule of Law-reference to Hobbes over the last 
few decades could reflect the increased volume of scholarship in general, the 
change in scholarly practices already mentioned, or an increased interest and 
awareness of Hobbes that has impacted thoughts and thinkers associated 
with the Rule of Law.35 This could suggest a disagreement as to the meaning 
                                               
32 In addition to those in the previous two notes, see also Zuckert, supra note 19; 
OAKESHOTT, supra note 20. (Whilst the Oakeshott book was published in 1999, the 
first edition was published in 1983.)  
33 This reflects the omission-related accounts’ dominance over intention-related 
accounts. 
34 For an extended discussion related to this point, see the Common Assumption 
that the Rule of Law has changed over time in Chapter 2. 
35 In a very basic sense, there has been a marked increase in the relative use of both 
phrases in the available corpus commencing 35 years ago. This is supported by a 
Google Ngram search of the phrases ‘Hobbes’ and ‘Rule of Law’. Google Ngram 
Viewer, SEARCH OF “HOBBES,RULE OF LAW” 1651-2008, 
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of Hobbes’s ideas or the meaning of the concept of the Rule of Law. This 
provides an interesting backdrop to the consideration of Hobbes and his Rule 
of Law-like ideas. To clarify the nature of this disagreement, I develop the 
context in which Hobbes was working, and resolve the question of how his 
Rule of Law-like ideas should be viewed.    
THE IMPORTANCE OF (HOBBES’S) CONTEXT 
In this part, I illustrate the importance of going beyond the caricatures 
and considering Hobbes’s ideas in the context of their authoring. To do this, I 
first expand Chapter 2’s general justification of this methodology, before 
arguing this general justification holds in relation to Hobbes’s ideas.  
The Importance of the Rule of Law in Context 
There exists a wealth of research in relation to both the concept of the 
Rule of Law and the meaning and context of Hobbes’s ideas; yet, the two 
strands of literature—the contextualist ideas frequently associated with 
intellectual history, and the Rule of Law literature relating to the conceptual 
                                               
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Hobbes%2Crule+of+law&year_s
tart=1651&year_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=5&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%
2CHobbes%3B%2Cc0%3B.t1%3B%2Crule%20of%20law%3B%2Cc0 (last visited Jul 
20, 2018).  
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content of the Rule of Law—have not been brought together.36 A detailed 
intellectual history literature explores the historical context in which various 
Rule of Law-relevant texts were authored; yet, these works do not explore the 
Rule of Law specifically. Whilst the idea of examining Rule of Law ideas in 
context is not new,37 contemporary consideration of Hobbes frequently 
reflects the sovereign’s caricature. A contextualist examination brings the 
literatures together and enables identification of Hobbes’s account’s 
relevance to the Rule of Law in a way that avoids the use of the caricatures.   
I suggest only one way to conduct a contextualist examination without 
making the bolder claim that it is necessarily paramount. This idea modifies 
                                               
36 For an application of the principles suggested herein to the international Rule of 
Law, see Paul Burgess, Deriving the International Rule of Law: an Unnecessary, 
Impractical and Unhelpful Exercise, (FORTHCOMING). For an approach that seeks to 
contextualise the international Rule of Law generally, see Ian Hurd, The International 
Rule of Law: Law and the Limit of Politics, 28 ETHICS AMP INT. AFF. 39–51 (2014); IAN 
HURD, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 and 3 (2017).   
37 For example, a compelling case was made for reading Dicey’s Rule of Law idea in 
context in 1959, in F.H. Lawson, Dicey Revisited. I, 7 POLIT. STUD. 109–126 (1959); F. 
H. Lawson, Dicey Revisited. II, 7 POLIT. STUD. 207–221 (1959). For the general position 
that contextualising Hobbes is beneficial, see ‘The Context of Leviathan’ Michael 
Oakeshott, Introduction, in HOBBES ON CIVIL ASSOCIATION , 2–9 (2000); Jeffrey R. 
Collins, Interpreting Thomas Hobbes in Competing Contexts, 70 J. HIST. IDEAS 165–
180 (2009); Glenn Burgess, Contexts for the Writing and Publication of Hobbes 
Leviathan, 11 HIST. POLIT. THOUGHT 675–702 (1990). 
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the ‘Cambridge School’ of intellectual history (most frequently associated with 
Quentin Skinner38) by also applying Collingwood’s logic of questions and 
answers.39 When considered in Rule of Law terms, the suggestion is that we 
can only properly understand a (Rule of Law-relevant) solution if we 
understand the correlative (Rule of Law-relevant) problem. Exploring the Rule 
of Law this way seems unlikely to represent an unattractive proposition as the 
Rule of Law has itself previously been described as a solution concept.40 By 
identifying the precise meaning, interpretation, and operation of the problem 
perceivable by a particular author, an understanding of the context in which 
the author’s theory is situated can be identified. Accordingly, and as 
introduced in Chapter 2, a Rule of Law idea can be seen as part of a dialogue 
(of sorts) as the societal position and the Rule of Law conception exist in a 
                                               
38 For the classic formulation of this position—that requires a close assessment of 
exactly what an author was doing in her or his text—see Quentin Skinner, Meaning 
and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. THEORY 3–53 (1969). 
39 Robin George Collingwood, Chapter V: Question and Answer, in AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 29–43 (1939). 
40 Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 
21 LAW PHILOS. 137–164, 158 (2002); Noel B. Reynolds, Grounding the Rule of Law, 2 
RATIO JURIS 1–16, 5 (1989); Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law After the Short Twentieth 
Century: Launching a Global Career, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 327–346, 327 (Richard Nobles & David Schiff 
eds., 2014). 
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problem / solution relationship.41 In putting these ideas together, it is possible 
to illustrate more precisely what, for that author, was meant by the Rule of 
Law-like idea at the point of writing. In the very least, this method facilitates 
refinement of any methodology based solely on consideration of the Rule of 
Law (as a solution sans problem) and provides increased precision in 
identifying the nature and meaning of any conception. It certainly affords an 
analytical benefit over caricature-based assessments of the conceptions.   
It is necessary to make one assumption in adopting this approach: a 
Rule of Law-thinker’s idea of the Rule of Law represents her solution to a (Rule 
of Law-relevant) problem that was, in the very least, perceivable by her.42 On 
this basis, identification of the problem is critical. This aspect is, however, not 
only fundamental to this approach, but also is, I suggest, fundamentally 
under-appreciated in the discussions of the Rule of Law.43 
                                               
41 A similar approach to Hobbes’s ideas—and each piece of political philosophy 
springing from a new vision of a particular problem—can be seen in OAKESHOTT, 
supra note 23 at 6–7. 
42 I address the feasibility of this assumption in the next part: Hobbes’s Rule of Law: in 
Context. 
43  Regarding the importance of considering the origins and precise nature of 
conceptions of the Rule of Law, and the dearth of consideration in these terms, see 
Chapter 1. See also Quentin Skinner, The Ideological Context of Hobbes’s Political 
Thought, 9 HIST. J. 286–317 (1966). 
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Hobbes’s Context 
To dispel any suggestion that commonly known facts about the 
authoring may invalidate the problem / solution approach, I must expand 
upon Hobbes’s basic background. This is—by no means—a complete 
exposition, but it will provide a sufficient base on which to assess the context 
of Leviathan’s authorship and subsequent publication in January 1651.44 
These facts relate to: the time during which Hobbes wrote Leviathan; 
Hobbes’s exile in France for the entire duration of the authoring of Leviathan; 
and, the motivation for and the intended audience of the work. I explore 
these in the following sub-sections in terms of the Environmental, Relational 
and Authorial Contexts (respectively). 
Environmental Context  
Whilst debate exists regarding the precise dates between which 
Leviathan was written, I will take the dates as being between January 1646, 
                                               
44 The academic literature on Hobbes and Leviathan is vast. In this part, I principally 
cite three authors: Noel Malcolm; Richard Tuck; and, Quentin Skinner. My focus on 
their, well regarded, works more than adequately suffices for the general 
background I provide.  
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and January 1651 (the ‘authoring period’). A brief rationale for this position 
follows. 
The environment in which Hobbes was writing was fundamentally 
different to that which exists in contemporary democracies. England had 
been—and could still be considered as being—ravaged by a civil war that 
commenced in early 1642, and which had followed, and overlapped with, the 
Thirty Years War that ended in 1648. The rebels, as supporters of 
parliamentary sovereignty, sought a change in the way that Charles I had 
ruled that was also related to fears of papist rule. Royalist supporters, and 
Charles himself, advocated the King’s near-absolute or even divine powers 
that were questioned through parliament’s refusal to grant the King funds.45 
The parliamentarians sought a form of more popular rule in which the King’s 
powers were subject to parliamentary control. Although the hostilities 
included the tyrannicide of Charles I in January 1649, the end of the war is 
frequently considered to have occurred following the Battle of Dunbar in 
September 1650; this event indicated to Hobbes that parliamentary rule was 
now assured.46 Whilst it is often noted that Hobbes was writing in response to 
                                               
45 See, for example, the late-1648 work by Robert Filmer, The Necessity of the 
Absolute Power of all Kings, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 172–183 (1991). 
46 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 79. 
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the civil war,47 debate exists about the amount of Leviathan that was written 
by the time the war ended. Nevertheless, it seems to be widely agreed that 
the writing process was at least underway around that time.48 In any event, the 
period post-Dunbar and pre-publication is short and afforded little time for 
substantial authoring.49 If writing was almost complete around that time, this 
could, perhaps, account for the suggested change in Hobbes’s approach 
when it became apparent—after the battle—the royalist cause was lost.50   
In addition to the Civil War itself, another event is suggested to have 
played a fundamental role in influencing Hobbes’s views in Leviathan: the 
                                               
47 See, for example, ROSS HARRISON, HOBBES, LOCKE, AND CONFUSION’S MASTERPIECE: 
AN EXAMINATION OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 10 (2002). It has also 
been suggested that Hobbes was writing in response to the problems in England as 
well as in late sixteenth century France: Oakeshott, supra note 37 at 7. Hobbes, 
himself, in the final paragraph of Leviathan notes his writing was ‘occasioned by the 
disorders of the present time…’: RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES: LEVIATHAN: REVISED STUDENT 
EDITION [395]-[396] (2 (Rev.) ed. 1996).  
48 For a view that the bulk of the work was completed before the battle of Dunbar, 
see TUCK, supra note 47 at liv. For a view that approximately two thirds of Leviathan 
was complete before the battle, see MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 59.  
49 For the suggestion that the text was complete in manuscript form in December 
1650, see MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 9; TUCK, supra note 47 at liv. Regarding the 
process being complete in January 1651, see QUENTIN SKINNER, 3 VISIONS OF POLITICS: 
HOBBES AND CIVIL SCIENCE 11 (2002). 
50 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 52, 56, 72–75; TUCK, supra note 47 at xliii–xliv. 
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Engagement Crisis.51 Commencing in 1649, the Engagement Crisis relates to 
the royalists’ loyalty to the new parliamentary regime. Whilst the precise 
intent regarding Hobbes’s work is debated,52 there is, nevertheless, some 
agreement that the debate amongst royalist exiles becomes polarised and 
Leviathan could be seen as an answer to some of these issues.53 I think this is 
correct if the scope of the problems is broadened slightly beyond the precise 
confines of engagement itself (or, at least, in defining that idea broadly). 
Placing the Engagement Crisis of 1649 in the context of authoring, various 
commentators place the dates of authoring Leviathan between early 1649 
and late 1650.54  However, there are some—albeit more speculative—dates of 
inception as early as January 1646;55 a date that coincides with a wave of 
                                               
51 Skinner has mounted a sustained argument that the point of Leviathan is to 
contribute to the debate in this controversy. See, SKINNER, supra note 49 at 289. Cf. 
Glenn Burgess, Usurpation, Obligation and Obedience in the Thought of the 
Engagement Controversy 1, 29 HIST. J. 515–536 (1986); Burgess, supra note 37; 
GLENN BURGESS, ABSOLUTE MONARCHY AND THE STUART CONSTITUTION (1996).  
52 Burgess, supra note 37. 
53 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 58; TUCK, supra note 47 at xii. 
54 For the suggestion that authoring commenced in January 1649, see TUCK, supra 
note 47 at xi. For the start of authoring around Autumn 1649, see MALCOLM, supra 
note 2 at 9; SKINNER, supra note 49 at 228. For late 1647-early 1649, see Burgess, 
supra note 37 at 676. 
55 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 57–58. For further doubt on a 1646 inception date—
despite this being referenced by Hobbes himself—see SKINNER, supra note 49 at 15–
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compositions (where royalists in England were offered the chance, in effect, 
to pay to prevent their lands being seized).   
In taking account of this debate, the identification of problems that 
could relate to the authoring of Leviathan (as a solution) would benefit from 
adopting an inclusive approach. Accordingly, I delineate the authoring 
period as commencing with the compositions, through the Engagement 
Crisis and the execution of the King, up until the manuscript was submitted: 
between January 1646, and January 1651.  
Relational Context 
Hobbes was in exile in Paris for an 11-year period encompassing the 
entirety of the authoring period. This crucial factor is both important to my 
consideration and is frequently overlooked. His exile ended around a year 
after the publication of Leviathan.56 With reference to the basic assumption I 
                                               
16. Doubt is also cast on Hobbes’s claimed inception date of 1645, where it is 
suggested that this may simply have related to the collation of ideas. See MALCOLM, 
supra note 2 at 10–12. Alternate dates, for example, mid-1647, have also been 
suggested. For mention of this, albeit where a later inception date is applied, see 
Burgess, supra note 37 at 676, 682. 
56 TUCK, supra note 47 at lix; MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 6, 79; SKINNER, supra note 49 
at 22. 
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adopt—that Rule of Law-ideas represent a solution to perceivable (Rule of 
Law-relevant) problems—Hobbes’s physical estrangement from England may 
call into question the nature of the problems that were perceivable by him.  
England’s affairs were, nevertheless, immanent in Hobbes’s thoughts 
despite not being physically present. Whilst the Parisian intellectual 
environment was of great interest to Hobbes,57 he was very much integrated 
into Charles II’s exiled royal court and was involved in tutoring the young 
prince in mathematics.58 The extent of his integration is illustrated by his 
concerns over damage that may be caused to the young prince’s reputation 
through the incorrect suggestion of the nature of his tutoring in the 
publication of the second edition of De Cive.59 Association with the court 
placed him in a position to receive—and be concerned with—news and 
updates from England. Communications were relatively efficient. It was 
already possible to transmit key information within days60 and to rapidly 
                                               
57 For mention of Hobbes’s early interactions with Galileo, see HARRISON, supra note 
47 at 10. Hobbes was involved with the intellectuals surrounding Mersenne. See, 
THOMAS HOBBES, THE CORRESPONDENCE: VOLUME I: 1622-1659 xxii (Noel Malcolm ed., 
1994); JEFFREY R. COLLINS, THE ALLEGIANCE OF THOMAS HOBBES 61 (2007). 
58 SKINNER, supra note 49 at 15; OAKESHOTT, supra note 23 at 2.  
59 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 53–54. 
60 For the suggestion that, for example, news of the battle of Dunbar reached Paris in 
just over a week, see Id. at 79. 
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exchange documents between the France and England.61 This ability 
facilitated a debate regarding the engagement controversy,62 the receipt of 
information regarding the situation in England,63 and involvement with the 
debates from France.64 Accordingly, there is no reason to think that being in 
Paris, within a society of expatriates interested in political events in England, 
provided any more of an impediment to remaining informed than being in 
any other part of England (outside of London). Hobbes’s geographical 
estrangement does not, therefore, provide a significant impediment to my 
problem / solution methodology. 
 
                                               
61 For an exposition of the complicated and remote process of publication of 
Leviathan with an English Publisher, see Id. at 206–207, 209. 
62 See, for example, SKINNER, supra note 49 at 232, 276–7. Whilst Skinner’s position is 
questioned by Malcolm, the ability of Hobbes to contribute through having access to 
the debates is not questioned. See MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 67. 
63 Skinner, for example, quotes Hobbes’s suggestion the exiled courtiers’ delivery of 
news regarding the victories of Parliament prompted his authoring Leviathan. 
SKINNER, supra note 49 at 15. In making this point, Skinner references THOMAS 
HOBBES, 1 THOMÆ HOBBES MALMESBURIENSIS OPERA PHILOSOPHICA QUÆ LATINE lxxxi–
xcix (Sir William Molesworth ed., ). 
64 In correspondence, Hobbes stated ‘I haue no inclinations to the place where there 
is so little security…’ Thomas Payne, CORRESPONDENCE: PAYNE TO SHELDON (1649). 
This is referenced, and quoted, in MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 78. 




It would be peculiar to consider the contexts already outlined without 
considering where Leviathan sits in relation to Hobbes’s other works and, 
further, the target and purpose of Leviathan itself. The impact of civil war 
(generally) seems readily perceivable to Hobbes’s writing of Leviathan as 
political unrest also occurred in France during his period of exile;65 however, 
Hobbes’s other political writing—including The Elements of Law and De Cive—
were also authored during a civil war or conflict.66 In May 1640, mere months 
before the start of the Civil War, The Elements of Law was completed; its 
strongly royalist account of power is suggested as one reason why Hobbes 
fled to France.67 De Cive, written in Paris shortly after the start of the civil war 
in early-1642,68 contained many similar and interrelated arguments to 
Leviathan. (It has been suggested Hobbes had De Cive on his desk whilst 
writing the later work.69)  An English version was published in 1651.70 
                                               
65 It is also suggested that previous conflicts in France, as well as England, provided 
inspiration for Hobbes. See Oakeshott, supra note 37 at 7. 
66 Loughlin, supra note 23 at 12. 
67 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 2; SKINNER, supra note 49 at 8. See also HOBBES, supra 
note 57 at 115. 
68 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 2. 
69 Id. at 12. 
70 SKINNER, supra note 49 at 303. 
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Notwithstanding these contributions, Hobbes’s focus in France—at least in the 
years before the authoring period—seems to have been focused on optics, 
mathematics, physics, and logic.71 Furthermore, it is also sensible to consider 
that—whilst many see Hobbes as providing one of the first positivist 
accounts72—he was writing at a time when the natural law tradition dictated 
the terms for legal theory.73   
Given Hobbes’s very recent contribution to political thought in De 
Cive, and where Hobbes is thought to have not been displeased with the 
thoughts contained therein,74 it seems sensible to query, why Hobbes would 
be moved to write Leviathan. In effect, we should ask both who was the 
target, and what was the purpose, of Leviathan?75 First, however, it is 
instructive to consider some differences with Hobbes’s earlier works. 
                                               
71 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 3; SKINNER, supra note 49 at 5–7.   
72 See, for example, discussion of this characterisation by Loughlin, supra note 23 at 
6–7.  See also OAKESHOTT, supra note 23 at 45. However, arguments have also been 
made that Hobbes is better characterised as an ‘anti-positivist’. See Dyzenhaus, 
supra note 19 at 465. 
73 Dyzenhaus, supra note 19 at 465. 
74 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 2–3. 
75 Hobbes’s corpus also includes Behemoth. Although this relates to the struggle for 
power over the English in relation to the Civil War, its authoring and publication 
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Leviathan has been described as a ‘new version’ of De Cive or as a 
continuation or vulgarisation of earlier work, but there are significant 
differences in the assumptions on which the arguments are based.76 Given the 
broad similarities, one could see the latter work as a simple restatement; but 
this would be a mistake as there are similarities and differences in both the 
content and presentation of Leviathan.77 The differences include: the focus on 
the ideas of authorisation and the concept of an artificial person in 
Leviathan;78 the addition of content relating to the acquisition of 
sovereignty;79 and, the increased focus on religion, the addition of new 
chapters, and the focus on human psychology.80 The focus of Leviathan also 
changes—with the first half of the text taking a more practical approach to 
princely advice.81 The changes in the last two parts regarding religion—in 
                                               
occurs considerably later than Leviathan and is—as a result of its inability to evidence 
meaning at the time of Hobbes writing Leviathan—not considered here.   
76 SKINNER, supra note 49 at 11–13. See also THREE-TEXT EDITION OF THOMAS HOBBES’S 
POLITICAL THEORY: THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, DE CIVE AND LEVIATHAN, (Deborah Baumgold 
ed., 2017). 
77 A detailed exposition of the differences can be found in: MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 
12–24. 
78 Id. at 15–16.; SKINNER, supra note 49 at 13 and Ch. 6. 
79 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 33. 
80 Id. at 13–14. 
81 Id. at 56. 
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contrast to the earlier parts of the book which could be considered as 
enhancing earlier arguments—differ most markedly from earlier works,82 as 
the second half represents a substantially new work.83   
There are many potential reasons for change. They could, in the earlier 
parts, relate to attempts to enhance consistency,84 or as responses to issues 
with earlier works’ arguments.85 This reason (at least in relation to the parts 
drafted before the end of the war), could also relate to his being a loyal 
royalist.86 (Although, a line of thought suggests the work is an attempt to 
respond to arguments within the royalist camps.87) Debate regarding 
Hobbes’s reasoning is rife: Skinner argues Hobbes’s reason was, 
fundamentally, to contribute to the Engagement Crisis;88 yet, Malcom 
suggests there is no textual evidence for this and Burgess claims Skinner’s 
position can only be attributed to the Review and Conclusion of Leviathan—as 
an afterthought, as the text’s real purpose (as a support of the royalist cause) 
                                               
82 TUCK, supra note 47 at xxxviii and xxxix. 
83 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 15. 
84 Id. at 19. 
85 Id. at 15. 
86 Id. at 22.; SKINNER, supra note 49 at 21. 
87 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 25; TUCK, supra note 47 at xii. 
88 This is the fundamental thesis in SKINNER, supra note 49. 
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was overtaken before its completion—and the rest of the work responds to the 
European philosophical enterprise.89 The work has also been attributed to a 
general response to the century’s turmoils or predicament of mankind.90 In 
summary, there is little consensus regarding the rationale behind the 
changes. 
As to the intended audience for the work, its publication in England, 
and the authoring of the work in English, suggests it is aimed at an English 
audience,91 and more particularly—given the practical focus on ruling—an 
English Prince.92 However, the relative difference between the earlier and 
later parts of the book could suggest Hobbes had abandoned royalist ideas 
and, perhaps, sought to attract a more favourable audience.93 (The decision 
to do so could have been taken sometime in the 12 months preceding 
                                               
89 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 67; Burgess, supra note 37 at 676–677, 679, and 692. 
90 TUCK, supra note 47 at xlv; OAKESHOTT, supra note 23 at 51. This point seems to 
have some support from Hobbes who, in the last paragraph of Leviathan suggests 
the work is a response ‘occasioned by the disorders of the present time’. TUCK, supra 
note 47 at [395]. 
91 SKINNER, supra note 49 at 19. Although, as Malcolm points out, the intent to print in 
England cannot be inferred at the outset of authoring. MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 51.  
92 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 52. 
93 TUCK, supra note 47 at xliv.   
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August 1650.94) What seems clear, is that by the time the final paragraphs of 
the Review and Conclusion were penned—although the book’s theoretical 
root did not change—the intention was to show people could submit to the 
new parliamentary regime.95   
The complexity of Hobbes’s writing context is apparent. Hobbes’s 
perception of, and response to, the turmoil around him may have been a 
factor in his decision to refine or augment previous ideas and to publish 
Leviathan. The nature of these potentially perceivable problems can be 
illuminated through examining the period’s pamphlets.   
The Importance of Context in Understanding Hobbes 
It is now relevant to ask the more specific question: Does considering 
Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like ideas in context add anything? I think it does. I think 
it not only adds clarity to Hobbes’s meaning, but it also provides a way to see 
beyond the sovereign’s caricature and the arbitrariness caricature that 
conspire to cause analytic confusion. In other words, a contextual assessment 
of Hobbes’s Rule of Law ideas is capable of revealing nuances that the 
                                               
94 MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 59. 
95 Id. at 72–4, 80. 
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sovereign’s caricature fails to identify96 and can go some way toward 
addressing the disagreement as to the meaning of Hobbes’s ideas or the 
meaning of the concept of the Rule of Law.   
Before I illustrate one way of contextualising problems perceivable by 
Hobbes at the time he was writing Leviathan, it is useful to first consider what 
may—to many—be an obvious point: Hobbes’s context is very different to our 
contemporary context.97 By specifically stating this point, I want to ensure that 
it is not trivialised or overly simplified where the arbitrariness caricature may, 
otherwise, be readily paired with the sovereign’s caricature. Arbitrariness, as 
it exists in Hobbes’s Leviathan, reflects a different concern to that which 
presently exists.98 Hobbes—who was considered a royalist—was writing 
Leviathan in the aftermath of a civil war and the removal and replacement of a 
monarchical sovereign with a sovereign parliament (that will be) headed by a 
Lord Protector. A number of questions were being raised in relation to the 
legitimacy, legality, and authority of the new government. The aim was to 
                                               
96 A similar point is made by Malcolm: Id. at 82. 
97 This—obvious—statement parallels the—equally obvious—third Common 
Assumption of the Rule of Law in Chapter 2: Contemporary Conceptions Differ to 
Historical Conceptions.  
98 I delve into the precise nature of these details in the next part. 
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answer whether the new government could be lawfully obeyed.99 The 
turbulence associated with these upheavals cannot be underestimated. 
Whilst arbitrariness can be seen in contemporary democratic societies, when 
compared to the arbitrariness that concerned Hobbes, the two senses are 
factorially differentiable. As a result of the potential for the underlying 
problems to be seen as fundamentally different, there is value in both 
considering the precise context of Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like ideas, and for 
doing so in more detail than any caricature would afford.  
HOBBES’S RULE OF LAW: IN CONTEXT 
By conceiving of Hobbes’s idea of the Rule of Law in problem / solution 
terms, a more nuanced understanding of Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like idea can 
be attained. I detail the problems perceivable by Hobbes through recourse to 
the arguments contained in popular pamphlets that were published during or 
immediately prior to the period in which Hobbes penned his solution (to the 
pamphleteers’ problems) in Leviathan. I then outline the way in which the 
solution relates to the problem before illustrating the difference between this 
meaning and the generally accepted Hobbesian meaning.    
                                               
99 SKINNER, supra note 49 at 228. 
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Societal Context: The Pamphleteers’ (Rule of Law) Problem 
After a brief explanatory note about the nature and benefits of 
exploring pamphlets, I outline, each in a separate subsection, the 
fundamental problems identifiable from popular pamphlets during the 
authoring period (January 1646-January 1651). The subsections’ titles reflect 
the problems’ categorisation:  
o The form, nature and structure of government;  
o The necessity of (the people’s) consent and its effect on the 
legality / legitimacy of the government;  
o The impact and relevance of possession (of governmental 
power);  
o The duty, or obligation, of obedience from protection;  
o The needs or ultimate ends of society; and,  
o The purpose or ends of government.   
This order, broadly, reflects the order in which the problems came to 
prominence through the authoring period. I must be careful here.  I am not, 
nor do I need to, make specific claims regarding the exclusivity or 
periodisation of the problems. There is no necessary linearity to their 
invocation. There are, however, broad trends that lend—tentative—support to 
the ordering adopted.  
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Pamphleteers: a brief explanation of nature and purpose 
A pamphlet is a printed tract that can be as short as a page, and as 
long as a small book. They are easily and rapidly produced and can be made 
cheaply available. In an era before the internet and anything recognisable as 
a modern newspaper, pamphlets provided a way to publicly and widely 
comment, argue, spread news, or comment on events. They were used for 
propaganda as well as for political, personal, polemical, or profit motivated 
reasons.100 The versatility of their production makes a modern equivalent 
difficult to identify, but they could be conceived as being part tweet, part 
blog, part news report. 
By virtue of the purposes to which they were put, pamphlets provide a 
detailed record of the Rule of Law-relevant discussions that were taking place 
and the context in which Hobbes was writing.101 Across the half-decade of the 
                                               
100 For an excellent overview of the medium, and its uses, see JASON PEACEY, 
POLITICIANS AND PAMPHLETEERS: PROPAGANDA DURING THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS AND 
INTERREGNUM (2004); JOAD RAYMOND, PAMPHLETS AND PAMPHLETEERING IN EARLY 
MODERN BRITAIN (2003). 
101 A fantastic and detailed source of pamphlets exists in the Thomason Tracts. This 
contains a record of over 20,000 documents that were contemporaneously collected 
and collated by George Thomason. CATALOGUE OF THE PAMPHLETS, BOOKS, 
NEWSPAPERS, AND MANUSCRIPTS RELATING TO THE CIVIL WAR, THE COMMONWEALTH, AND 
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authoring period, there are more than 5,000 pamphlets preserved in the 
Thomason Tracts alone.102 Given I have not limited myself to only this store of 
information, some selection has been necessary. In doing so, I have not 
adopted any exclusive or restrictive limitations on the idea of a pamphlet. 
Whilst I have benefited from the vast amount of work that has already taken 
place in relation to the pamphlets of the period,103 as well as work focused 
specifically on Hobbes’s context,104 I have identified pamphlets that were: 
                                               
RESTORATION COLLECTED BY GEORGE THOMASON, 1640-1652, (George Thomason ed., 
1908).  
102 This figure is based on my very rough assessment of the 413 pages of the 
Thomason Tract catalogue that covers the authoring period with an average of 12 
pamphlets recorded on each of those pages. For the catalogue, see  Id. 
103 PEACEY, supra note 100; THE REGICIDES AND THE EXECUTION OF CHARLES I, (Jason Dr 
Peacey ed., 2001); JASON PEACEY, PRINT AND PUBLIC POLITICS IN THE ENGLISH 
REVOLUTION (2013); RAYMOND, supra note 100; NEWS, NEWSPAPERS AND SOCIETY IN 
EARLY MODERN BRITAIN, (Joad Raymond ed., 1 edition ed. 1999); JOAD RAYMOND, THE 
INVENTION OF THE NEWSPAPER: ENGLISH NEWSBOOKS 1641-1649 (1996); ALEXANDRA 
HALASZ, 17 THE MARKETPLACE OF PRINT: PAMPHLETS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EARLY 
MODERN ENGLAND (1997); DAVID ZARET, ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE: PRINTING, 
PETITIONS, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EARLY-MODERN ENGLAND (1999); ENGLISH 
RADICALISM, 1550-1850, (Glenn Burgess ed., 2011). 
104 Skinner, supra note 43; SKINNER, supra note 49; Quentin Skinner, Thomas Hobbes 
and His Disciples in France and England, 8 COMP. STUD. SOC. HIST. 153–167 (1966); 
Burgess, supra note 37; BURGESS, supra note 51; Burgess, supra note 51; PEREZ 
ZAGORIN, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION (1954); 
MALCOLM, supra note 2; NOEL MALCOLM, ASPECTS OF HOBBES (New Ed edition ed. 
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most prominent by considering arguments that are popular and influential (in 
the sense that these arguments are raised on several occasions by several 
people as well as provoking a number of responses); enduring (meaning that 
the arguments subsist across various pamphlets); and, most importantly, Rule 
of Law-relevant.105  
My focus on pamphlets is conscious and deliberate. Whilst alternative 
methods may illustrate the problems that were being raised in society, 
pamphlets provide a way to not only understand both sides of the issue—by 
virtue of the responses and counter-responses that often accompany initial 
arguments—but also identify issues that reflect society’s interests by virtue of 
their being designed to have broad appeal. By aggregating the arguments’ 
key points under only six headings, not only do I not suggest there are not 
other problems being discussed—there are—but also, I do not suggest these 
include every and all problems that could have fallen within my categories—
                                               
2004); Collins, supra note 37; Mark Goldie, The Reception of Hobbes, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 1450–1700 (J. H. Burns, ed., 1991); James 
J. Hamilton, The Social Context of Hobbes’s Political Thought, 11 MOD. INTELLECT. 
HIST. 1–29 (2014). 
105 In this sense, I rely on the dual meanings of Rule of Law-like ideas from the Rule of 
Law elements distilled in Chapter 3 as well as the broad normative force idea of the 
Rule of Law.  
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there are doubtless others. By identifying these six problems, my aim is 
merely to illustrate the arguments’ broad bases without becoming stuck in 
the weeds of each pamphlet’s finer aspects. Furthermore, whilst many of the 
pamphlets are polemical, propagandist, or factionally motivated, I do not 
identify the authors’ positions in this respect as I have no interest in the 
relative positions (or merits of each argument). As my aim is to identify and 
evidence the general problems perceivable by Hobbes (or anyone else in 
society), my broad-brush categorisation loses nothing.   
The form, nature and structure of government 
Following a civil war that questioned God-given monarchical powers, 
and a shift in the system of government to a hitherto unknown non-
monarchical structure, the agitation of questions that explore the appropriate 
form, nature, and structure of government is both understandable and 
expected. Questions arose like: Is a monarchy or a parliamentary democracy 
superior? Is there anything superior to the law? And, is the King subject to the 
law? Questions like these were raised throughout 1646 and 1647, and 
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included arguments relating to the logical superiority of the King,106 and that 
the King should be dispensed with because individuals—as the descendants 
of Adam and Eve, being capable of reason—need not suffer tyrannical 
leaders.107 Arguments related to the ability of right reason to operate so as to 
enable men [sic] to preserve themselves, the position of equity as being 
superior to law, and the inherent sovereignty of the people can be seen in 
Leveller pamphlets by Overton, as well as and work authored, perhaps, by 
Wildman.108 These points were also included in (the first) Agreement of the 
People in 1647, which sets out the basic Leveller manifesto and includes 
arguments relating to the necessity of a covenant with one another, equality 
before the law, the importance of rights and a fundamental law, and a new 
                                               
106 MARCHAMONT NEDHAM, THE CASE OF THE KINGDOM STATED (1647); ANON., A 
PARALELL OF GOVERNMENTS (1647); JOHN COOK D., REDINTEGRATIO AMORIS (1647). For 
an explanation of the importance of these works, see PEACEY, supra note 100 at 117. 
107 JOHN LILBURNE, THE FREE-MANS FREEDOM VINDICATED 11–12 (1646). See also further 
explanation in ZAGORIN, supra note 104 at 11–12. 
108 RICHARD OVERTON, AN APPEALE FROM THE DEGENERATE REPRESENTATIVE BODY 30 
(1647). Zagorin suggests that some of these demands were taken from a previous 
pamphlet of Wildman’s. See ZAGORIN, supra note 104 at 30. (Attributing authorship 
to Wildman of THOMAS FAIRFAX, JOHN WILDMAN & ROBERT EVERARD, THE CASE OF THE 
ARMIE TRULY STATED (1647).)  
Chapter 4: The Leviathan’s Rule of Law 
 
201 
social contract.109 The arguments, it has been suggested, go beyond 
democratic constitutionalism and, instead, represent the state—as a state of 
nature—that the author saw as existing in England at the time.110  They all 
relate to the idea of the Rule of Law adopted herein.  
In exploring the question of the King’s superiority, mention must be 
made of Filmer. In Filmer’s Patriarchia, published in 1680, he draws a parallel 
between a father’s—non-consent based—power over his children and a King's 
power over his subjects and suggests, as this is a power derived from God, it 
cannot be resisted.111 Similar arguments by Filmer were available in mid-
1648.112 In January 1649, John Cook takes an opposing stance when he—in 
the speech he would have given, as the government’s solicitor, should the 
King have pleaded to the charges against him—suggests the King had always 
                                               
109 EDMOND BEAR, AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE FOR A FIRME AND PRESENT PEACE (1647). 
Similar demands related to the exploitation of the masses can also be found in later 
pamphlets. See, for example, ANON., LIGHT SHINING IN BUCKINGHAMSHIRE (1649). 
110 ZAGORIN, supra note 104 at 12–17. (Zagorin attributes authorship of An 
Agreement… to Lilburne.) 
111 ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS (1991).  
112 Filmer, supra note 45; Robert Filmer, The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed 
Monarchy, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 131–171 (J. P. Sommerville ed., 1991). 
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been subject to the law.113 In the same month, arguments were also raised as 
to the superiority of the natural law over both made law and the sovereign 
people,114 and in the following month, Milton—in his Tenure of Kings and 
Magistrates—suggest men [sic] are by nature free, and there exists a right of 
revolution that extends to the removal of kings—even if not tyrannical—as 
kings are subject to the law.115 These arguments come amidst pamphlets 
questioning whether the execution of the King was just,116 and where the 
charge of tyranny was also laid at the feet of the parliamentary government 
for failing to heed the wishes of the people.117 Government’s legality, and its 
subjection to the law, remained at issue throughout the authoring period.118 
Obedience to government is suggested as being lawful only in only certain 
                                               
113 JOHN COOK, KING CHARLS HIS CASE (1649).  For discussion of this point, see 
ZAGORIN, supra note 104 at 79. For later arguments that the Commonwealth is 
superior to a monarchy, see HENRY ROBINSON, A SHORT DISCOURSE BETWEEN 
MONARCHICAL AND ARISTOCRATICAL GOVERNMENT (1649); MARCHAMONT NEDHAM, CASE 
OF THE COMMON-WEALTH STATED (1650).  
114 JOHN GOODWIN, RIGHT AND MIGHT WELL MET (1648).  
115 JOHN MILTON, THE TENURE OF KINGS AND MAGISTRATES (1649). 
116 ANON., THE SUBJECTS SORROW (1649). 
117 JOHN LILBURNE, ENGLANDS NEW CHAINS DISCOVERED (1649). The importance of this 
work is explored by SKINNER, supra note 49 at 294; THE INTERREGNUM: THE QUEST FOR 
SETTLEMENT, 1646-60, 85 (G. E. Aylmer ed., Revised ed. 1974). 
118 FABIAN PHILIPPS, KING CHARLES THE FIRST, NO MAN OF BLOOD (1649). 
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circumstances,119 whilst the Levellers’ third Agreement of the People declared, 
inter alia, that: there may not be an exemption for any person to the laws; the 
laws must be made in English; and, the government is not sovereign as it 
cannot act in all matters.120 Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like answer in Leviathan 
goes to the heart of these problems. They also play a role in the other 
problems below.   
The necessity of (the people’s) consent and its effect on the legality / 
legitimacy of the government 
This problem could be summarised in only a few questions: Is consent 
necessary to be ruled (and has it been given)? And, is the new regime legal?  
Arguments related to these questions occur, relatively evenly, throughout the 
entire authoring period.  
The need for consent to be ruled was advocated most vigorously by 
the Levellers in 1647,121 and in the following year by Goodwin and Milton.122 
Similar points were also argued by Lilburne—who sought to argue tyranny 
                                               
119 ANON., AN ENQUIRY AFTER FURTHER SATISFACTION (1649). 
120 WILLIAM THOMPSON & JOHN LILBURNE, ENGLANDS STANDARD ADVANCED IN 
OXFORDSHIRE (1649). 
121 OVERTON, supra note 108; BEAR, supra note 109. 
122 GOODWIN, supra note 114; MILTON, supra note 115. 
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follows from the absence of consent123—and by several others in subsequent 
years.124 The legality of the new regime remained at issue and formed a 
fundamental aspect of the Engagement Controversy. In early 1649, to 
illustrate obedience was lawful notwithstanding the government’s legal 
status, illegality was assumed as a basis for argument.125 This assumption was, 
however, subsequently repudiated,126 and more positive defences of the 
charge of illegality were mounted.127 Notwithstanding this minor U-turn, 
                                               
123 LILBURNE, supra note 117. 
124 See ROBINSON, supra note 113; RICHARD HOLLINGWORTH, AN EXERCITATION 
CONCERNING USURPED POWERS (1650); WILLIAM PRYNNE, THE ARRAIGNMENT, CONVICTION 
AND CONDEMNATION OF THE WESTMINSTERIAN-JUNCTO’S ENGAGEMENT (1649). See also 
ANON., EXERCITATION ANSWERED (1650). 
125 For the initial statement that although the government may be unlawful, it remains 
lawful to obey its commands, see FRANCIS ROUS, THE LAVVFULNES OF OBEYING THE 
PRESENT GOVERNMENT (1649); JOHN DURY, A CASE OF CONSCIENCE RESOLVED (1649).  
(Rous’s pamphlet and the responses it prompted are explored more fully below.) 
126 ANTONY ASCHAM, THE BOUNDS & BONDS OF PUBLIQUE OBEDIENCE (1649). 
127 JOHN DURY, CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE PRESENT ENGAGEMENT (1649); ANON., 
A LOGICAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE LAWFULNESS OF SUBSCRIBING THE NEW ENGAGEMENT 
(1650). 
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legality arguments were, however, made both before,128 and after this 
point.129  
The impact and relevance of possession (of governmental power) 
This problem is largely reflected in the pamphlets associated with the 
Engagement Controversy. A key question related to whether the 
parliamentarians’ possession of government power (as civil war victors) was 
sufficient to warrant obedience from the population. Dury mounts the first 
defence based on de facto possession, relying on a Calvinist position, in 
March 1649: even if the government’s legitimacy is doubted, it is not the 
place of individuals to meddle.130 The following months saw a flurry of 
pamphlets in support or opposition. In April, in The Lawfulness of Obeying 
the Present Government,131 Rous argues that support of the new government—
through taking the Oath of Engagement—is consistent with previous oaths to 
the King, and suggests legality is of no consequence. Citing biblical and 
                                               
128 ANON., EIKON BASILIKE (1649). For commentary on this, see THE INTERREGNUM, 
supra note 117 at 85. For related arguments relating to the unjust execution of the 
king, see ANON., supra note 116. 
129 PHILIPPS, supra note 118. 
130 DURY, supra note 125. For further discussion of the impact and terms of this 
argument, see DURY, supra note 122. 
131 ROUS, supra note 125. 
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historical precedent, he argues obedience is lawful, even if a change in 
government is unlawful.132 Whilst this resembles Dury’s earlier argument, 
Rous suggests it is only in lawful commands, from a power with no visible 
force to oppose it, that a de facto power is to be obeyed.133 Within weeks, 
similar arguments are made by Ascham in three works in as many months,134 
and he expands an earlier argument to suggest those demanding obedience 
must have possession.135 Nedham also makes similar arguments in support of 
Rous.136 Opposition was equally prominent and swift. Commencing in May 
                                               
132 JOHN M. WALLACE, THE ENGAGEMENT CONTROVERSY 1649-1652: AN ANNOTATED LIST 
OF PAMPHLETS (1964); SKINNER, supra note 49 at 271, 292; MALCOLM, supra note 2 at 
35–36, 66–67; THE INTERREGNUM, supra note 117 at 83. For similar sentiments, see 
ANON., supra note 127. 
133 For further detail on this point, see ZAGORIN, supra note 104 at 69. 
134 ASCHAM, supra note 126; ANTONY ASCHAM, A COMBATE BETWEENE TWO SECONDS 
(1649); ANTONY ASCHAM, A DISCOURSE, WHEREIN IS EXAMINED, WHAT IS PARTICULARLY 
LAWFULL DURING THE CONFUSIONS AND REVOLUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT (1648). See also 
later arguments in LEWIS DU MOULIN, THE POVVER OF THE CHRISTIAN MAGISTRATE (1650). 
135 ASCHAM, supra note 134; ANTONY ASCHAM, OF THE CONFUSIONS AND REVOLUTIONS 
OF GOVERNMENTS (1649). For a similar point, see ANON., supra note 127. 
136 NEDHAM, supra note 113. For background and further detail, see MALCOLM, supra 
note 2 at 66–67; SKINNER, supra note 49 at 290–300; ZAGORIN, supra note 104 at 122; 
WALLACE, supra note 132 at 41–42. 
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1649, these took the form of arguments that only legal powers should be 
obeyed as well as doubting the biblical interpretations used by Rous.137   
The duty, or obligation, of obedience from protection 
The question that reflects this problem is: does protection by the 
government obligate the citizen to obey the government? Although this 
overlaps with the de facto questions raised above, the present question 
comes to prominence only from late-1649, and flows (as do the issues I 
explore below) from Ascham’s arguments—that duties are owed to a 
protector—raised in July and August 1649,138 before arguing, in November 
1649, both that those demanding obedience should have plenary possession 
and people obey out of fear.139 These points lay the foundation for 
subsequent suggestions that self-preservation is a basic motivation for 
                                               
137 See, for example, NATHANIEL WARD, A RELIGIOUS DEMURRER, CONCERNING 
SUBMISSION TO THE PRESENT POWER (1649); ANON., THE GRAND CASE OF CONSCIENCE 
STATED (1649); JOHN AUCHER, ARGUMENTS AND REASONS TO PROVE THE INCONVENIENCE 
& UNLAWFULNESS OF TAKING THE NEW ENGAGEMENT (1650). The subsequent attacks on 
Rous generally focused on his interpretation of Romans. This is apparent even from 
the annotated list of pamphlets provided in WALLACE, supra note 132. 
138 ASCHAM, supra note 126. This is a defence of Rous, and a reaction to Ward. WARD, 
supra note 137. 
139 ASCHAM, supra note 135. 
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obedience.140 Ascham’s largely secular point,141 is also taken up in 
providential terms by others.142 Whilst often summarised as requiring a 
mutual obligation between protection and obedience,143 it is also put in 
slightly different terms by Ascham: no obedience also means no protection.144 
A reflection and extension of the point is found in the suggestions that it was 
for the people to make the best conditions they can with conquerors and 
powers,145 and that protection, peace, or the avoidance of confusion is the 
                                               
140 ROBERT SANDERSON, A RESOLUTION OF CONSCIENCE (1649). This opposes Ascham, 
as the author separates the force and authority of the government. See, WALLACE, 
supra note 132; SKINNER, supra note 49 at 301. See also Ascham’s response ANTONY 
ASCHAM, A REPLY TO A PAPER OF DR SANDERSONS (1650). 
141 The shift, by some, to fully secular arguments is noted in THE INTERREGNUM, supra 
note 117 at 87, 93. 
142 DURY, supra note 127. For a response to Dury, see HENRY ROBINSON, AN ANSWER 
TO MR. J. DURY (1650). 
143 N. W., A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE ENGAGEMENT: (1650); ANON., CONSCIENCE 
PUZZEL’D (1649); SAMUEL EATON, THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE AND THE NATIONAL 
COVENANT PROVED TO BE NON-OBLIGING (1650); ANON., MEMORANDUMS OF THE 
CONFERENCES HELD BETWEEN THE BRETHREN SCRUPLED AT THE ENGAGEMENT (1650). For 
commentary on this point, see SKINNER, supra note 49 at 275–289. 
144 ASCHAM, supra note 140. 
145 ANON., supra note 143. 
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end—a necessary end—of government.146 These suggestions frame the 
following subsections. 
The needs or ultimate ends of society 
This sub-section and the one following, whilst derived from the 
previous one, reflect similar ideas viewed from different positions: society’s; 
and, the government’s. Whilst the suggestion that peace is society’s chief end 
is first prominently raised by Ascham in mid-1649,147 consistent attention is 
not focused on the question until early 1650.148 By mid-1650, the argument 
included that society’s members need protection from one another and that 
this can be achieved by yielding to a common power.149 Whilst, by January 
1651, arguments are made that men [sic] should seek peace to remove 
themselves from the state of nature,150 before then, in August 1650, societal 
needs are expressed in terms of necessity: what is necessary to preserve a 
                                               
146 N. W., supra note 143; ANON., supra note 143; SANDERSON, supra note 140; 
NEDHAM, supra note 113. 
147 ASCHAM, supra note 134; ASCHAM, supra note 126. 
148 ANON., supra note 127; N. W., supra note 143; S. W., THE CONSTANT MAN’S 
CHARACTER (1650); NEDHAM, supra note 113. 
149 NEDHAM, supra note 113. For a view of Nedham in these terms, see SKINNER, supra 
note 49 at 280–1. 
150 HENRY PARKER, SCOTLANDS HOLY WAR (1651). 
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safe society is an absolute power.151 These sentiments relate intimately to the 
purposes or ends of government outlined immediately below.   
The purpose or ends of government 
We now consider a similar problem, but from the government’s 
perspective. Arguments related to government’s purpose or ends largely 
parallels government’s necessity, and the mutual obligation of protection and 
obedience, outlined above. A related argument regarding the purpose of the 
law is initially made in 1649,152 before it is argued in the Memorandums, in 
August 1650, that the Government’s purpose is to provide mutual 
recognition.153 Despite this specific argument, it is possible to infer a purpose 
or end of government if the government’s purpose is seen as correlative to 
society’s needs, and by considering these as the same relationship viewed 
from a different perspective.154 Should this be the case, it is possible to infer a 
                                               
151 ANON., supra note 143. 
152 GERRARD WINSTANLEY, A LETTER TO THE LORD FAIRFAX (1649). See also, ANTHONY 
ASCHAM, THE ORIGINAL & END OF CIVIL POWER (1649). 
153 ANON., supra note 143. For further discussion, see SKINNER, supra note 49 at 300; 
WALLACE, supra note 132. 
154 In this respect, I have in mind something akin to the way in which Hohfeld views 
relationships between parties. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE LAW J. 710–770 (1917).   
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governmental purpose when considering the problems regarding both the 
needs and ends of society as well as—more obviously—the duty and obligation 
of obedience when protection is provided.155 For example, if society’s 
members need protection from one another, one purpose of government 
that could be inferred is that this protection should, in some way, be 
provided.156 
Why the Problems are Rule of Law-like Problems 
Each of the six problems can be conceived as falling either within the 
normative force conception, or the Rule of Law elements. In relation to the 
normative force idea, it is clearly the case that there is an impact on the way 
that power is / may be exercised that relates to the problems raised. The 
problems’ satisfaction of the Rule of Law elements is, perhaps, not as 
intuitively obvious. Comprehension is necessary for the society to understand 
where and how power will be exercised; this flows from the imposition of or 
consent to a known governmental structure, or from knowledge of the extent 
or nature of what is required by either government (the form/structure of 
                                               
155 See the previous two sub-sections for references to the particular points.  
156 I appreciate that this requires some assumptions regarding the role and necessity 
of government in society. I provide no evidence for this. However, my point 
generally does not depend on any inferred purpose or end of government.  
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government; as well as the necessity of consent) or the people (the relevance 
of possession; obedience for protection; society’s needs; and, government’s 
ends). Procedural pellucidity is satisfied, albeit largely implicitly, as each of 
the problems relate to the need for some formal / procedural structure that 
must be seen—and be seen to be seen—in the imposition of power. 
Hobbes’s Solution to the Pamphleteers’ (Rule of Law) Problem: Only One 
Problem? 
I have identified six Rule of Law-like problems from the authoring 
period’s popular pamphlets. Hobbes, in Leviathan, answers all of these and 
not merely one of them (as would be the case if a caricature is adopted). 
Solutions to these problems were debated across a vast number of 
pamphlets that were read by large numbers of people in England (and 
beyond). The sheer number suggests a substantial market and substantial 
readership; the nature of the debate indicates an educated, informed and 
interested public;157 and, the problems’ reoccurrence suggests the issues 
remained unresolved.  
                                               
157 Here, I do not directly challenge Habermas’s idea of the ‘public sphere’ in JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A 
CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (1 ed. 2015). However, there do exist arguments to 
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Despite being in France, there is no reason why Hobbes could not 
have been actively engaged with these problems. My argument does not rely 
on Hobbes having read all or any of these pamphlets. I use the evidence 
above merely to illustrate the existence of the problems.158 All that matters for 
my argument is that the problems, in the terms that I have broadly 
categorised, reflect problems considered to exist in society (by the 
pamphleteers or by their readers). In this sense, the problems in the 
pamphlet debates reflect a societal reality and, where Hobbes is part of that 
society, he too is exposed to the problems that are reflected in the 
pamphlets; it, therefore, makes no difference whether Hobbes has been 
exposed to the particular (reflected) versions of the problems as they exist in 
the pamphlets. Accordingly, I do not attempt to show that Hobbes read any 
                                               
amend the temporal boundaries. Delineation of the public sphere has been 
questioned and suggestions made that this should be extended into the mid 17th 
century, see for example NEWS, NEWSPAPERS AND SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN BRITAIN, 
supra note 103 at Ch 5; PEACEY, supra note 100 at 314; HALASZ, supra note 103 at 42. 
See also, ZARET, supra note 103. In relation to the literacy rates during the time, see 
Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Seventeenth Century London, in POPULAR CULTURE IN 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 31–58, 49 (Barry Reay ed., 1988). 
158 It is for this reason that I have not separated the various points into their various 
polemical or political camps; where the arguments came from or the authors’ 
ultimate goal is of no moment. 
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of the texts; it is enough for me to show the problems were a real concern in 
Hobbes’s society.   
Consider for a moment several pamphleteer arguments already 
outlined that suggest: men [sic] should seek peace to remove themselves 
from the state of nature;159 what is necessary to preserve a safe society is an 
absolute power;160 yielding to a common power protects society’s members 
from one another;161 peace is society’s chief end;162 people obey out of fear;163 
self-preservation is a basic motivation for obedience;164 consent to be ruled is 
necessary;165 and, the formation of a social contract is necessary.166 Even on 
the basis of the sovereign’s caricature, these sound very much like Hobbes’s 
arguments. Whilst I make no suggestion that he derived his arguments from 
                                               
159 PARKER, supra note 150. 
160 ANON., supra note 143. 
161 NEDHAM, supra note 113.  
162 ASCHAM, supra note 134; ASCHAM, supra note 126. 
163 ASCHAM, supra note 135. 
164 SANDERSON, supra note 140.  
165 OVERTON, supra note 108; BEAR, supra note 109. 
166 BEAR, supra note 109.  
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these texts, it is both important and relevant to note that arguments of this 
sort were not unpopular at the time he was writing.167  
What does all this mean in terms of Hobbes’s solution to the 
pamphleteers’ problem? First, the title of this section specifies ‘the 
pamphleteers’ Rule of Law problem’ because pamphlet selection has been 
made on the basis of the arguments having some relevance to the broad 
ideas of the Rule of Law I have adopted. The point of this is to focus on the 
issues regarding Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like ideas and to argue that Hobbes’s 
context—illustrated by the problems in society—assists in clarifying Hobbes’s 
meaning. This requires that Hobbes’s solution—consisting of the Rule of Law-
like ideas in Leviathan—be considered in terms of the (six) problems I have 
identified as existing in society at the time of authoring.    
The sovereign’s caricature in Hobbes’s Leviathan (reprise) 
The sovereign’s caricature provides a solution to one of the six 
problems evident when Hobbes was writing. I think Hobbes meant to answer 
                                               
167 Some of the arguments could have been borrowed from Hobbes’s earlier works 
De Cive (1642) and The Elements of Law /De Corpore Politico (1650). See, for 
example, THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE: THE ENGLISH VERSION: OR, THE CITIZEN (Howard 
Warrender ed., 1984); THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL & POLITIC, 
(Ferdinand Tonnies ed., 1928). 
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more than just this problem. Failing to appreciate this—even in caricatures of 
Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like idea—can lead to fundamental unclarity in relation 
to his account generally.   
Recall that the sovereign’s caricature reflects a ruler exercising largely 
arbitrary and unlimited power, where there can be no higher power and 
where the sovereign rules as an absolute ruler exercising absolute authority. 
These are all structural or formal aspects of sovereignty. Thinking of this from 
the other perspective, the other (five) problems that I have identified do not 
raise issues that can be solved by the terms of the sovereign’s caricature. To 
illustrate, I split the remaining problems (other than the formal/structural 
problem) into two categories of problems: societally-focused; and, 
government-related. Societally-focused problems—that question the need for 
consent, the nature of the duties that follow from protection, and, the content 
of society’s needs generally—do not call for a solution that requires 
specification of the nature or structure of the sovereign. They call for a 
solution regarding what individuals or society must do. This does not reflect 
the sovereign’s caricature. Similarly, government-related problems—that raise 
questions regarding what follows from de facto possession, and the purpose 
/ end of government—call for solutions regarding what the government 
should do in certain circumstances. Neither category necessitates a solution 
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that describes the nature of the powers exercised (unlimited and absolute) or 
the structure or form of government (as the highest authority) as is 
communicated in the sovereign’s caricature.  
Hobbes did not respond to only one problem; he meant to respond to 
all of the problems.168 His responses evidence this. Let us first consider his 
responses to societally-focused problems. The need for consent is, as is well 
known, reflected in Hobbes’s account of the social contract. He requires that 
the people provide consent—by compacting with one another—to be subject 
to a single, absolute, sovereign power.169 In relation to the second of the 
societally-focused problems—regarding the duties that flow from protection 
being provided to society—Hobbes clearly signals his intent to contribute to 
the debates and reflect some of the disorders of the present time by 
                                               
168 Of course, I cannot illustrate Hobbes’s actual intent; this is a familiar problem in 
relation to any form of intellectual history. By illustrating the close parallels of 
Hobbes’s account, I hope that it will be clear that the theory he proposes not only 
neatly matches the problems but also that it makes more sense when viewed in 
these terms.   
169 Hobbes puts it best: ‘I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to 
this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to 
him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.’ TUCK, supra note 47 at [87] (italics 
in original). See also, Id. at [107] and [391]. 
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adopting the ‘mutual relation’ phrase used in the pamphlets.170 It is also clear 
that, in relation to Hobbes’s theory generally, there is a near absolute duty to 
obey any command of the sovereign as long as the sovereign provides 
protection and prevents society lapsing again into war.171 Here, he clearly 
means to respond to the duty / protection problem. In relation to the needs 
of society as the final societally-focused problem, society’s need could be 
expressed as being to avoid being in the state of nature, and as this requires 
individuals be protected from one another, they agree to be subject to a 
sovereign that can provide this protection. Hobbes’s position is that the end 
of society is to avoid war and to seek peace by entering a social contract.172  
                                               
170 He does this in the final paragraph of the book. The paragraph commences like 
this: ‘And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall 
government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, 
without application, and without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the 
mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience…’ TUCK, supra note 47 at [395]-
[396]. 
171 ‘The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no 
longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them… The end of 
Obedience is Protection...’ Id. at [114]. In the same sense, a subject can disobey the 
sovereign when his or her life is threatened. See, for example, Id. at [109]-[112]. 
172 ‘The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men… in the introduction of that restraint 
upon themselves, (in which we see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of 
their own preservation…’ TUCK, supra note 47 at [85]. ‘The only way to erect such a 
Common Power…  is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or 
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The government-relevant problems relate to the duty of protection 
following obedience, de facto possession and, the purpose / end of 
government. In relation to the first two, whilst Hobbes does not directly 
address the question of whether mere possession affords a duty to obey, his 
theory answers this broadly in the negative as, by virtue of the necessary 
requirement for a process of consent to place the sovereign into power, 
Hobbes’s sovereign can never be merely in possession: the duty to obey 
comes from that act of consent.173 Accordingly, mere possession could not 
suffice as this could not, by virtue of the requirements for the establishment of 
the commonwealth and the sovereign, arise. An answer to the final problem 
regarding the purpose or ends of government is suggested through the very 
nature of the compact between the people: individuals compact to obtain 
protection from one another and they agree to be subject to the sovereign on 
the basis that protection is provided.174 The purpose of the government 
could, therefore, be said to provide this protection; the creation of the 
government is presupposed on this purpose. Given the way in which the 
                                               
upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, 
unto one Will…’ Id. at [87]. 
173 TUCK, supra note 47 at [87]-[88]. See also extracted quotes in note 169 and, with 
particular reference to his use of ‘only’, at 172.  
174 Id. at [85]. See also ‘finall Cause’ quote at 172. (This passage is accompanied by a 
marginal heading of ‘The End of Common-wealth, particular Security:’) 
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various aspects of Leviathan—when viewed as solutions—match perceivable 
problems in society when Hobbes was writing, it seems open to infer Hobbes 
meant to answer more than only the formal or structural problem.  
Failing to consider Hobbes’s wider scope, even when adopting a 
caricature, can lead to fundamental unclarity. Whilst Hobbes does want to 
provide an account of the form and structure of government, a more accurate 
view is provided when his account is also seen as providing solutions to the 
societally-focused and government-relevant problems (‘the other problems’). 
When the failure to take into account the other problems is considered, it is 
clear why Hobbes would usually be seen—especially by those adopting 
something like the sovereign’s caricature—as a non-Rule of Law thinker. In this 
sense, it is all too easy to write Hobbes off as an absolutist who merely 
advocates arbitrary powers, and not appreciate his sovereign as a ruler 
subject to controls on powers that are imposed by the very nature, purpose, 
and rationale behind the office itself. Where the (six) problems provide a 
context that illustrates constraints on the sovereign’s powers exist, and when 
the Rule of Law is seen as a normative force constraining the exercise of 
power or as relating to the Rule of Law elements, Hobbes’s ideas are certainly 
conceivable as Rule of Law-like ideas. 
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CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF HOBBES’S CONTEXT 
Is Hobbes’s context important? It is if we care not only about clarity, but 
also about ensuring that we do not neglect, or forget, that the ideas he 
provides solve problems that go far beyond the solutions that are 
acknowledged or identified when a mere caricature of his position is applied.   
By illustrating that it is possible to conceive of Hobbes as being 
relevant to (albeit broadly drawn) ideas of the Rule of Law, and by using 
pamphlets that were popular at the time that Hobbes was writing Leviathan to 
illustrate the problems that were perceivable by Hobbes, I have argued that it 
is useful, and necessary if heightened clarity is desirable, to consider his 
account as being a solution to more than a problem regarding the form and 
structure of government (as is suggested by caricatures of his position). By 
identifying six categories of problem apparent from pamphlet debates from 
the time Hobbes was writing, I have illustrated why the caricature view of 
Hobbes provides an unclear appreciation of Hobbes’s meaning: five of the 
problems perceivable by Hobbes, to which Leviathan can feasibly be seen as 
providing a solution, are not capable of being answered by the caricature. In 
this regard, it is clear that taking account of Hobbes’s broader context 
provides analytical benefit. Something important is lost when we conceive of 
Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like solution in a way that reflects less than 20% of the 
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work’s potential meaning. Taking a broader view of Hobbes’s meaning 
illuminates a broader—Rule of Law-relevant—gamut of principles that are 
generally not considered.  
One thing that does emerge from this analysis and methodology is the 
clear conclusion that, even if Hobbes’s Rule of Law-like solution in Leviathan is 
not accepted as being relevant to, or appropriately included in, 
contemporary Rule of Law terms, Hobbes is providing an answer to problems 
that would clearly be seen as being Rule of Law-relevant (in terms of 
contemporary conceptions). That these Hobbes-perceivable Rule of Law-
relevant problems—broadly conceived as being relevant to the form nature 
and structure of government, questions regarding what the government 
should do in certain circumstances, and what individuals in society must do—
can give rise to what are conceived today as non-Rule of Law-relevant 
solutions seems a peculiar outcome. Whilst nothing really turns on this 
aspect, it could be argued that the mere fact that Leviathan provides a 
response to Rule of Law-relevant problems is enough to categorise those 
solutions as also being Rule of Law-relevant.  
By using the context of Hobbes’s writing it is possible to differentiate 
Hobbes’s ideas from the relative caricature that is frequently cited. 
Furthermore, the application of a problem / solution approach not only 
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brings clarity to the way in which Hobbes is seen and used in the ongoing 
debate about what the Rule of Law is, but also suggests that exploring other 
authors’ ideas (that are frequently associated with the Rule of Law) in a similar 
way—in order to obtain a similarly more fine-grained understanding—may 
facilitate a greater level of clarity across the ongoing Rule of Law debate more 
generally.  After considering Locke in the next chapter, the ramifications and 
possibilities that flow from a consideration of change across two more fine-














ANOTHER LOOK AT LOCKE’S RULE OF LAW:  
LOCKE’S NOT A LOCK(E) AFTER ALL? 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is not Locke’s Rule of Law. What I mean by this is 
that the generally stated and accepted position regarding the Rule of Law in 
Locke’s Two Treatises (‘Locke’s Rule of Law’) is not truly reflective of the Rule 
of Law position that Locke meant to communicate: Locke’s Rule of Law. 
Disambiguation of these two positions is crucial in circumstances where 
‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is frequently and widely deployed in illustrating what the 
(contemporary) concept of the Rule of Law is. In order to achieve a greater 
level of clarity in relation to both the concept itself, and Locke’s idea’s use and 
/ or benefit to the concept, an enhanced understanding of Locke’s meaning is 
essential.  
It is necessary—if we want to be clear about exactly what Locke’s Rule of 
Law-like idea was—that we fully comprehend the totality of the problems to 
which Locke was responding. To do this, we must consider more than the 
simple form of arbitrary rule to which ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is generally taken 
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to relate. In this chapter, I apply the methodology introduced earlier in the 
thesis, and applied to Hobbes in the last chapter, to Locke’s Rule of Law-like 
idea in the Two Treatises. My goals are similar: illustrate the utility of a 
contextualist approach to Locke’s Rule of Law-like idea; and, disambiguate 
Locke’s Rule of Law and ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ by considering the meaning that 
becomes evident from exploring Locke’s idea in a problem / solution 
methodology. 
Both the Rule of Law and Locke’s Two Treatises are considerable fields 
of study. Academics around the world in law schools and history departments 
have built careers focused on either one of these ideas. However, as with 
Hobbes, there have been no attempts to bring together the legal theory 
aspects (of the Rule of Law conceptual debate) and the contextual intellectual 
history (regarding the Two Treatises) in a way that can fully illuminate what 
Locke was doing in his Rule of Law-relevant work. This chapter takes one 
small step toward remedying this. Through a contextualist examination of the 
Rule of Law-relevant aspects of the Two Treatises, I illuminate and illustrate 
the ways in which Locke’s Rule of Law is underappreciated in the Rule of Law 
literature due to the way that ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is frequently caricatured. 
The most pervasive aspect of ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’, and the one that the 
contemporary concept of the Rule of Law is most frequently allied with, is the 
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concept’s opposition to the operation or application of arbitrary power. 
However, simply bringing these two together fundamentally 
underappreciates some of the core motivations behind his work. Whilst this is 
undoubtedly one aspect of Locke’s thought, it is not the only, nor is it the 
most important, aspect of his Rule of Law-like thinking. 
Locke’s Rule of Law is far from unidimensional; nuances emerge by 
applying the methodology from the previous chapters. I identify (via popular 
pamphlets) a number of Rule of Law-relevant problems that exist in England 
at the time that Locke was writing the Two Treatises. In order to identify Rule 
of Law-like aspects of Locke’s work, I use the same Rule of Law definitions. 
Once I have both Rule of Law-like ideas—a set of problems from the 
pamphlets, and a set of solutions from Locke—I bring these together to 
demonstrate that Locke’s Rule of Law clearly and obviously is focused on 
solving some of the most important and widespread Rule of Law-like 
problems that existed in society. By doing so, I show that the Rule of Law-like 
solutions that Locke provides cannot—unlike his contemporarily applied 
caricature—be seen in terms of a concept that merely provides a defence 
against the exercise of arbitrary power; the account Locke offers, like 
Hobbes’s in the last chapter, focuses on several additional problems. The 
interconnection of these ideas is so fundamental to Locke’s account that 
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divorcing only one of these ideas to create a caricature underappreciates 
what Locke actually meant. The mere fact that the most popular 
contemporary view of the Rule of Law—that reflects an opposition to arbitrary 
power—is echoed in ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ work is no reason to pre-determine 
which aspects of his work will be attributed principal or sole importance 
especially when the conceptions of the Rule of Law are acknowledged to 
have changed considerably over time.1  
The structure of this chapter is relatively simple; it mirrors the structure 
of Chapter 4. I first provide some preliminary background details and outline 
what ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is commonly taken to be, as well as restating the 
adopted definitions for ‘the Rule of Law’. After providing some brief historical 
background to the period and to Locke more generally, through my recourse 
to popular pamphlets, I identify (five) Rule of Law-like societal problems that 
were perceivable by Locke during the time he was writing the Two Treatises. 
Then, I provide a specific rational for the categorisation of the problems as 
being Rule of Law-like problems. In the penultimate part—innovatively titled 
Locke’s Rule of Law in Context: A Solution and its Problems—I, illustrate 
through recourse to the Two Treatises, the Rule of Law-like solutions that 
                                               
1 See Chapter 2 for an exposition of Rule of Law change over time as a Common 
Assumption. 
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Locke provides to the problems identified in the preceding parts. Some brief 
conclusions close the chapter.  
THE RULE OF LAW AND ‘LOCKE’S RULE OF LAW’ 
The nature, operation, and content of the Rule of Law has both varied 
and changed over time. This idea of change, together with the suggestions 
that the Rule of Law is both a highly (or essentially) contested concept, and 
that it has its roots with Aristotle, represent three of four Common 
Assumptions that can be found at the start of the majority of articles outlining 
what the Rule of Law is.2 Whilst these Assumptions will be critically evaluated 
in this chapter, the main focus relates to the remaining assumption: there are 
a number of commonly cited and deployed Rule of Law canons as the usual 
suspects, common to many Rule of Law accounts. Whilst a number of thinkers 
fall into this category, I focus on only one: Locke.   
Before exploring ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’, I must first briefly re-state what I 
mean by ‘the Rule of Law.’ This can be simply done as I have already provided 
the ideas I will use.3 I continue to consider any idea that satisfies either the 
                                               
2 In relation to the Common Assumptions of the Rule of Law, see Chapter 2. See 
Chapter 3 regarding the conceptual uncertainty.  
3 See Chapter 3 (theory) and Chapter 4 (application). 
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normative force conception or the Rule of Law elements—Comprehension 
and Procedural Pellucid—as being Rule of Law-like ideas.  
‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ 
Locke is frequently taken to be a Rule of Law thinker. In this brief 
section, my goal is merely to outline the aspects of Locke’s thought that are 
taken to provide support to, or be representative of, the Rule of Law in the 
Rule of Law literature: ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’. In this sense, I do not intend to 
endorse—or, for that matter, contradict—those positions. I merely illustrate 
what ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is commonly taken to be by those who regard him 
as expounding an account of the Rule of Law. To differentiate this commonly 
adopted way of viewing Locke’s account, I will continue to use ‘Locke’s Rule 
of Law’ (with scare quotes) throughout this chapter.  
The most pervasive aspect of ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is its opposition to 
the operation or application of arbitrary power. The adoption and reference 
to this aspect of Locke’s thought forms the strongest bond to a conception of 
the Rule of Law that holds non-arbitrariness as a core function; this connects 
most strongly to contemporary ideas that also see the Rule of Law in 
opposition to arbitrariness. The use and deployment of Locke in the 
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contemporary sphere is, therefore, unsurprising as Locke specifically opposes 
arbitrary power: 
For all the power the Government has, being only for the good 
of the Society, as it ought not to be Arbitrary and at Pleasure, so 
it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated Laws: 
that both the People may know their Duty, and be safe and 
secure within the limits of the Law, and the Rulers too kept within 
their due bounds, and not be tempted, by the Power they have 
in their hands…4 
Locke’s quote is drawn from a passage that is remarkable for its use of 
phrases that are frequently seen in contemporary Rule of Law discourse: 
‘absolute arbitrary power’, ‘established and promulgated laws’, ‘declared and 
received laws’, ‘stated rules’, and ‘settled standing laws’.5 Similar—
contemporarily recognisable—Rule of Law language also precedes the 
passage: ‘The Legislative, or Supream Authority, cannot assume to its self a 
power to rule by extemporary Arbitrary Decrees, but is bound to dispense 
                                               
4 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, §137 (Peter Laslett ed., Student ed. 
1988) (emphasis in the original).  
5 Id. at II, §137. (Lest we miss their importance, Locke was even kind enough to 
emphasise the phrases quoted here by using italics.) 
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Justice, and decide the Rights of the subject by promulgated standing Laws, 
and known Authoris’d Judges.’6   
Reference to Locke in the Rule of Law literature, in circumstances 
where he makes such stark and clear reference to arbitrariness, is a highly 
attractive and enticing lure for those that also see arbitrariness as a core 
feature of the contemporary conception: Julian Sempill refers to Locke’s 
contribution to the Rule of Law project as relating to, inter alia, arbitrariness;7  
Both Brian Tamanaha and Martin Krygier have referred to Locke in terms that 
set him against arbitrary power;8 and Jeremy Waldron also makes 
arbitrariness the central focus of the discussion when outlining Locke’s role in 
the Rule of Law tradition.9 These are far from the only instances of this 
                                               
6 Id. at II, §136 (emphasis in the original).  
7 Julian A. Sempill, Ruler’s Sword, Citizen’s Shield: The Rule of Law & the Constitution 
of Power, 31 JL POL 333, 355–356 (2015). 
8 Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law: Pasts, Presents, and Two Possible Futures, 12 ANNU. 
REV. LAW SOC. SCI. (2016); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW HISTORY, POLITICS, 
THEORY 49 (2004). 
9 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2016 ed. 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-
law/ (last visited Jul 20, 2018). In this respect, Waldron seeks to differentiate the 
differences in meaning that can be associated with ‘arbitrary’ Id.; JEREMY WALDRON, 
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE MEASURE OF PROPERTY: THE HAMLYN LECTURES 35 (2012). The 
point regarding different meanings of ‘arbitrary’ between the 17th century and now 
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association.10 In this sense, identifying Locke with an account of the 
contemporary idea of the Rule of Law that also is seen as being opposed to 
arbitrariness is a relatively straightforward step. It is also clear that the ideas 
that are considered as being Locke’s Rule of Law do fall within the broad idea 
of the Rule of Law that is adopted herein. However, few authors dig any 
deeper and consider even the basic meaning of ‘arbitrary’ for Locke.11 There 
are other aspects to Locke’s ideas; uncovering these Rule of Law-like ideas is 
the central focus of this chapter.  
The potential for the Rule of Law idea communicated by Locke to 
relate to an—albeit subtly—different idea of arbitrariness is vitally important in 
circumstances where his idea is frequently invoked to illustrate what the Rule 
of Law is. Some aspect of critical evaluation should be made of Locke’s work 
                                               
was also noted by Reid: JOHN P. REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN 
THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 41 (2004). 
10 Further examples are: Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 
BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV. 781, 781 (1989); H. W. Arndt, The Origins of Dicey’s Concept 
of the “Rule of Law”, 31 AUST. LAW J. 117, 118 (1957); Fred Dallmayr, Hermeneutics 
and the Rule of Law, CARDOZO REV 1449, 1453 (1990). For a wider association of 
Locke with arbitrariness, see Julian A. Sempill, The Lions and the Greatest Part: the 
Rule of Law and the Constitution of Employer Power, 9 HAGUE J. RULE LAW 283–314 
(2017). 
11 This is not true of all accounts. See, for example, REID, supra note 9 at 41; 
WALDRON, supra note 9 at 35. 
The Problems and Solutions of Change in Conceptions of the Rule of Law 
 234 
to consider whether Locke’s Rule of Law—as the idea Locke meant to 
communicate through his work—reflects ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’. After all, if his 
idea of arbitrary was different to the idea of arbitrary that we consider to be 
part of the contemporary Rule of Law, the two forms should be 
disambiguated.  
LOCKE’S RULE OF LAW IN CONTEXT 
I illustrate ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is not Locke’s Rule of Law by 
considering Locke’s account in the context in which it was authored. By 
considering Locke’s Two Treatises of Government as a solution to problems 
perceivable by Locke during the particular political moment in which his work 
was being authored, his Rule of Law ideas can be disambiguated from the 
more contemporary uses to which they have been put.  
Locke’s Context 
Before outlining the specific problems perceivable by Locke, I must 
provide a basic background to Locke and his Two Treatises. The detail 
provided here is—by no means—a complete exposition, but it will provide a 
sufficient base on which to assess the context of the Two Treatises’ authorship 
Chapter 5: Another Look at Locke’s Rule of Law 
 
235 
and subsequent publication dated 1690.12 As I did with Hobbes, here my aim 
is to dispel any suggestion that any common ideas about the authoring may 
invalidate the problem / solution approach. These ideas relate to: the time 
during which Locke wrote the Two Treatises; Locke’s exile in Holland or his 
travels around France; and, his motivation for, and the intended audience of, 
the work. I explore these in the following sub-sections in terms of the 
Environmental, Relational and Authorial Contexts. 
Environmental Context 
Debate exists regarding the precise dates between which the Two 
Treatises was written. Nevertheless, I will take the dates of authorship as 
being between January 1679, and April 1683 (the ‘authoring period’). A brief 
rationale for this position follows. 
The environment in which Locke was writing was fundamentally 
different to that which exists in contemporary western democracies. As is well 
known, England had been recently ravaged by a civil war that had seen 
                                               
12 The academic literature on Locke and the Two Treatises is vast. In this part, and in 
outlining Locke’s background, I principally cite three authors: Peter Laslett, Richard 
Ashcraft, and John Dunn. This is not to detract from the vast scholarship that exists 
elsewhere. My focus on their, well regarded, works more than adequately suffices for 
the general background I need to provide.  
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Charles I executed, and a period of rule by Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector, 
before the monarchy was restored and Charles II was crowned—with 
retrospective effect back to the date of his father’s execution—in 1660. In the 
Civil War, the rebels, as supporters of parliamentary sovereignty, sought a 
change in the way that Charles I ruled. This had, as some important 
component, a fear of papist rule; Royalist supporters, and Charles himself, 
advocated the King’s near-absolute or even divine powers that were 
subsequently questioned when parliament refused to grant the King funds.13 
The parliamentarians sought a form of popular rule in which the King’s 
powers were placed under the control of the parliament. Whilst these events 
are provided by way of deep background, the similarities between this period 
and those surrounding Hobbes and the Civil War, and the period between 
1660 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, are clearly evident.14  
Following the interregnum, Charles II proved to follow—a little too 
closely for some—in his father’s footsteps. Locke was still in school when 
                                               
13 See, for example, the late-1648 work Robert Filmer, The Necessity of the Absolute 
Power of all Kings, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 172–183 (1991). 
14 The Glorious Revolution—whilst outside the scope of Locke’s writing of the Two 
Treatises—relates to the English Parliament’s installation of William and Mary on the 
English throne against the wishes of Charles II’s successor, James II. 
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Charles I was executed.15 Whilst short of being a formal civil war, the 
subsequent 37 years represented an unprecedented period of political and 
constitutional turmoil in England. Conflicts between the King and Parliament 
defined Charles II’s reign. These took various forms. Whilst I expand upon 
them below, it will suffice here to state they (relevantly) included both fears 
associated with arbitrary rule and absolute power, and conflict over the 
power available to the King through the existence of a standing army. In 
addition, fears regarding the influence of the pope represented a central and 
common problem during the period. This was, perhaps, not unfounded as 
Charles II’s brother—and heir to the throne—James was an openly practicing 
catholic and Charles was, as it turns out, a closet-catholic that had negotiated 
secret deals to convert to Catholicism in the near future in consideration of 
payments from the French King. The constitutional problems were stoked by 
fear that any catholic ruler would, inter-alia, exist in a state of war with 
protestant subject and would likely lay claim to their property (as lives, 
liberties, and property).16 These fears were sufficient to cause Antony Ashley 
Cooper, subsequently Lord Ashley and then the first earl of Shaftesbury 
                                               
15 Locke was 17 years old, and was likely at school not far from the execution site at 
the time of the execution. RICHARD ASHCRAFT, LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: 
VOLUME 17 13 (1 ed. 2012). 
16 RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS & LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 17–38 (1986); LOCKE, supra note 4 at 16–24. 
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(‘Shaftesbury’), to constitute the Whig party largely in opposition to Charles 
II’s policies and in an attempt to ensure parliamentary control and the 
exercise of power through consent. Shaftesbury was an influential and rich 
politically active actor who later served as the Lord Chancellor and was, in 
relation to his leadership of the Whigs as a party of radical opposition to the 
King, implicated in plots to assassinate the King and his brother, James. In 
addition, throughout the authorship period (prior to his death in early-1683) 
Shaftesbury was also Locke’s employer and best friend.17   
Debate exists about exactly when the Two Treatises was written. It was 
initially thought that Locke wrote the work to justify the Glorious Revolution 
shortly before the first edition’s publication dated 1690. This dogma has now 
been dismissed. The accepted orthodoxy is now that the work was 
completed several years earlier. The vast majority of writing—notwithstanding 
any subsequent minor edits that may have taken place pre-publication—was 
completed at or around the time of the Exclusion Crisis (in which the Whigs, 
through repeated attempts to pass the Exclusion Bill through the House of 
Commons were repeatedly scuppered by the King’s dissolution of 
                                               
17 LOCKE, supra note 4 at 25–37; ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 75–87; JOHN DUNN, THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE 
‘TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT’ 27–29 (1969). 
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parliament). Laslett’s argument that writing had taken place between 1679 
and 1681 (or 1683, at the latest), is challenged—at least in relation to the 
earlier date of completion—by Ashcraft who argues writing was completed in 
1680 to 1681 or possibly 1682.18 The authoring period that I adopt—between 
January 1679, and April 1683—takes account of the broadest suggestions of 
these dates. The period commences around the date on which Locke was 
requested to return to England from France by Shaftesbury to assist with a 
theoretical argument to justify a change in the constitution.19 As there is at 
least broad agreement that a completed draft of—what would become—the 
                                               
18 For Laslett’s dating, see, for example LOCKE, supra note 4 at 35, 51, 59. For 
Ashcraft’s dating, see, for example, ASHCRAFT, supra note 15 at 291; Richard Ashcraft, 
Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government: Radicalism and 
Lockean Political Theory, 8 POLIT. THEORY 429–485, 441–2 (1980). Others place the 
date in slightly different periods. See for example THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 1450–1700, 618 (J. H. Burns & Mark Goldie eds., 1991). (In which 
the period is suggested as being between 1681-83.) See also the suggestion that 
Locke commences drafting the two Treatises shortly after March 1679: QUENTIN 
SKINNER, 3 VISIONS OF POLITICS: HOBBES AND CIVIL SCIENCE 33 (2002). 
19 LOCKE, supra note 4 at 31; ASHCRAFT, supra note 15 at 28.  Locke returned to 
England shortly thereafter in April 1679. ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 137. 
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Two Treatises was in existence prior to the date of Locke’s escape to 
Holland,20 the authoring period concludes at this date.21    
Relational Context and Authorial Context 
Locke was immersed in the political and constitutional battles that were 
endemic in England during his period of employment by Shaftesbury.22 The 
influence of this relationship on Locke has been put as strongly as stating that 
‘without Shaftesbury, Locke would not have been Locke at all.’23 Even at its 
most benign, this relationship places Locke—as Shaftesbury’s amanuensis—in a 
position that required him to be intimately involved with Shaftesbury’s 
                                               
20 LOCKE, supra note 4 at 62–65; ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 388. The text was, at that 
time, under the cover name of de Morbo Gallico, (trans. ‘the French disease’—
meaning syphilis—as a possible allusion to the fears of both arbitrary power and 
popery that were, at that time, prevalent in France). LOCKE, supra note 4 at 62. 
21 ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 536, 388. Locke left for Holland in August, 1683. Id. at 
409. See also, LOCKE, supra note 4 at 24. It was shortly following Shaftesbury fleeing 
to Holland—in November 1682—that Locke left Shaftesbury’s household. ASHCRAFT, 
supra note 16 at 358–9.  
22 Locke was engaged by Shaftesbury, and became part of his household, from 1667, 
after they first met in Oxford in 1666. ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 85; LOCKE, supra 
note 4 at 25. 
23 LOCKE, supra note 4 at 27. 
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political commitments.24 A less benign appreciation places Locke in a position 
as friend, confidant, and author for one of the leading revolutionaries of 
English politics. In this respect, Locke’s relationship with Shaftesbury involved 
the latter leading a political party intent on securing its objectives through 
parliamentary means—via the Exclusion Bill—and a revolutionary movement 
that plotted to overthrow or assassinate the King and his heir.25 Ashcraft has 
noted a shift in policy between these two extremes that occurred during the 
authoring period, around 1681-2.26 Notwithstanding this, it seems to be 
clearly the case that, upon his recall from France by Shaftesbury in early 1679, 
Locke fostered and maintained a heightened interest in political theory.27 
Accordingly, there is little reason to suggest that Locke was unaware of the 
                                               
24 This extends to the suggestion that Locke wrote the Two Treatises for Shaftesbury. 
Id. at 27. This idea will be explored further below. But, cf. Ashcraft, supra note 18 at 
436. 
25 Ashcraft, supra note 18 at 431; ASHCRAFT, supra note 15 at 292–3. The 
assassination attempt—related to the Rye House Plot of 1683—and the attempts—that 
occurred after Shaftesbury’s death—to overthrow the King took several iterations 
including actions regarding Monmouth’s Rebellion and the successful installation of 
William and Mary on the throne.   
26 ASHCRAFT, supra note 15 at 290–292; ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 327. The shift 
correlates with the King’s dissolution of the Oxford parliament in January 1681. 
27 LOCKE, supra note 4 at 56. 
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broad-based nature of the problems that were being ventilated in the 
pamphlet literature.  
Whilst an assessment of Locke’s previous (or subsequent) works is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, and even though such an assessment is 
unnecessary for the argument advanced, it is interesting to note that the close 
relationship between Locke and Shaftesbury, and the nature of the latter’s 
political activism, may have been sufficient to have altered Locke’s political 
perspective that was—in some respects—evident prior to their association.28 
The point of mentioning the change is to illustrate the potential influence that 
Locke’s employer and friend may have had on him and to introduce the 
potential that the ideas contained within the Two Treatises may not, 
necessarily, have been solely the work of a philosopher divorced from both 
society or any overarching political normative agenda.29 In other words, in 
forming his thoughts, Locke seems to be influenced by the people, 
arguments, and society around him. In the exploration of the pamphlets that 
                                               
28 The shift in focus from a position that was closer to absolutism may have occurred 
due to the ‘community of ideas’ that existed as a result of the association from 1669 
to 1679. ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 83–84; LOCKE, supra note 4 at 30. 
29 Ashcraft makes a similar comment referring to Victorian biographers’ attitudes that 
created the ‘myth of Locke’s political innocence in order to safeguard their image of 
him as a detached philosopher.’ ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 86. 
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follows, it will become clear that Locke’s thought—related to the idea of the 
Rule of Law adopted here—is anything but an original and paradigm shifting 
exercise in philosophy divorced from reality; not only does Locke provide 
solutions to problems that are distinctly practical—and not-philosophically 
focused—but he also provides solutions that are echoed across a wide scope 
of political tracts during the authoring period.   
The Problems (related to Locke’s solution) 
By conceiving of Locke’s idea of the Rule of Law (as the account that 
Locke meant to communicate) in problem / solution terms,30 a more nuanced 
understanding of ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ (as the generally cited account) can be 
attained. I outline, each in a separate subsection, the fundamental problems 
that were raised in the pamphleteers’ work during the authoring period 
before explaining why these problems fall within the definition of the Rule of 
Law.   
Locke absorbs, reproduces, and answers in the Two Treatises a 
number of problems that exist in society that are also reflected in the period’s 
                                               
30 For a full argument relating to the problem / solution approach, see Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2. 
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pamphlets.31 In illuminating the problems, I have utilised the same approach 
as in the last chapter: I have identified only the pamphlets that were most 
prominent by considering arguments that were both popular and influential 
and related to the broad—two-pronged—meaning of the Rule of Law I adopt.32  
In outlining the problems, I do not state the nature of the problems’ 
relationship to the idea of the Rule of Law that I adopt. (I defer this exposition 
to the next section.) The problems, and the interrelationships between them, 
can be represented thus: 
                                               
31 A large number of pamphlets were published throughout the authoring period. 
Estimates of the number of pamphlets produced, and related to, the Exclusion 
Crisis—a period encompassed in full by the authorship period—runs to over 200. See, 
LEE WARD, THE POLITICS OF LIBERTY IN ENGLAND AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 8 (2004); 
O. W. Furley, The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet Literature in the Exclusion Campaign, 
1679-81, 13 CAMB. HIST. J. 19–36, 19 (1957). 
32 For further details on the way in which the pamphlets were selected, see Chapter 
4: Pamphleteers: a brief explanation of nature and purpose.  





Figure 1.1 – The Authoring Period’s Problem Wheel 
The interrelationships between the problems—which will become 
apparent in the following subsections—are illustrated by the lines connecting 
the individual problems. These relate to conceptual connections between the 
problems which are, in turn, apparent from the pluralistic account included in 
most pamphlets; in short, there is rarely an instance where only one of these 
problems is discussed. The connections on the problem wheel are not simply 
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created by me for diagrammatic convenience; they are made by, and are 
reflective of, connections made by the pamphleteers themselves.33  
What is apparent from the diagram is that the fear of popery or a 
catholic monarch represents the core of the problems raised. The other 
problems are not commonly raised in relation to all of the other problems. 
Putting this another way, the other problems, whilst capable of existing 
independently as problems, are frequently and explicitly tied back to the core 
issue of popery. It is for these reasons that ‘Popery / a Catholic Monarch’ 
occupies the hub position to the other problems’ spokes in the—near 
complete—problem wheel.34 The similarity of the problem wheel to a sight-
target, and the positioning of ‘Popery / a Catholic Monarch’ in the centre of 
the cross-hairs is also non-coincidental. One of the things that will be 
                                               
33 In illustrating these connections, I do not suggest I have illustrated all connections 
that are apparent or possible to make across the pamphlet literature. All I suggest is 
that the connections illustrated represent both popular and fundamental 
connections that can be readily identified.  
34 I state ‘near complete’ as—although it is not difficult to imagine a situation where 
the repossession of property can lead to a state of war—the connection is not 
frequently made or, at least, is not obviously made, in the pamphlets examined. The 
outcome of a state of war is suggested as an outcome by Locke. See, for example, 
LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §192, 199, 221–222. 
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explored below is the use of the other problems to effectively target popery 
as a central problem; the other problems are used to focus on popery. 
As a final point regarding the problem wheel, it is relevant to point out 
that the order in which I have listed these problems, does not have any 
significance; there is no ‘start’ point on the wheel. There is, based on the 
authoring period’s pamphlets, no discernible pattern in which the problems 
come to prominence. The problems can be seen in the literature across the 
entire authoring period and most of the problems seem to be raised in 
broadly similar proportions across that time. 
By aggregating the arguments’ key points under only five problem-
headings, and as was the case with my similar exercise regarding Hobbes, I 
do not suggest these are the only problems being discussed; there are 
certainly many others. I also do not suggest the problems identified within the 
cited pamphlets include all of the pamphlets that could have fallen within my 
Rule of Law criteria; there are doubtless others. I merely illustrate the most 
popular arguments. As my aim is to identify and evidence the general 
problems perceivable by Locke, my broad-brush approach and 
categorisation loses nothing.  
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Potential for War / a State of War 
In circumstances where England had emerged from civil war within 
living memory, the prospect of a state of war—whether that be a civil war, a 
foreign war, or a hypothetical state of war (as discussed by, inter alia, 
Hobbes35)—was never far from pamphleteers’ consciousness. In response to 
the perceived Whig agenda that sought to encourage subjects to disobey the 
sovereign, it was suggested that the act of disobedience would itself result in 
a state of war.36 Further, fears that the Whigs’ attempted exclusion of James 
from the line of succession to the throne (via the Exclusion Bill) was suggested 
                                               
35 This is reflected in Hobbes’s state of nature. See, THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: WITH 
SELECTED VARIANTS FROM THE LATIN EDITION OF 1668 XIII (E. M. Curley ed., New Ed 
edition ed. 1994). This, of course, includes the most famous statement of life during 
the incommodities of war as involving ‘continual fear and danger of violent death, 
and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ Id. at Ch. XIII, [9]. 
36 Hobbes’s state of war is specifically referenced by L’Estrange in making this point. 
ROGER L’ESTRANGE SIR, AN ANSWER TO THE APPEAL FROM THE COUNTRY TO THE CITY 31–2 
(1679). Dryden’s point, and invocation of Hobbes, is put this way: ‘Then farewell the 
Good Act of Parliament, which makes it Treason to Levy Arms agaist the present 
King, upon any pretences whatsoever. For if this be a Right of Nature, and 
consequently never to be Resign'd, there never has been, nor ever can be any pact 
betwixt King and People, and Mr. Hobbs would tell us, That we are still in a state of 
War.’ JOHN DRYDEN, HIS MAJESTIES DECLARATION DEFENDED 10 (1681). See also, 
ROBERT BRADY, THE GREAT POINT OF SUCCESSION DISCUSSED (1681). (Referenced by 
ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 293–4.) 
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as being likely to end in a civil war.37 Conquest and ideas of invasion also 
come within this problem category (and here, there is a distinct overlap with 
the problems of arbitrary power and fears of popery). There were 
suggestions that James may seek to come to the throne through conquest, 
and that the Exclusion Bill may itself lead to a ‘War of expediency’.38 The fear 
of war also extended to external invasion by French forces as a consequence 
of James—as a catholic successor—being denied the throne.39 This connection 
between war and both popery and arbitrary power, that forms an ever-
present line of argument in Whig pamphlets, is clearly stressed in The 
Character of a Popish Successor, where it was suggested that popery may be 
restored by arbitrary power through an attempted conquest which must be 
repelled.40 In terms where James’s desire to exercise arbitrary power would 
necessarily provoke a war, it is stated:  
                                               
37 ‘To endeavour so absolute a Subversion of our Government, if it be not Treason, is 
to design, if it be pursued, that which cannot but happen, Anarchy and Confusion, 
and all the Calamities of an unnatural Civil War.’ ANON., ENGLANDS CONCERN IN THE 
CASE OF HIS R.H. 4 (1680). 
38 WILLIAM CAVENDISH DEVONSHIRE DUKE OF, REASONS FOR HIS MAJESTIES PASSING THE 
BILL OF EXCLUSION IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND (1681). Tarlton cites to the ‘Letter to a 
Person of Quality’ in relation to the quote. Charles D. Tarlton, The Exclusion 
Controversy, Pamphleteering, and Locke’s Two Treatises, 24 HIST. J. 49–68, 67 (1981).       
39 CHARLES BLOUNT, AN APPEAL FROM THE COUNTRY TO THE CITY 6 (1679). 
40 ELKANAH SETTLE, THE CHARACTER OF A POPISH SUCCESSOUR 20 (1681).  
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… his temper, bred up in such principles in politicks, as made 
him in love with Arbitrary power, and bigotted in that Religion, 
which allewise propagates it self by Blood… would he not 
thereby have been provok't to the utmost fury and revenge, 
against those who laid them upon him? This would certainly 
have bread a contest, and these limitations of power proposed 
to keep up the Government, must unavoidably have destroyed 
it, or the Nation, (which necessity would have forced into a War 
in its own natural defence) must have perished either by it or with 
it.41  
These examples, drawn from both sides of the political debate and 
from across the authoring period, illustrate that war—broadly conceived—was 
a problem that was raised, and debated, across the pamphlets.   
Popery / a Catholic Monarch 
Pamphlets’ titles frequently made the authors’ argumentative position 
very clear without the need to have recourse to the content. For example, A 
Protestant Antidote Against the Poyson of Popery provides a clear indication 
of both the perspective from which the argument is being made, and the 
issue being argued against.42 The idea that catholic influence was akin to a 
                                               
41 WILLIAM JONES, A JUST AND MODEST VINDICATION 31 (1682). Tarlton also points to 
this pamphlet to illustrate a similar point. Tarlton, supra note 38 at 68.  
42 CHRISTOPHER NESS, A PROTESTANT ANTIDOTE AGAINST THE POYSON OF POPERY (1679). 
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poison sums up, clearly, the Whigs’ general position. As noted above, the 
problem of popery and catholic rule is commonly and invariably intertwined 
with the problems of war and arbitrary rule. In relation to arbitrary rule and 
popery, this occurs to the point that the two are often seen as being largely 
synonymous.43 The interrelationship between the issues stems in one respect 
from the frequently stated assertion that catholic monarchs tend to rule by 
force and that without arbitrary government popery can never prevail.44 Other 
interrelationships are apparent from pamphlets that associate popery with 
being a lawless and arbitrary power that will cause the sovereign to deprive 
subjects of land, liberty, and property.45  However, the interrelationship is 
never clearer than in this example:   
…if you think to bind and fetter him by Laws, that will be no 
better than the wise men of Gotham's hedging in the Cuckow; 
for when he (as all other Popish Kings do governs by an Army, 
                                               
43 ‘… [L]et us but rightly consider, how far the first Foundations of Popery, (viz. 
Arbitrary Power) may be laid in England.’ SETTLE, supra note 40 at 8. See also, the 
close association in BLOUNT, supra note 39 at 10. (‘However, I cannot but ascribe 
great part of our present Calamities, to his Highnesses Education in that Arbitrary 
and Popish Government…’) 
44 BLOUNT, supra note 39 at 24.    
45 ‘…[T]he Canonists made all their Laws according to their own Arbitrary will, and 
observed the Civil Law only for their profit, and not when it made against them…’ 
WILLIAM LAWRENCE, MARRIAGE BY THE MORALL LAW OF GOD VINDICATED 24 (1680). 
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what will all your Laws signifie? You will not then have 
Parliaments to appeal to; He and his Council will levy his arbitrary 
Taxes, and his Army shall gather them for him…46 
Further, more specific, problems relate to the fear that protestant 
subjects would be considered heretics and would be put to death under a 
catholic king.47 In circumstances where Catholics condemn protestants as 
heathens and would threaten protestants’ lives and properties, the Exclusion 
Bill is suggested to have been brought as a consequence of the nation’s 
awakening to the dangers associated with England’s heir being a catholic.48 In 
relation to James taking over the throne as a catholic, reference is made to 
James’s past disregard of laws to suggest he would be even less restrained in 
his contraventions on becoming king.49  In all of these senses, popery or the 
placement of a catholic on the throne can be seen to represent the core 
problem in the authoring period’s pamphlets.    
                                               
46 BLOUNT, supra note 39 at 4–5. 
47 DAVID CLARKSON, THE CASE OF PROTESTANTS IN ENGLAND 10–11 (1681).  See also, 
GENTLEMAN IN THE CITY, A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN IN THE CITY 3 (1680). (‘It is not only 
lawful for such a Prince to destroy those of his Subjects, who disagree from him in 
Faith and worship, but it is an indispensable Duty upon him to do it.’) 
48 GENTLEMAN IN THE CITY, supra note 47 at 1–2. 
49 Id. at 9. 
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An Arbitrary Sovereign 
The interrelationship between arbitrary government and other 
problems during the authoring period has already been mentioned. The 
quote extracted above in relation to the problem associated with a state of 
war reflects the emphasis on the exercise of arbitrary power as being, in 
effect, the end result of other characteristics and circumstances.50 It seems, in 
this respect, arbitrary power—as the means by which power is to be 
exercised—is both the result of other problems and a facilitator of problems, 
as well as a specific problem in itself.51 And, furthermore, the suggestion that 
the arbitrary will of canonists will be employed to the detriment of civil laws 
also illustrates this fear of arbitrary rule.52 This sentiment is also apparent in 
the Defence of the Charter, where it is stated:  
… they Act and manage, and engage in courses, which tend to 
their own and the publick ruin, with an utter neglect of Rights, 
Laws, and antient constitutions; nay, they endeavour to subvert 
them all, that they may more certainly and speedily arrive at the 
mischiefs designed by our Enemies.53 
                                               
50 See note 41 and associated text. 
51 Arbitrary power could in some senses also be seen as part of a solution; the Whigs’ 
appreciation of the papists’ position puts arbitrary power as a solution. 
52 LAWRENCE, supra note 45 at 34. 
53 THOMAS HUNT, A DEFENCE OF THE CHARTER 17–18 (1683). 
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Whilst it is the case that arbitrary rule was problematised on its own 
terms, it is also clearly interconnected with absolute government: the 
suggestion that absolute government itself is not properly a government was 
raised by Penn;54 and, the problems associated with the existence of arbitrary 
government is also discussed by Neville.55 The question of succession and 
lawfulness is also directly challenged by Settle in questioning how an 
‘Arbitrary absolute Popish Tyrant’ can be a lawful successor to an established 
and bounded government in circumstances where he [sic] ‘violently, 
unlawfully, and tyrannically overruns the due bounds of power’ in 
circumstances where this would mean the people would be required to: 
[S]ubmit to such an Arbitrary Majesty, to have their Magna 
Charta abolisht, their Religion and Liberties destroyed, and to 
have Popery and Arbitrary power set up, and yield to have the 
Right of Lords and Commons extirpated, and all devolve into the 
King...56   
This problem was further explained by the fear that James’s previous 
efforts to subvert the laws whilst merely an heir to the throne would, on 
gaining the throne—and becoming legally capable of doing no wrong—cease 
                                               
54 WILLIAM PENN, ENGLANDS GREAT INTEREST 2 (1679). 
55 HENRY NEVILLE, PLATO REDIVIVUS 18–19, 38–39 (1681). 
56 SETTLE, supra note 40 at 20. 
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to be fenced by the laws and would redouble his efforts to subvert the 
protestant religion.57  
In addition to these issues, the idea of arbitrary rule can also be seen to 
encompass a cognate idea: the fears associated with a standing army. This 
idea was prevalent in Shaftesbury’s own pamphlet,58 as well as in a speech to 
parliament where he pointed to the dangers of granting the King funds where 
his allegiance is in question and in relation to the raising of an army.59 This is 
no better summed up than in the phrase—already extracted above—that when 
he ‘… as all other Popish Kings do governs by an Army, what will all your Laws 
signifie?’60 When considered together with the other aspects of arbitrary rule, 
it is clear that the problem is one that was raised, and addressed in varying 
ways, across the pamphlet literature. 
 
 
                                               
57 GENTLEMAN IN THE CITY, supra note 47 at 3. 
58 EARL OF SHAFTESBURY - ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, A LETTER FROM A PERSON OF 
QUALITY 18–19 (1675). 
59 EARL OF SHAFTESBURY - ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, A SPEECH LATELY MADE (1681). 
60 BLOUNT, supra note 39 at 4–5. For a similar sentiment, see SETTLE, supra note 40 at 
8–9. 
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The Authority of Parliament 
One of the most fundamental aspects of the Whig argument was 
centred on the ability of parliament to govern as a representative institution 
that functioned through the consent of the people. In this respect, these 
arguments also extended to suggestions that the dissolution of parliament by 
the King—in the context where Charles II used the dissolution of parliament to 
prevent the passage of the Exclusion Bill—was contrary to the principles for 
which government was established.61 Attempts were made by the Whigs to 
suggest that consent through parliament was opposed to various other fears 
like arbitrary government, a standing army, or rule by catholic monarchs.62 In 
these respects, the necessity of parliament to the Whig approach was clear 
from their holding the institution out as a bulwark against the arbitrary and 
popish tyrant that was represented by James.63 Yet, there existed a fear that 
parliament with a catholic King would be impossible. Clarkson sums this up 
by posing and answering a simple question: 
                                               
61 ANON., VOX POPULI, VOX DEI (1681). 
62 BLOUNT, supra note 39 at 4–5. 
63 SETTLE, supra note 40 at 14–15. See also, the comment that it is ‘Charters, and 
Governments of municipal Cityes and Towns, (which are the greatest defences 
against Popery…)’ in HUNT, supra note 53 at 13. 
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But may not Parliaments secure us by Laws and Provisions 
restraining the Powers which endanger us? 
There is nothing of this tendency can in reason be expected from 
Parliaments, without securing the Throne…  [The papists] are for 
another Government, in which the Pope must be Supreme, and 
to which our Kings must be subjected or kill'd.64  
The basic point was that parliament, unlike a popish sovereign, would 
not assume greater power, and that property owners would not lose their 
estates.65  
There were, of course, also arguments against the Whig position. 
Some of the most prominent related to the divine right theory of government, 
the inability of institutions like parliament to be truly representative, and the 
fact that parliament’s rights were relatively recently established.66 What is, 
                                               
64 CLARKSON, supra note 47 at 30. 
65 PHILOLAUS, A CHARACTER OF POPERY AND ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT (1681). (Cited in 
ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 250.) 
66 MATTHEW RIDER, THE POWER OF PARLIAMENTS IN THE CASE OF SUCCESSION (1680); 
ANON., THE INTEREST OF THE THREE KINGDOMS (1680); M. R., THREE GREAT QUESTIONS 
CONCERNING THE SUCCESSION AND THE DANGERS OF POPERY (1681). See also, JOHN 
NALSON, THE COMPLAINT OF LIBERTY & PROPERTY AGAINST ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT 
(1681); ANON., AN IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT (1681); PAUL LATHOM, THE POWER OF KINGS 
FROM GOD (1683). The Whig argument that sparked many of the responses is 
WILLIAM PETYT, THE ANTIENT RIGHT OF THE COMMONS OF ENGLAND ASSERTED (1680). 
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however, clear is that a considerable part of the debate in the authoring 
period can be attributed to the relative popularity of Filmer’s arguments. 
Although Filmer’s theory on the divine right of kings had been popular during 
the Civil War, and brief mention was made in the context of the problems that 
Hobbes could perceive, it received renewed interest in the Lockean 
authoring period. This interest included the publication of his Patriarchia and 
the Free-holders Grand Inquest, in 1680.67 It has been suggested that Filmer’s 
theory—that sovereigns’ authority was derived, by direct lineage, from the 
authority Adam exercised in the garden of Eden, and reflects patriarchal 
power in the familial home—was not only taken seriously, but also caused 
Locke to cease working on his general theory of government (in the Second 
Treatise) and to focus on the specific refutation of Filmer’s idea (in the First 
Treatise).68 Whilst the order of Locke’s authorship is unclear, it is clear and 
                                               
67 Robert Filmer, Patriarcha, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1–63 (J. P. 
Sommerville ed., 1991); ROBERT FILMER SIR, THE FREE-HOLDERS GRAND INQUEST (1648).  
See also, in relation to publication and authorship dates, Cesare Cuttica, Reputation 
versus Context in the Interpretation of Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, 33 HIST. POLIT. 
THOUGHT 231–257, 233–234 (2012). In relation to Filmer’s earlier published works—in, 
for example, late-1648—see Filmer, supra note 13. 
68 Laslett suggests that the Free-holders Grand Inquest did not require a general 
discussion of patriarchalism or the origins of government. See, LOCKE, supra note 4 
at 57–59. Laslett’s ordering of authorship of the Two Treatises is debated. See, 
ASHCRAFT, supra note 15 at 289–95, 298–305.   
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uncontroversial that, during the Exclusion Crisis, Filmer was in vogue, and 
required a serious response.69 Whig efforts were focused, in no small part, on 
dealing with the problem of the authority that was suggested as accruing via 
the divine right of kings, with their own argument regarding the authority of 
parliament via the consent of the people. It is no coincidence that the two 
aspects of this problem suggest a structure of solution that is eventually 
adopted in the Two Treatises.  
Repossession of Property 
One problem that was continually expressed and impressed in the 
pamphlet literature was the suggestion that a popish sovereign would lay 
claim to individuals’ property. During this period, the widely construed idea 
of property was taken to include not only material things; it related to 
individual’s lives, liberties, and estates. The perceived threat also extended to 
the property of others as there was also a fear that a catholic king would 
facilitate reclamation of the abbey lands that were confiscated at the start of 
the Reformation.70 Prior takings of property outside of England by catholic 
rulers are cited as being evidence or authority for the suggestion that the 
                                               
69 LOCKE, supra note 4 at 47. 
70 L’ESTRANGE, supra note 36 at 36–37. 
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same will happen should a catholic monarch take the throne in England.71 
These Whig arguments did, it is alleged, obtain some purchase. James 
himself sought to assuage fears and insisted that it was his intent to defend 
and protect property.72 This idea was also frequently put into comparative 
terms: subjects’ property rights under a catholic monarch are impoverished in 
comparison to those under a protestant monarch.73 In circumstances where 
Whigs point clearly to these fears, it is of no surprise that they then also 
suggest that parliament is held out as an effective security against the loss of 
individual’s lives, liberties, and estates.74 Reference to popish rule (as a threat 
to property) and the authority of parliament (as a defence to property 
reclamation) represent  the two most fundamental interconnections that can 
be seen in the pamphlets.  
 
                                               
71 GENTLEMAN IN THE CITY, supra note 47 at 2. (’Nor… can the Papists themselves 
Condemn us for taking these due ways and Methods to secure our Religion, and 
preserve our Lives and Properties; seeing they are not only agreeable to the 
Measures, (but much more modest) which they have taken in Forreign Countries to 
preserve their own.’) See also, C. B., AN ADDRESS TO THE HONOURABLE CITY OF LONDON 
2 (1681). 
72 Furley, supra note 31 at 24. 
73 GENTLEMAN IN THE CITY, supra note 47 at 3; CLARKSON, supra note 47 at 22. 
74 JONES, supra note 41 at 16–17. 
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Why the Problems are Rule of Law-like Problems 
Each of the problems can be conceived as falling within the broad 
definitions of the Rule of Law adopted: either within the normative force 
conception, or as including the Rule of Law elements. In considering the 
problems, and the problem wheel in Figure 1.1, one thing that is apparent is 
that the problems are of a different nature: process-related problems; a 
defence problem; and, an outcome problem. The problem related to a state 
of war is an outcome problem. This outcome is what results when 
parliamentary authority—as a defence-problem—is insufficient to prevent the 
process-related problems—of repossession of property, the existence of an 
arbitrary sovereign, and the influence of popery / a catholic monarch—from 
occurring.75 Accordingly, the problem wheel can be further segmented into 
three rows that illustrate the nature of each problem: 
                                               
75 The classification of ‘Popery / a Catholic Monarch’ problem as a process-problem, 
together with the other two process-problems does not impact the earlier 
classification of the Popery problem as the central focus of the pamphlets. Nor does 
it impact the classification of the other two process-problems that can be, as stated 
earlier, conceived to exist independently.  
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Figure 1.2 – Problem Wheel’s Problems’ Nature 
I outline why each problem is a Rule of Law-like problem by 
considering whether the problems, in terms of their nature, can fall within the 
normative force conception or the Rule of Law elements.  
Process-Problems: Popery, Arbitrariness, and Property Repossession  
As the problems all, to some degree, relate to the problem of popery / 
a catholic monarch, it is most sensible to start at that point. In terms of the 
Rule of Law elements, the pamphlets raise questions related to the idea of 
whether an individual can comprehend the rules to which he or she is subject. 
Individuals cannot comprehend the rules if the rules are not being made by 
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the King or other identifiable sovereign, and they are instead—and perhaps 
covertly—being made through popish influence, then this reflects an absence 
of procedural pellucidity. This problem, for these two reasons, is a Rule of 
Law-like problem in terms of the Rule of Law elements. 
The perceptions expressed in the pamphlets reflect a fear of some 
form of external control or influence over the sovereign—whether this be by 
the Pope, or by external forces from catholic nations (like France). The 
problem associated with this external influence is Rule of Law-like as this may 
obviate the operation of any normative force conception; an external power 
may not be subject to any normative force that may operate on an internal 
sovereign.76 The imposition of the will of this external power would, itself and 
for this reason, be seen as being arbitrary in nature—which would both run 
against the idea of the normative force conception and would reflect the next 
problem explored: an arbitrary sovereign.  
A problem relating to the fear of an arbitrary sovereign is the most 
obviously Rule of Law-like problem. The idea of arbitrariness makes up a 
component of most Rule of Law ideas and, more specifically, is included as 
part of the normative force conception. Furthermore, an arbitrary command is 
                                               
76 This point is directly related to the authority of parliament problem explored 
below. 
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not properly something that can be comprehended or be one that is subject 
to clearly communicated procedures. This relationship, particularly where a 
sovereign is making arbitrary decisions outside of the normally accepted 
parliamentary procedure,77 illustrates that the idea of an arbitrary sovereign 
falls within the compass of ideas relating to both of the Rule of Law elements.   
The final process-problem relates to the seizure of property. The 
problem in the pamphlets reflects the fear that there will be little rationale or 
process associated with any seizure. This clearly reflects a relevance to 
procedural pellucidity, as well as a lack of comprehension regarding the rules 
to which individuals are subject. In short, there is, regarding the situation 
following a catholic monarch taking the throne, little certainty or predictability 
that property will be secure. In common with the idea of a catholic being on 
the throne, there seems to be no way that normative force can operate in 
these terms. It is also the reason that parliament is put forward—by the Whigs 
at least—as a defence to these problems. 
 
 
                                               
77 The authority of parliament is dealt with below in relation to defence-problems. 
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Defence Problem: Parliament’s Authority  
Parliament’s authority is suggested as a defence against the operation 
of arbitrary power, the impact of a popish influence, and the repossession of 
property. In this sense, and where each of those problems is Rule of Law-like, 
the problems raised regarding parliament’s authority is—by association—also 
properly conceived as being Rule of Law-like. There is, however, a more 
direct relationship. Parliament is frequently suggested—in Whig pamphlets—as 
being an effective defence by way of its grounding in consent. Consent and 
the parliamentary process reflect the ideas inherent in the Rule of Law 
elements—establishing both procedural processes and facilitating 
comprehension of those processes—as well as creating a structure through 
which normative force can operate. For these reasons, it is clear that the 
defence offered by the Whigs—and, for that matter, the criticisms of 
parliament’s authority mounted by the opposing Tories—can be seen as a 
Rule of Law-like problem. 
Outcome Problem: Potential for War 
As noted above, the potential for war was, possibly as a result of the 
recently concluded Civil War, an extant theme across the authoring period. In 
this sense, the potential for war existed as a problem independent of the 
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other problems. Whilst the same rationale of being Rule of Law-like can be 
applied to the problem as an independent problem, it is its existence as an 
outcome on which I focus. The interconnections in the pamphlets make it 
clear that a state of war can result from both a popish or an arbitrary 
sovereign being in power. It is also relevant to note that the Tories see that a 
state of war would follow from the disobedience of the sovereign’s 
commands; whereas, the Whigs take the view that a state of war follows when 
the sovereign rules arbitrarily (and they associate all popish rulers with this 
form of Rule). The problem could also be seen as relating to the causes of a 
state of war that could, for example, relate to an external invasion by (catholic) 
France. Once again, the Rule of Law-relation here comes back to the 
connections with popery and arbitrary rule and the lack of a normative force 
that may operate. In short, any of the Rule of Law-like problems can result in 
the problem of a state of war. In this sense, these connections import the Rule 
of Law relevances noted above.   
LOCKE’S RULE OF LAW IN CONTEXT: A SOLUTION AND ITS PROBLEMS 
Through recourse to popular pamphlets, I have outlined the nature of 
the Rule of Law-like problems perceivable by Locke. Through outlining 
Locke’s relationship with Shaftesbury, I have also illustrated—by virtue of 
Shaftesbury’s request that Locke assist him in providing a theoretical 
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argument to justify a change in the constitution and Locke’s immersion in the 
political controversies of the age by virtue of his relationship with 
Shaftesbury78—why Locke was likely to have been intimately aware of these 
problems.79 One thing that I have not pointed to, is the suggestion that at 
some stage between 1682-83, Shaftesbury commissioned several versions of 
a manifesto outlining a declaration of principles for the burgeoning 
revolutionary movement.80 Locke’s account was both produced around the 
same time and could be seen as a response to Shaftesbury’s request.81 In this 
sense, what has been seen as a populist resolution of the problem of how the 
people should re-appropriate their political power through a revolution,82 
could also be seen as a response to Shaftesbury’s request to state the 
principles of the revolutionary moment. My claims—that Locke provides a 
solution to, inter alia, the problems outlined in the part above—hold 
                                               
78 LOCKE, supra note 4 at 31; ASHCRAFT, supra note 15 at 28. 
79 Whilst detailed studies have been conducted into Locke’s library and reading 
records, I do not need to establish that Locke actually read any of the pamphlets 
cited. For my argument, it is sufficient that the pamphlets reflect the problems in 
society and Locke, by virtue of being part of that society, is capable of perceiving 
those problems. 
80 ASHCRAFT, supra note 16 at 391–392. 
81 Other responses received by Shaftesbury are now either lost or are no longer 
studied or seen as relevant. 
82 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 1450–1700, supra note 18 at 618. 
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regardless of which account is correct; the purpose for his drafting the 
document is of no consequence (to my argument). In a more focused sense, I 
simply claim that Locke’s Two Treatises provides a Rule of Law-like solution to 
the Rule of Law-like problems identified above. Accordingly, in this part I 
merely illustrate the way in which Locke’s responses can be seen to respond 
to the problems. 
Locke’s Rule of Law reflects and responds to the problems identified. 
Even the briefest consideration of the Second Treatise—for example, by 
examining the table of contents—suggests close links between the problems 
and Locke’s focus. Chapters entitled ‘Of the State of War’, ‘Of Property’, ‘Of 
Paternal Power’, ‘Of the Extent of the Legislative Power’, and ‘Of Tyranny’ 
parallel the problems identified. These connections become more obvious 
when Locke’s work is examined in more detail. To take one chapter as an 
example, his account of the dissolution of government mirrors precisely the 
problems I have identified. Within his chapter—in circumstances where it is 
clear that he is describing the constitution of England83—he sets out two broad 
bases on which government can be dissolved. The first, Locke splits into 
various sub-topics that relate to the arbitrary will of the sovereign, a 
                                               
83 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §213. (See Laslett’s note in relation to this paragraph that 
also takes this view.) 
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sovereign’s interference with parliament, and the delivery of subjects into the 
subjection of a foreign power;84 the second, relates to a sovereign acting 
contrary to the trust placed in that sovereign, which includes attempts to 
invade the property of a subject.85 Locke then states, in the next paragraph, 
that a state of war will follow if a sovereign acts in this way.86 In the context of 
my earlier outline of the problems, and even without more explanation 
regarding his arguments, Locke’s characterisation of the dissolution of 
government in these terms—as a break-down in the operation of government 
itself—clearly reflects both the problems that I have outlined, and a close 
connection to the political and constitutional situation in England at the time 
he was writing. Whilst these brief illustrations evidence a close connection 
between the problems and Locke’s solutions and illustrate my argument 
precisely, the picture becomes more vivid when the solutions to each of three 
                                               
84 Id. at II, §212-217. 
85 Id. at II, §221. In considering these passages, I am conscious that Laslett holds the 
opinion that paragraphs 219 and 220 may have been written outside of the 
authoring period, in 1689. Their general omission would explain, to some extent, the 
difficulty in reconciling the ‘secondly’ at the start of paragraph 221. Laslett suggests 
this may follow from the ‘First’ in paragraph 212. If—what are now paragraphs 219 
and 220—are omitted, Locke’s description of a first and second point makes more 
sense.  
86 Id. at II, §222. 
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problem natures illustrated in Figure 1.2 above—Outcome, Process, and 
Defence Problems—are explored and considered.  
Locke’s Solutions to Process Problems 
Process problems relate to popery, property, and arbitrary rule. The 
core problem on the problem wheel, popery, is not directly addressed head 
on in the Second Treatise. However, as will be seen, it is both collaterally and 
synonymously addressed. There is, however, a focus on the impact and 
understanding of religion—at least where it is suggested as grounding 
sovereigns’ divine rights—in the First Treatise, where Locke provides a line by 
line refutation of Robert Filmer’s Patriarchia.87 Locke’s focus on the dangers of 
popery can be seen in the Second Treatise through the idea of a conquest by 
a foreign power. His focus refers to the influence of the pope and Catholicism 
over England. This is the case where, at that time, the papacy could 
legitimately be considered to be a foreign power,88 or where it was believed—
at least by Locke and his contemporaries—that Catholics were held within a 
tyrannical relationship by and to the Pope in exercising absolute power.89 This 
interpretation—in the context of the societal turmoil during the authoring 
                                               
87 Filmer, supra note 67. 
88 ASHCRAFT, supra note 15 at 215. 
89 Id. at 25. 
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period and considering the ways in which government can be dissolved—is 
certainly open on consideration of Locke’s comment that: ‘The delivery also 
of the People into the subjection of a Foreign Power, either by the Prince, or 
by the Legislative, is certainly a change of the Legislative…’.90 It is in this sense 
that Locke’s responses to the threat of Catholicism are to be examined.91 The 
operation of an arbitrary sovereign also provides a closely related problem in 
circumstances where catholic rule was so frequently equated with 
arbitrariness.92 The connection is relevant because, as will be seen, Locke 
often brings together absolute and arbitrary power.93 The merging of issues 
relating to a popish, arbitrary, and absolute sovereign in the problems 
expressed in the pamphlets during the authoring period—that is illustrated by 
the interconnections on the problem wheel—is also mirrored in Locke’s 
Second Treatise. In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that Locke does not 
offer a clear-cut answer to each problem and, instead, provides responses 
that address the problems as an interconnected group. It is, however, clear 
                                               
90 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §217. (Cf Laslett’s note re this point in which he suggests 
Locke may not have been referring to Charles II.) 
91 I will return to this point in relation to Locke’s solution to the outcome problem (the 
potential for a state of war). 
92 See the section Popery / a Catholic Monarch, above. 
93 In relating the nature of despotical power, see LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §135, 137. 
And, see Id. at II, §23, 64, 189. Regarding the act of governing without standing laws, 
see, Id. at II, §172.   
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that the Rule of Law-like solution provided—as a rationale for the way in which 
an errant government can be replaced without a break in society’s general 
governance—does address all of the process problems.  
Other process problems are easier to locate. During a discussion of 
tyranny, Locke states: ‘Where-ever Law ends, Tyranny begins…’ and goes on 
to detail that the extra-legal actions of a king are no more excusable than 
those of a lesser individual.94 A similar point is made when discussing the 
dissolution of government: both foreign and domestic attempts to take the 
properties of any people—thus putting oneself in a state of war—can be 
resisted and the invader’s station has no impact on the appropriateness of 
this action.95 These comments closely reflect some of the fears expressed as 
part of the problem of arbitrary rule and, more specifically, the fear that 
James would, if crowned and once he was considered as being incapable of 
breaking the law, give even less regard to the laws. This is also clear when 
Locke sets out the extent of legislative power and states that this cannot be 
exercised arbitrarily or through arbitrary degrees, and must, instead, rule by 
‘promulgated standing Laws, and known Authoris’d Judges’.96 He goes on to 
                                               
94 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §202. 
95 Id. at II, §231-232. 
96 Id. at II, §136. 
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say, in circumstances where the people consent to being governed, it cannot 
be supposed they intended to confer arbitrary power as the exercise of the 
(conferred) power must be limited to purposes that promote the public 
good.97 It is in these sections that Locke sets out, in detail and repeatedly, an 
argument that is a clearly recognisable Rule of Law-like position. He later 
summarises these and adds that the government must not interfere with 
property—through taxation—without consent, and describes this control in 
terms of the ‘Bounds…set to the Legislative Power’.98 Once again, it is clear 
that Locke is not only responding to the problem of rule by an arbitrary 
sovereign, but is doing so in a fashion that relates to the way the problems 
were stated during the authoring period: namely, the perceived fear that 
Charles and James would rule without parliament—as occurred in the context 
of the dissolutions of parliament during the Exclusion Crisis—and that society 
would be governed in a way that did not acknowledge or respect the need 
for the people’s consent. 
The final process problem relates to property. It is, of course, well 
known that the Two Treatises is, in large part, focused on providing an 
                                               
97 Id. at II, §135-139. See also, a brief definition of tyranny in the chapter devoted to 
the same: Id. at II, §199. 
98 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §142. 
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argument for the defence of private property against government 
intervention and reclamation.99 Locke provides an expansive idea of property 
in which the concept is constituted by individuals’ ‘Lives, Liberties, and 
Estates’100 and describes the preservation of property as ‘[t]he great and chief 
end…of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
Government...’101 Notwithstanding this more general focus of the work, Locke 
also has a chapter ‘Of Property’, that is suggested as being focused on 
Filmer’s argument that was made popular during the authoring period.102 In 
circumstances where preservation of property—in Locke’s broadly defined 
sense—is the end of government, property clearly cannot be taken without 
consent.103 If this occurs, then the government is arbitrary and is in state of war 
with its subjects,104 revolution or rebellion may justifiably follow abuses of 
                                               
99 In opening the Second Treatise—in the first paragraph in which he is not referring 
back to the contents of the First Treatise—Locke introduces his argument in this way: 
‘Political Power then I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and 
consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property… and 
all this is only for the Publick Good.’ Id. at II, §3. 
100 Id. at II, §123. 
101 Id. at II, §124. See the similar sentiment at Id. at II, §222. See also, in relation to the 
idea that property is not secure in more primitive societies, Id. at II, §94. 
102 See Laslett’s notes to lines 16-19 of paragraph 25. LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §25. 
(This is, of course, in addition to the specific refutation of Filmer in the First Treatise.) 
103 Id. at II, §138. 
104 Id. at II, §221-222.  
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property if this follows ‘a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices.’105 
The road to revolution or rebellion that Locke described closely mirrors the 
problems of the authoring period; the long train of abuses, and the fear that 
property would be taken is illustrative of Charles’s actions in attempting to 
subvert parliamentary authority and the fear that a popish ruler would, as 
catholic monarchs had in other places, seek to repossess various individuals’ 
property (in the narrow sense) and may, by virtue of being in a state of war 
with heretic protestant subjects, seek their death or at least would take away 
their liberty (relating to property in the wider sense). In this regard, the Rule of 
Law-like process problems from the authoring period are clearly answered in 
terms that suggest, given the actions of the sovereign, that rebellion is either 
likely or justified.  
Locke’s Solutions to the Defence Problem 
The authority of parliament is suggested by Whig pamphleteers as a 
defence against the process problems; in turn, and in opposition, 
parliament’s authority was questioned by the Tories. The problem that 
existed could be said, therefore, to relate to the proper extent of parliament’s 
authority. When it is kept in mind that Locke was active in the Whig party, and 
                                               
105 Id. at II, §225. 
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he echoes many of Shaftesbury’s—arch-Whig—positions, it will be of no 
surprise that pro-parliamentary authority positions not only constitute one of 
the fundamental points of the Second Treatise, but also that the concept is 
peppered throughout his work.   
Locke’s view is that parliament’s authority is grounded in consent: the 
government cannot oblige any action where consent is absent.106 The nature 
of this consent, that political society will be joined, and government created, 
for the purpose of the common good is fundamental to this position.107 The 
corollary of this position means that power cannot be exercised for the 
destruction of the people.108 Further, people can only transfer to the 
government powers that they themselves held in a pre-political society.109 It is 
in these senses that the King’s authority is given to him by the law.110 It is also 
suggested that it is the function of civil society—in responding to and 
                                               
106 Id. at II, §199. See also Id. at II, §142. 
107 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §131, 138. 
108 Id. at II, §229. 
109 Id. at II, §135. This is an argument given for the reason why arbitrary power—which 
did not accrue to an individual in the state of nature—could not be a power 
transferred to the government; hence why the exercise of arbitrary power was 
outside of any consent and, therefore, outside of the common good. See, also Id. at 
II, §137. 
110 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §206. 
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reflecting the consent granted to the government—that allows us to 
distinguish proper government from absolute monarchy.111 Locke’s account in 
the Second Treatise—not to mention his refutation of Filmer’s divine right 
theory in the First Treatise—attempts to provide an account that justifies why 
individuals should treat government—and, within government, parliament (as 
government’s supreme authority)—as being authoritative. In circumstances 
where the Tories argued that the King was supreme and should be able to 
dictate to the parliament, the question of parliamentary authority—over both 
the people and the King—was a fundamental problem to which Locke 
responded with a simple idea: the people’s consent, given when joining or 
being part of civil society, provides the necessary authority and, crucially, the 
necessary constraint, on the exercise of power. This last part is not only 
important in terms of the Rule of Law-like-ness of the point, but also to 
differentiate the idea from the Tories’ divine right idea that the King was all-
powerful and, therefore, power could be exercised arbitrarily as there was no 
                                               
111 Id. at II, §90. Locke suggests that ‘the end of Civil Society [is] to avoid, and remedy 
those inconveniences of the State of Nature…’ which formulates the claim related to 
the protection of property in a slightly different—although not at all inconsistent—way. 
See also Laslett’s comments to this effect Id. at II, §100. 
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constraint on what could be done.112 Accordingly, Locke’s response to the 
problem allows not only the Whigs’ point to be rationalised, but also provides 
a Rule of Law-like constraint on the exercise of arbitrary power as one of the 
fundamental problems of the period.  
Locke’s Solutions to the Outcome Problem 
The outcome of a failure of parliamentary authority to check the way in 
which arbitrary or popish rulers, inter alia, seek to take individual’s property is 
a state of war. The fact that revolution may follow any attempts from the 
government to take property without consent has already been noted.113 It 
seems likely that it is this aspect of Locke’s work that caused it to be 
considered as a justificatory work following the Glorious Revolution. This 
seems to be especially the case in the context where, on Locke’s account, 
acting against the sovereign does not operate so as to endanger the 
institution of government.114 Locke’s account could, post-Glorious Revolution, 
be seen as a way to legitimise the continued existence of the government; 
                                               
112 This brings to mind the problem of infinite-regress often associated with a 
Hobbesian style sovereign; that, if another authority existed that could constrain the 
sovereign, it would be that other authority that would, in fact, be sovereign.  
113 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §222-226. See also, Id. at II, §232. In relation to opposing 
unlawfully exercised authority, see Id. at II, §204-206. 
114 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §207. 
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however, the text was not written for this purpose,115 and could not have been 
given the period in which it was authored.   
Locke considers the arbitrary exercise of power operating so as to, 
inter alia, seize individuals’ property in the context where a parliamentary 
institution could not operate so as to defend against those problems. In 
providing this summary of the problems, there is no way to distinguish 
whether the ‘Locke considers’ aspect refers to the extant situation in Locke’s 
state of nature, or the actual contextual situation in which Locke was writing in 
England during the authoring period. This simple exercise illustrates clearly 
the problems’ operation as a connective tissue between Locke’s philosophical 
or theoretical account and the practical political reality that he faced. Locke’s 
simple assessment of the situation is that a state of war exists when an 
absolute, arbitrary, power is exercised by one man over another to take away 
his property whenever he pleases.116 A more specific contextual relationship 
of the problem and solution also exists: a situation of war exists between ruler 
and ruled when parliament is repeatedly dissolved.117 Locke, however, must 
work to ensure that it is understood that the state of war does not mean a 
                                               
115 Although, of course, it may have been published for this purpose. 
116 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §172. See also, Id. at II, §176, 199, 202, 222. 
117 This has been suggested as being a reference to James. See, LOCKE, supra note 4 
at II, §205. See also, Id. at II, §155. 
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total end to civil society and a return to the state of nature on a wholesale 
basis and, instead, constitutes a change to the structure of the Legislative.118 
This is apparent in various places,119 but none more so than in the final 
sentence of the Second Treatise in which he states:   
Or else when by the Miscarriages of those in Authority, it is 
forfeited; upon the Forfeiture of their Rulers, or at the 
Determination of the Time set, it reverts to the Society, and the 
People have a Right to act as Supreme, and continue the 
Legislative in themselves, or erect a new Form, or under the old 
form place it in new hands, as they think good.120 
In making this comment, Locke neatly sums up the contextual aims of 
the Whigs in responding to the problems outlined in the pamphlets of the 
authoring period. In considering the outlines provided above, this could also 
be put into these terms: when there has been arbitrary rule of subjects—that 
may follow from popish influence—and where property is sought to be taken, 
a state of war exists between the ruler and the ruled which reconstitutes the 
sovereign power in society. In considering this summary, the Rule of Law-like 
aspects of Locke’s Two Treatises can clearly be seen as being capable of 
providing a solution to the Rule of Law-like problems that have been 
                                               
118 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §213-217. 
119 Id. at II, §207. 
120 Id. at II, §243 (italics in original).  
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identified in the pamphlets of the authoring period. One question, however, 
remains: does the interpretation of Locke’s account in this way facilitate a 
different understanding of the Lockean position that is generally taken to be 
‘Locke’s Rule of Law’?  
CONCLUSION:  
‘LOCKE’S RULE OF LAW’: NOT LOCKE’S RULE OF LAW 
Earlier in this chapter, I set out what ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is commonly 
taken to be: a conception that is opposed to the arbitrary imposition of 
power.121 Before even considering other Lockean Rule of Law-like ideas like 
‘established and promulgated laws’, ‘declared and received laws’, ‘stated 
rules’, and ‘settled standing laws’,122 it is relevant to pause and consider the 
basic problem of arbitrariness that is ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’. This popular 
position of arbitrariness underappreciates the complexity of Locke’s Rule of 
Law when his statement of ideas in the Two Treatises is considered in context. 
In this concluding part, I outline why this is the case. First, however, I must 
provide a quick caveat. In relation to the formulation of ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ I 
do not suggest that the authors that have used Locke in this way fail to 
                                               
121 See, ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’, above. 
122 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §137. For full quote, see note 4 above, and 
accompanying text.  
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appreciate the subtleties of Locke’s account; nor do I suggest it is necessary 
to drill down into the contextual background of an author’s meaning in every 
situation. I do, however, suggest that doing so—or at least actively 
appreciating that there is something more than mere anti-arbitrariness to 
Locke—is both uncomplicated and important. Yet, this is not generally done; 
and, it is not generally done despite the benefits that accrue to our 
understanding of the concept of the Rule of Law by doing so. By considering 
Locke’s Rule of Law only in terms of arbitrariness, we are missing something 
fundamentally important. We are missing something because the very idea of 
arbitrariness hides a more complex web of problems; including his Rule of 
Law-like ideas.    
The Problems with Locke 
In considering ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’, Locke is taken to be tackling the 
problem of arbitrary power. However, it is clear Locke had in mind far more 
than just this single problem. Locke’s Rule of Law (as his account in context) 
responds to more than mere arbitrariness. Of course, the immediate question 
here should be: so, what? It would be correct to, first, question whether the 
difference in originating problems actually makes any difference and, second, 
question whether this difference merely has to do with the fact that I have 
applied a wider Rule of Law definition (and, hence, I am actually considering 
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something both different to ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ and, also, that what I am 
considering is not properly conceived of as the Rule of Law). I address this 
second question first.  
Am I considering something different to ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’? 
In circumstances where I have sought to adopt a slightly broader idea 
of the Rule of Law than that which is generally taken to be ‘Locke’s Rule of 
Law’, I am, of course, considering something different. There must be 
differences in the accounts; this is, after all, the point that I am making. The 
more precise and helpful formulation of this idea is to question whether the 
difference is so substantial as to render my broad definition not actually an 
idea that could be a Rule of Law idea.123 Given the way that I have generated 
the broader definitions that I adopt—and the fact that it is more abstract and 
less specific than the idea in ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’—there seems to be little 
complaint that can genuinely be raised to suggest that ideas of the Rule of 
Law, whatever they may be taken to be, would not fall within the definition 
that I adopt. On this basis, any suggestion that the definition adopted herein 
is not a Rule of Law idea seems unlikely to be capable of gaining any traction. 
                                               
123 I am happy to concede that Locke’s position—whatever that may be taken to be—
does indeed relate to the Rule of Law—whatever that may be taken to be. 
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Of course, one possibility for the differences may be as a result of ‘Locke’s 
Rule of Law’ being put to different uses; the difference may be something that 
is actually to do with the way that the user / interpreter of Locke seeks to use 
the contemporary idea. In this respect, I return to the view that the adoption 
of a presently accepted / or acceptable view of what the Rule of Law is runs 
the risk of missing something about the concept (as it was meant to be 
understood by its author) that is important.124 It is for this reason that the 
following question attains even more importance.  
Does the difference make any difference? 
More is not always better. Whilst it is clear that my exploration reveals 
there are several more Rule of Law-like problems that Locke may have been 
attempting to address in the Two Treatises than are appreciated in ‘Locke’s 
Rule of Law’, the mere fact that considering additional factors in Locke’s 
account—specifically the context of the writing of his content—does not 
necessarily provide a more accurate, or useful, conception of the Rule of Law. 
However, in this situation, more is both different and better; and these things 
conspire to mean that the difference does make a difference. 
                                               
124 See Chapter 1. 
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Locke’s Rule of Law is more than a single problem concept.  When 
viewed in context, it is a rich tapestry of ideas that stem from a fear of arbitrary 
rule together with three other problems that are inextricably intertwined with 
one another whilst, in turn, being bound together by a fundamental and 
motivating fear of popery. It is crucial to appreciate that arbitrariness is not a 
central concern and, further, may be facilitative of other problems (that may 
not relate to limiting power per se). Locke’s account of arbitrary or absolute 
rulers seems to be, in many senses, another way for him to identify the likely 
or feared method of rule—as well as the outcome that may follow—that would 
be adopted by a catholic ruler. In this sense, Locke’s mere use of the term 
‘arbitrary’ is loaded; for this reason, it may not communicate the same 
meaning of the concept when it is applied in contemporary discourse. This is 
not to say that Locke did not seek to merely use—in some senses—something 
like the dictionary meaning (at least as it would currently be defined). But, in 
considering the problem / solution approach adopted herein, what is clear is 
that the solution must be understood in the context of the problem. In other 
words: there exists a genuine disagreement only if there are inconsistent 
views about the same subject matter; or, illustrating the other side of the 
relationship, there exists a genuine agreement only if there are consistent 
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views about the same subject matter.125 Putting this another way, 
notwithstanding Locke’s invocation of some very Rule of Law-like words—that 
include, inter alia, ‘established and promulgated laws’, ‘declared and 
received laws’, ‘stated rules’, and ‘settled standing laws’126—he can only be 
conceived as meaning the same thing as other theorists who use similar 
conceptual descriptions if those ideas—as solutions—relate to the same 
problems. Whilst that is the case with ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’, this is not what 
occurs when Locke’s Rule of Law is considered.  
There is another way to view this disjoint. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
benefit of the problem / solution approach is that it provides two 
perspectives from which to consider an issue: from the problem’s, and the 
solution’s perspective.127 This perspective shift can also apply when 
considering two forms of account in order to consider whether the problems 
to which the contemporary Rule of Law-like ideas—including those of ‘Locke’s 
Rule of Law’—are the same as those when Locke was writing. There is, of 
course, some crossover in the Rule of Law-like problems. As has been stated, 
arbitrary power remains the mainstay of Rule of Law discourse. Yet, whilst 
                                               
125 See Chapter 2. 
126 LOCKE, supra note 4 at II, §137.  
127 I expand upon this idea in Chapter 6. 
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issues associated with protection of property (widely conceived) could be 
seen to fall within some substantive ideas of the Rule of Law, the other 
problems—to do with a fear of popery, the authority of parliament, and a state 
of war—are far less obviously considered as (contemporary) Rule of Law-like 
problems. (Perhaps this illustrates why Locke is only conceived of in terms of 
arbitrariness—as this is the only useful aspect that can be cherry-picked given 
the contemporary problems in society?)  As has been illustrated, there is a 
substantial difference between the single problem of arbitrariness that is 
frequently attributed to Locke, and the several problems that his account 
seeks to tackle. Accordingly, not only does the difference make a difference, 
it is clear that ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is not Locke’s Rule of Law.  
‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is not Locke’s Rule of Law: What Does this Mean? 
There is, of course, one issue with stating ‘‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ is not 
Locke’s Rule of Law’: ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ never was Locke’s Rule of Law. The 
account that I have identified as being different to the contextual account—the 
account in which Locke merely provides a solution to the exercise of arbitrary 
power—is not actually what Locke meant. The account is, however, what many 
Rule of Law thinkers simply take Locke to have said. This means that the way 
that Locke and ‘Locke’s Rule of Law’ have been applied may provide an 
account that is different, in fundamental and crucial respects, to that which 
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Locke actually provided.128 In considering the Rule of Law as a solution 
concept, and in considering the problems to which Locke was responding in 
providing his Rule of Law-like account, it seems clear that it is necessary—if we 
want to be clear about exactly what Locke’s Rule of Law-like idea was—that we 
fully comprehend the totality of the problems to which Locke was 
responding. This requires us to consider more than the simple form of 
arbitrary rule to which Locke is taken to relate. When we do this, it becomes 
obvious that our conception of Locke—at least insofar as the Rule of Law 
goes—may not be as secure as we have previously thought. It seems that 





                                               
128 I emphasise ‘may’ here, as I do not claim that the ultimate outcome of the 
difference between the two accounts must be different across the board.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
HOBBES AND LOCKE:   
BOTH SIDES OF THE STORY /  
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?1 
INTRODUCTION:  
EVERYBODY WANTS TO RULE THE WORLD / FIGHT THE POWER2 
As will by now be clear, conceptions of the Rule of Law are legion, 
contested, not infrequently confused, and are often simply drawn together in 
a way that suggests—sometimes only implicitly—the thinkers responsible for 
the conceptions are all talking about the same idea. (Notwithstanding the 
contest that exists regarding the conceptual content.) I am sceptical about 
this; I do not accept many of the people associated with the Rule of Law are 
actually—let alone necessarily—talking about the same thing. By this, I do not 
                                               
1 PHIL COLLINS, Both Sides BOTH SIDES OF THE STORY (1993); THE SMITHS, The Smiths 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? (1984). (I illustrate opposing sentiments with song 
titles that come from the same musical era. These not only provide nostalgic levity, 
but also a difference in viewpoint within a single media which illustrates the dangers 
of conceiving of works from a similar period—like Hobbes and Locke—as necessarily 
talking about the same idea.) 
2 TEARS FOR FEARS, EVERYBODY WANTS TO RULE THE WORLD (1985); PUBLIC ENEMY, Fear 
of a Black Planet FIGHT THE POWER (1989). 
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mean to suggest that the usual suspects of the Rule of Law3 cannot be 
lumped into a massively broad and over-general concept that is subsequently 
attributed the name ‘the Rule of Law’; after all, that is exactly what currently 
happens. What I do mean to suggest is that there are problems with 
assuming that two terms, phrases, or ideas, that may be superficially similar, 
in two separate accounts, are necessarily comparable or reflect the same 
idea. To pick on one well known Rule of Law desideratum as an example, 
predictability is frequently cited as being an essential element of the Rule of 
Law; its essentiality can be identified or distilled from any number of Rule of 
Law accounts.4 However, I do not think that simple reliance on the common 
statement of an idea, or the mere similarity of term, in a Rule of Law account is 
sufficient; more is needed before any robust conclusion can be drawn 
regarding the existence of common themes. What I do in this chapter, in 
relation to Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule of Law accounts from the last two 
chapters, is explore the similarities and differences to illuminate and explain 
the extension of a methodology that will allow the clarification of both their 
conceptions of the Rule of Law, as well as assisting in the process of bringing 
clarity to the content of the concept of the Rule of Law more generally. In 
                                               
3 See Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. 
4 For an expansion of the examination of the common idea of predictability, and 
others, see Chapter 3.  
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doing so, I make substantial progress toward answering the research 
question that I pose in this thesis: what is the nature of the change across Rule 
of Law conceptions? 
By considering similarities and differences that can be seen at varying 
levels of analytical scrutiny in both Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule of Law-like 
accounts in Leviathan and the Two Treatises, I argue that their accounts, whilst 
both coming within my broad Rule of Law definition, have almost no 
similarity. This absence of similarity is not simply based on the mere fact that 
the two accounts are, clearly, very different accounts; dissimilarity results from 
a deeper, conceptual, difference that has not previously been appreciated. 
As I have already considered their accounts as being solutions to problems in 
their societies, I first identify similarities on the face of the accounts (what I will 
call ‘superficial’ similarities) before, second, illustrating why those similarities 
cannot be seen as true similarities: the solutions—even if couched in similar 
terms—respond to different problems and this renders them distinguishable 
from one another; these differences—notwithstanding a similarity of term or 
nomenclature—represent different Rule of Law inflections. What is also clear is 
that these differences do not reflect the differences that exist in relation to the 
caricatures often associated with both thinkers’ work. By considering the 
accounts in terms of a problem / solution relationship, I identify any 
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similarities and differences that could, otherwise, be confused. In addressing 
the research question undergirding this thesis, this form of analysis can, as a 
result, be used as a foundation for the examination of conceptual change 
across other ideas of the Rule of Law.  
The structure of the chapter is relatively simple. I first, briefly, restate 
the background to the Rule of Law debate, outline Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule 
of Law caricatures, and illustrate some of the complications that exist when 
considering both of these thinkers. In Disambiguating Hobbes and Locke, I 
illustrate the way in which my problem / solution methodology can be 
extended to identify the issue with considering the superficial similarities in 
Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule of Law-like accounts. Then, by considering the 
problems to which the two authors respond in their Rule of Law-like accounts, 
I consider whether the apparent similarities on the face of the accounts are 
actually similar before spending some time teasing out the nature of the 
differences between the accounts themselves. In the penultimate part—
Conceptual Comparisons as Conceptual Change—I take steps toward 
answering my research question by considering how this sort of examination 
can assist in identifying mechanisms of change between different Rule of Law 
conceptions. In the final part, I offer some brief conclusions. 
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SIMILAR (?) RULE OF LAW ACCOUNTS:  
TWO TRIBES GO TO WAR / BROTHERS IN ARMS5 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law can appear to be either similar or 
different; but this depends on the level at which any analysis takes place. Of 
course, it cannot be denied that there are real differences between various 
conceptions of the Rule of Law. Differences can be seen in terms of the 
conceptual form in which conceptions are put forward; this includes, for 
example, differences in the desiderata that make them up, or the focus of the 
conception (i.e. whether it is formal or substantive).6 These are well explored 
and generally obvious points of difference. Less obvious, but no less 
important, differences exist in the context of some of the canonical 
conceptions that require modification of our appreciation of the ideas and 
their relative similarity / difference. For example, if Aristotle’s conception of 
the Rule of Law is to have any cogency in relation to the contemporary idea of 
the Rule of Law, it simply makes no sense to consider it only in terms of a 
society in which slave ownership is both widely practiced and accepted as 
                                               
5 FRANKIE GOES TO HOLLYWOOD, Welcome to the Pleasuredome TWO TRIBES (1984); 
DIRE STRAITS, Brothers in Arms BROTHERS IN ARMS (1985). 
6 These differences—especially in terms of the usual suspects—have already been 
explored in the first three chapters of this thesis. These could be conceived as being 
first-order differences in the content of the Rule of Law conceptions.  
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morally acceptable. The aspects of Aristotle’s thought that relate to slavery 
must be conveniently forgotten or read-down to facilitate some relevance for 
his ideas. This stark difference over millennia is no less apparent across a 
period of time that is an order of magnitude less; Dicey’s late-nineteenth 
century English society was substantially different to any western democratic 
modern state that exists today. Substantive differences also occur on even 
smaller timescales: Hayek and Fuller’s mid-twentieth century Rule of Law 
accounts, written either during or in the wake of the hostilities of the Second 
World War, belong to an era far removed from Raz’s late-twentieth, or the 
U.N.’s early twenty first-century ideas of the concept.7  
To avoid obvious discrepancies in analysis, it makes intuitive sense to 
consider accounts that come from within the same, or at least a closely 
related, society and period of history. Considering the Rule of Law-relevant 
                                               
7 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 112 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007); 
Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW 
AND MORALITY 210–226 (2 ed. 2009); UN SECURITY COUNCIL, THE RULE OF LAW AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES - REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY-GENERAL 6 (2004), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/2004%20report.pdf 
(last visited Jul 20, 2018). For an account of the historical background to the 
concept, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 
(2004). For an account of why history is important in relation to the concept of the 
Rule of Law, see Chapter 1.   
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aspects of Hobbes’s and Locke’s ideas seems likely to minimise these 
contextual background-differences; after all, Hobbes’s Leviathan, and Locke’s 
Two Treatises of Government were authored only around 30 years apart.8 
Both authors were—geographically and nationalistically speaking—Englishmen 
engaged in the enterprise of commenting on the nature of the exercise of 
power in England at the time. Yet, whilst, the temporal, geographical, and 
cultural relationship between these two have far more in common than 
between the other canons of the Rule of Law, works from similar contexts can 
be fundamentally different in focus;9 the precise nature of the endeavours in 
which each author was engaged, and the precise social groups with which 
they were associated were fundamentally different.  
In disambiguating ideas associated with the Rule of Law, I will continue 
to use the two broad definitions that I have used thus far: the normative force 
conception and the Rule of Law elements.10 I consider any idea that satisfies 
                                               
8 For the justification for dating Leviathan and the Two Treatises to January 1646-
January 1651, and January 1679-April 1683, respectively, see Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5.  
9 This point is illustrated by the sub-titles adopted throughout this chapter. 
10 For the theory and application of these ideas, see Chapter 3 (theory) and Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5 (application). 
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either idea, as a Rule of Law-like idea. In this sense, Hobbes and Locke are 
both Rule of Law thinkers.11   
If a simple caricature of each thinker’s account is adopted, Hobbes’s 
and Locke’s Rule of Law-like accounts (‘the accounts’) can be seen as not only 
fundamentally different, but also largely opposing one another. In building 
off the consideration of the thinkers’ caricatures in earlier chapters,12 the 
caricatures could be put into these terms: 
The ‘Lockean caricature’:  A government opposing the operation of 
arbitrary or absolute power;13 and  
The ‘Hobbesian caricature’:  A sovereign that can exercise largely 
arbitrary and unlimited power.14 
These are, in many senses, very abstract. When only the caricatures are 
considered, there is a clear difference between the two accounts. The 
caricatures do what caricatures do; they accentuate various features in order 
to create a memorable and recognisable representation of the thing. They do 
                                               
11 See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
12 See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
13 This caricature, and its relation to Locke’s Rule of Law, is considered in Chapter 5. 
14 This caricature, and its relation to Hobbes’s Rule of Law, is considered in 
Chapter 4. 
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not, however, capture all aspects of the conceptions.15 This is a problem for 
conceptual clarity.  
An assessment of the accounts at a different level of analysis reveals a 
very different picture. Notwithstanding the fact that the position 
communicated in the caricatures is not incorrect per se, different levels of 
analysis expose not only different points of disagreement, but also in some 
respects points of agreement. Whilst I will expand upon this idea in the next 
part, the accounts fundamentally agree on the importance of consent; in 
both, consent facilitates the creation of the power structure—as the 
parliamentary government for Locke, or the Leviathan for Hobbes—which then 
facilitates Rule of Law-like controls. Where the relative level of agreement / 
disagreement can vary depending on the level at which conceptual analysis 
takes place, and notwithstanding the broad contextual similarity, what is 
required is a way to ensure that the appreciation of the accounts—as Rule of 
Law accounts—can be disambiguated in a way that does not throw the baby 
out with the bathwater.  
                                               
15 As caricatures, nor are they meant to.  
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DISAMBIGUATING HOBBES AND LOCKE:  
I STILL HAVEN’T FOUND WHAT I’M LOOKING FOR / ONE STEP BEYOND16 
Whilst a contextual assessment of the accounts has revealed an 
unexpected level of similarity, the problem / solution methodology that has 
already been applied to the accounts provides a way to disambiguate 
between them and illustrate that although the accounts may be in some 
respects the same, they are in other respects different and differentiable. 
Considering both the problems that Hobbes and Locke were able to perceive 
in their societies at the time they were writing together with the solutions that 
they proposed provides one way to drill-down into the similarities and 
differences that exist between the accounts.  
The problem / solution methodology suggests we can properly 
understand a (Rule of Law) solution only if we understand the correlative (Rule 
of Law) problem.17 In extending this idea, we can also say: we cannot assume 
there is a contest between theorists simply because two answers are different 
(as they could still mean the same thing); and, we cannot assume there is 
                                               
16 U2, Joshua Tree I STILL HAVEN’T FOUND WHAT I’M LOOKING FOR (1987); MADNESS, 
One Step Beyond ONE STEP BEYOND (1979). 
17 For the introduction of the idea generally, see Chapter 2: How can we Assess What 
the Rule of Law is / was for a Particular Canonical Author?   
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agreement between theorists because two answers are the same (as they 
could still mean something different). In Chapter 2, I suggested that the 
problem / solution approach facilitates refinement of any methodology based 
solely on consideration of the Rule of Law (as a solution sans problem) and 
provides increased precision in identifying the nature and meaning of any 
conception. I then, in Chapters 4 and 5, illustrated the application of this idea. 
There is, however, scope to expand the methodology in service of the 
questions raised in this chapter. Again, as noted in Chapter 2, a problem / 
solution pairing has the advantage of providing two perspectives from which 
to consider the nature of change: the solution’s and the problem’s. It is this 
aspect of the methodology that facilitates an additional point of contrast 
between Rule of Law solutions. This allows aspects of Rule of Law-like ideas, 
ostensibly postulated in the same terms, to be disambiguated as a result of 
the fact that they respond to different problems: different Rule of Law 
inflections can be differentiated. This sort of contrast is not possible if the Rule 
of Law-like idea alone (as the solution-half of the problem / solution equation) 
is considered simply on its own tenets.  
Why Disambiguating is Important 
When the superficially similar solutions provided by Hobbes and Locke 
in the accounts are considered in terms of the motivating problems, 
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differences emerge. The differences range from subtle, to stark; but, 
nonetheless, differences exist. It is useful before going any further to state 
why this difference is important. In doing so, I delve back into the problem / 
solution methodology.18  
In circumstances where two accounts can be seen as superficially 
similar, the identification of a different problem that relates to the 
(superficially similar) solutions provides one way to disambiguate a precise 
meaning of each solution. If two questions are asked, and two answers are 
provided in ostensibly the same terms, the question itself can be used to 
provide context and meaning—and, hence, provide disambiguation—for the 
answer. A simple example will suffice. Consider these two questions: first, 
‘what time will we eat lunch?’; and, second, ‘how many people have walked 
on the moon?’ The answer to both may be ‘12’; yet, it is clear the (superficially 
similar) answer means something very different in each case. The inflection 
imported to ‘12’ in response to each question is different. The same principle 
applies to the solutions provided by Hobbes and Locke: additional meaning 
can be gleaned by considering the problems to which the solutions were 
provided as a response. In this sense, and by way of an example, we may 
                                               
18 See Chapter 2, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5. 
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consider the superficially similar solution regarding the operation and 
importance of consent as taking two forms: 
The operation and importance of consentH; and 
The operation and importance of consentL. 
The former relates to Hobbes’s formulation of the solution; and, the 
latter relates to Locke’s formulation. In these senses, and through this formal 
construction, the two solutions—whilst related and superficially similar—are, 
different inflections of the same idea. This simple way to disambiguate is 
important because, when viewed in this way, it is clear that the accounts—
although superficially similar—should not be conflated merely because there 
are certain terms, turns of phrase, or even more widely stated ideas that are 
held in common. This process of disambiguation allows each inflection to be 
conceptually separated and to be considered individually. Identifying these 
inflections enables us to be more conceptually precise in our understanding 
and application of each, either, or both of the ideas contained within the 
accounts. 
To illustrate how it is possible to disambiguate the ideas contained 
within the accounts, it is necessary to first illustrate which aspects of the 
accounts are in need of disambiguation. As noted above in relation to the 
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caricatures, it is clear that the accounts are in many respects, largely different; 
they are also written from different perspectives, with different normative 
goals, and in relation to different societal crises.19  
Similarities in Hobbes’s and Locke’s Solutions 
The several similarities between the Hobbesian and Lockean solutions 
stand in stark contrast to the differences between the caricatures. The act of 
examining the accounts in greater detail shifts the accounts’ relative 
coherence; the neat image provided by the Rule of Law-like aspects of the 
accounts in caricature is not, however, as simple as it first appears. Even if 
Hobbes and Locke view the world in very different ways, given the existence 
of some agreements, and in order to disambiguate, it is necessary to identify 
exactly where agreement may lie.  
                                               
19 Hobbes provides a theory that was, at least at the time of writing, intended to 
provide a response to the Engagement Crisis, as a general guide for the exiled king; 
Locke was writing as part of the revolutionary Whig movement, intent on opposing 
Charles II’s extension of powers and the ascension to the throne of the catholic 
bother and heir James (during the Exclusion Crisis), as part of the Earl of 
Shaftesbury’s inner circle. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say that Hobbes was 
arguing for Charles II, and Locke was arguing against Charles II. 
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The first, and most fundamental, aspect on which the accounts agree is 
the operation and the importance of consent. In Hobbes’s and Locke’s ideas 
of the social contract, an individual’s consent to be subject to power is 
essential. Hobbes’s social contract requires that the people provide consent—
by compacting with one another—to be subject to a single, absolute, 
sovereign power.20 Locke’s view is that parliament’s authority is grounded in 
consent: the government cannot oblige any action where consent is absent;21 
political society will be joined, and government created, for the purpose of 
the common good.22 An undergirding aim in giving consent, for Locke, is that 
people enter civil society to extract themselves from the state of nature in 
order to protect their property.23 For Hobbes, the aim is to avoid war and to 
seek peace.24 In both accounts, society’s end reflects a need or an intent to 
avoid being in the state of nature, and, as this requires individuals be 
                                               
20 See RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES: LEVIATHAN: REVISED STUDENT EDITION [85]-[88] (2 (Rev.) 
ed. 1996).  
21 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, §138, 142 (Peter Laslett ed., Student 
ed. 1988). 
22 Id. at II, §131, 138. 
23 Id. at II, §85, 90, 124, 138, 229. In relation to unprotected property placing 
individuals in a state of war, see Id. at II, §222. Locke’s state of nature can be seen as 
being more non-hypothetical (than Hobbes’s). 
24 TUCK, supra note 20 at [85]. 
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protected from one another, individuals consent to being subject to a power 
that can provide this protection. 
The second point of agreement, relates to the transfer of individual’s 
rights or powers to a centralized form of power that can wield it in pursuit of 
the society’s ends. (This is, obviously enough, intimately related to the idea of 
consent.) For Hobbes, individuals compact to obtain protection from one 
another and they agree to be subject to the sovereign on the basis that 
protection is provided.25 Hobbesian individuals cede their right to everything 
in order to obtain the benefit of protection.26 Lockean individuals give up 
both their powers to do whatever is required to preserve themselves, as well 
as the power to punish.27    
The third area of agreement relates to the nature of sovereign authority 
and the need to obey commands. This, like the transfer of rights, also relates 
to consent. For Hobbes, the duty to obey does not stem from the power of 
the sovereign per se: it comes from the act of consent.28 He puts it this way: ‘I 
Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this 
                                               
25 Id. at [85]. 
26 Id. at [64]-[65]. 
27 LOCKE, supra note 21 at II, §128-130. 
28 TUCK, supra note 20 at [87]-[88]. 
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Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up, thy Right to him, and 
Authorise all his Actions in like manner.’29 Where the ‘end of Obedience is 
Protection…’, and Hobbes outlines the ‘mutuall Relation between Protection 
and Obedience’,30 it follows for him that—where individuals need to seek 
peace and an escape from the state of nature31—a sovereign’s commands 
should be obeyed. Locke provides a simple idea: the people’s consent, given 
when joining or being part of civil society, provides the necessary authority 
and, crucially, the necessary constraint, on the exercise of power.32   
These three similarities become apparent when a contextual analysis of 
the Rule of Law-like aspects of the accounts is undertaken.33 The suggestion 
that there are similarities may not, however, be intuitively analytically 
appealing. After all, it is apparent that Hobbes and Locke are, on both the 
scale of the most detailed textual analysis as well as in the most cursory 
                                               
29 Id. at [87] (italics in original). 
30 Id. at [395]-[396]. (This is the closing sentiment of the book.) 
31 Id. at [64]. 
32 For the suggestion that one is obliged to follow the sovereign’s commands once 
consent has been given, see LOCKE, supra note 21 at II, §121. Whilst it is clear that 
the duty to obedience subsists during the time that a sovereign acts in accordance 
with the trust placed in it, the duty to obedience ceases once illegal attempts are 
made on an individual’s liberties. Id. at II, §134, 228. 
33 For a full contextual analysis of the Rule of Law-like accounts, see Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5.  
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caricature, engaged in very different arguments with different goals. Given 
this conceptual sandwich created by clear disagreement at both extremes, 
with a level of agreement created by contextual analysis in the middle, the 
question could be raised as to what benefit my identifying similarities holds. 
Two answers are offered. The first is simply that any further analysis is helpful 
in clarifying the exact meaning and nature of a conception; and this is never 
more apparent than in the case of conceptions of a concept like the Rule of 
Law that is so hotly contested. The second response is more substantive and 
is illustrative of a wider point I want to make in this thesis: consideration of 
Rule of Law-like aspects of the accounts results in the potential to 
disambiguate what may otherwise—at a certain conceptual level, or, on the 
face of it—appear to be similarities. By conducting a problem / solution 
contextual analysis of the accounts it is possible to facilitate this 
disambiguation. It is then possible to further interrogate the aspects of 
agreement outlined above.   
Are the ‘Similarities in Hobbes’s and Locke’s Solutions’ Similar? 
The accounts’ solutions do not exist in a vacuum; they respond to a 
number of problems that can be identified through an analysis of the context 
in which Hobbes and Locke were writing. The unprecedented periods of 
turmoil in which Hobbes and Locke existed led to an unprecedented number 
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of pamphlets that commented on, critiqued, or supported the various issues 
or arguments that, collectively, reflected society’s most important problems 
of the time. In using pamphlets to reflect problems that were perceivable by 
Hobbes and Locke I go beyond simply considering the Rule of Law-like 
solutions (sans problems) they provide. By exploring the differences in the 
problems that give rise to the accounts, the solutions’ (dis)similarities can be 
exposed. I explore the relationship between the various problems and 
solutions that can be seen in the accounts. In doing so, I relate the accounts’ 
similarities back to each author’s problem categorisation in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The Operation and Importance of Consent  
Consent represents, at the most fundamental level, the clearest and 
most obvious similarity between the accounts. It makes sense, therefore, to 
start here. Hobbes’s and Locke’s social contract arguments were each 
focused on exposing the essential role of consent in relation to the legality or 
authority of the government. However, notwithstanding this similarity, the 
problems that motivated their solutions were fundamentally different: 
Hobbes was motivated by questions regarding an existing sovereign’s 
legitimacy; Locke was motivated by questions regarding how a ruler or soon-
to-be ruler is acting or may act. 
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Hobbes’s consent-solution addresses several problems perceivable by 
him. One of the most fundamental problems that emerged can be 
summarised by a single question: is consent necessary to be ruled (and has it 
been given)?34 Arguments that consent was a necessary aspect of being ruled 
were provided by well-known groups, authors, and pamphleteers.35 Tyranny, 
it was said, follows the absence of consent.36 Whilst these forms may be seen 
as representative of a parliamentary cause—especially where popular royalist 
arguments often took the form of a divine right of kings in which consent was 
not present37—Hobbes’s argument sought to adopt what could be seen as the 
‘opposition’s’ tactic regarding consent, and use it to justify the execution and 
application of absolute power. In doing so, his solution brought together two 
                                               
34 See Chapter 4: The necessity of (the people’s) consent and its effect on the 
legality/legitimacy of the government. 
35 For example, RICHARD OVERTON, AN APPEALE FROM THE DEGENERATE REPRESENTATIVE 
BODY (1647); JOHN MILTON, THE TENURE OF KINGS AND MAGISTRATES (1649); JOHN 
LILBURNE, ENGLANDS NEW CHAINS DISCOVERED (1649). 
36 Whilst this was frequently stated, see, as one example, LILBURNE, supra note 35. 
37 The most famous work of this kind is Robert Filmer, Patriarcha, in PATRIARCHA AND 
OTHER WRITINGS 1–63 (J. P. Sommerville ed., 1991). Whilst this was not published until 
1680, similar works by Filmer in substantially similar terms were available during the 
time Hobbes was writing. See, Robert Filmer, The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed 
Monarchy, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 131–171 (J. P. Sommerville ed., 1991); 
Robert Filmer, The Necessity of the Absolute Power of all Kings, in PATRIARCHA AND 
OTHER WRITINGS 172–183 (1991). 
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disparate groups’ popular arguments. As a royalist, Hobbes faced, in effect, a 
problem that required a solution that could vindicate the imposition of 
absolute power in a way that ensured the parliamentarians were not able to 
trump the King’s power. Hobbes’s consent-solution also responded to 
problems associated with claims that there was a requirement to obey a 
sovereign in power merely as a result of that sovereign being in power. This 
argument, relating to de facto powers, was a key focus of the Engagement 
Controversy pamphlets. In more specific terms, this related to whether the 
parliamentarians’ possession of government power (as civil war victors) was 
sufficient to warrant obedience from the population.38 Hobbes’s consent-
solution, in effect, takes off the table the questions associated with de facto 
power as—at least under a Hobbesian consent-based scheme—the only way a 
sovereign can come to power is through consent. Finally, Hobbes’s consent-
solution also responded to questions regarding the purpose or ends of 
government.39 This related to the mutual obligation between protection and 
obedience, and the idea that self-preservation is a basic motivation for 
obedience, that was also raised in the pamphlet literature.40 In short, the 
                                               
38 See Chapter 4: The impact and relevance of possession (of governmental power). 
39 See Chapter 4: The purpose or ends of government. 
40 See Chapter 4: The duty, or obligation, of obedience from protection. Regarding 
self-preservation as motivation, see ROBERT SANDERSON, A RESOLUTION OF CONSCIENCE 
(1649). For an example the ‘mutual obligation’ idea, see ANON., CONSCIENCE PUZZEL’D 
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Hobbesian multi-faceted solution was that consent to be ruled was given to 
escape the state of nature and, further, the imposition of absolute power was 
necessary to avoid a state of war—the natural inclination that we should seek 
peace ensured that consent must continually be given. 
In contrast, the Lockean form of consent was a solution to empower the 
parliamentary cause. However, this statement retains the superficial 
distinction related to the outcome of the solution. What is needed is a 
consideration of the Lockean problems for which consent is offered as a 
solution. Most obviously in terms of the First Treatise, there is an element of 
Locke’s argument that responds to the idea of divine right as put forward by 
Filmer in Patriarcha.41 This was most frequently raised in opposition to the 
Whig argument that consent through parliament was opposed to various 
other fears like arbitrary government, a standing army, or rule by catholic 
monarchs.42 Whig efforts were focused, in no small part, on addressing the 
                                               
(1649). For further discussion, see QUENTIN SKINNER, 3 VISIONS OF POLITICS: HOBBES 
AND CIVIL SCIENCE 300 (2002); JOHN M. WALLACE, THE ENGAGEMENT CONTROVERSY 
1649-1652: AN ANNOTATED LIST OF PAMPHLETS (1964). 
41 Filmer, supra note 37. Not only was Patriacha published during the time that Locke 
was writing the two Treatises, but Filmer also republished the Free-holders Grand 
Inquest in the same year. ROBERT FILMER SIR, THE FREE-HOLDERS GRAND INQUEST (1680). 
42 See Chapter 5: The Authority of Parliament. For an example of this form of 
argument, see CHARLES BLOUNT, AN APPEAL FROM THE COUNTRY TO THE CITY 4–5 (1679). 
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problem that flowed from suggestions of a divine right of kings, with their 
own solutions regarding the authority of parliament via the consent of the 
people. Locke’s consent-solution (relatedly) also stretched to his account of 
the protection of individuals’ property. Putting this point more particularly, 
the problem expressed in the pamphlet literature was that a popish sovereign 
would lay claim to individuals’ property43 and the Whigs, unsurprisingly, held 
parliament out as an effective security against the loss of individual’s lives, 
liberties, and estates.44 Parliamentary government, again with an eye on 
unlimited and arbitrary power, is offered as a check on the exercise of power. 
In these senses, parliamentary authority is seen as a defence problem: one 
concerned with the way in which parliament can operate so as to counter the 
operation of arbitrary power, the impact of a popish influence, and the 
repossession of property.45 The issue of exactly how consent as a defence 
would operate constituted the nature of Locke’s solution to these various Rule 
of Law-like problems.  
In the accounts, in relation to the ‘similar’ solution of consent, we can 
see two distinct forms of problems. Hobbes is responding to a set of consent-
                                               
43 See Chapter 5: Repossession of Property.   
44 See, for example, WILLIAM JONES, A JUST AND MODEST VINDICATION 16–17 (1682). 
45 See Chapter 5: Repossession of Property; Popery / a Catholic Monarch; and, An 
Arbitrary Sovereign. 
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problems—where an existing sovereign’s legitimacy was questioned, and 
where there existed an issue regarding the extent or form of power to be 
exercised—that question how the exercise of exercise of arbitrary or absolute 
power can be justified. Locke is responding to a set of consent-problems that 
question how—when a ruler or soon-to-be ruler is acting, or will act, arbitrarily 
and threatens property—consent can operate as a defence against the 
exercise of power. This is more than a mere statement of the polemical 
approaches that Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts undoubtedly were intended 
to bring to their respective political camps’ propaganda campaigns. The 
problems run deeper than this. The problems—let us not forget—exist 
independently of the accounts as they are merely illustrated through the 
periods’ pamphlet literature. The problems reflect the fundamental pre-
suppositions—as well as the preoccupations—of society itself. Hobbes was 
responding to a problem that questioned the way in which something had 
happened; whereas Locke’s problems reflect a more radical questioning of 
the fundamental norms upon which society is based.  
The Transfer of Individuals’ Rights or Powers 
In both accounts, the idea of a transfer of rights or powers is intimately 
connected to the problems associated with consent; it is, for both Hobbes 
and Locke, the act of consent that facilitates the transfer. However, 
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notwithstanding this similarity, the rationale behind the transfer is different: 
there is a difference between the nature, and the extent, of any transfer. In 
relation to the problems that motivated Hobbes’s solution, these relate to the 
need for protection from one another and to the suggestion that this can be 
achieved by yielding to a common power.46 Arguments were also made that 
men [sic] should seek peace to remove themselves from the state of nature,47 
or through the expression of the idea that absolute power is necessary to 
preserve a safe society.48 In these senses, the root cause of the motivation for 
the giving of any consent related to the tyranny that could be inflicted 
between individuals in a state of nature. This idea forms the basis of Hobbes’s 
transfer-solution. 
Locke’s problems, however, stem from a different root. The problem—
at least as far as the Whigs were concerned—related to the justification of 
parliament’s ability to govern as a representative institution (through the 
consent of the people).49 The basic point was that parliament, unlike a popish 
                                               
46 MARCHAMONT NEDHAM, CASE OF THE COMMON-WEALTH STATED (1650). In relation to 
Hobbes’s perceivable problems, see Chapter 4: The needs of ultimate ends of 
society. 
47 See, for example HENRY PARKER, SCOTLANDS HOLY WAR (1651). 
48 See, for example ANON., supra note 40. 
49 See Chapter 5: The Authority of Parliament. 
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sovereign, would not assume greater power, and that property owners would 
not lose their estates.50 The arguments against this position related to the fact 
that parliament’s powers were recently established, and questioned the 
inability of parliament to be truly representative.51 What was largely being 
suggested by the Whigs in their opposition to and agitation against the threat 
of arbitrary popish rule (with the associated threat to individuals’ property), 
was the operation of a specific grant of powers and rights—through the 
limited nature of the consent granted—as a throttle on the exercise of arbitrary 
(and absolute) power. In short, the problem for the Whigs—as Locke was, no 
doubt, considering the problems from a Whig’s perspective—was to 
demonstrate a way that a parliamentary sovereign would not exercise and, 
indeed, could not exercise absolute or arbitrary power in the way that it was 
suggested a popish prince may do. It was on this basis that Locke formulated 
his transfer-solution.   
Hobbes and Locke formulated superficially similar responses: there 
should be a transfer of individuals’ rights or powers in order to establish 
                                               
50 PHILOLAUS, A CHARACTER OF POPERY AND ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT (1681). 
51 See, for example, MATTHEW RIDER, THE POWER OF PARLIAMENTS IN THE CASE OF 
SUCCESSION (1680); ANON., THE INTEREST OF THE THREE KINGDOMS (1680); JOHN 
NALSON, THE COMPLAINT OF LIBERTY & PROPERTY AGAINST ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT 
(1681). 
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sovereign authority. However, the problems informing these solutions are 
clearly distinguishable. Hobbes’s context involves problems related to fears 
of tyranny on a horizontal scale (between individuals). As a result, his social 
contract transfer-solution was formulated in terms where individuals enter an 
agreement to give rights to an absolute ruler that can ensure the safety of 
individuals where a state of war between individuals was a primary fear and 
motivational factor for entering the social contract.52 Locke’s problem relates, 
instead, to problems regarding individuals and the sovereign as it stands (or 
will stand); in other words, the problems relate to the exercise of power on a 
vertical scale. It for this reason that Locke’s transfer-solution operates both as 
a limitation on the power that is to be subsequently exercised, and to 
illustrate why the grant cannot be in the form of absolute power.53  
In a (very) broad sense, Hobbes’s transfer-solution stemmed from the 
need to justify why power must be exercised at an absolute level; for Locke, 
the solution relates to why it cannot be exercised at that level. This 
fundamental distinction comes from the nature of the problems to which they 
were responding and the context in which they were writing: Hobbes was 
                                               
52 See Chapter 4: Hobbes’s Solution to the Pamphleteers’ (Rule of Law) Problem: 
Solving Only One Problem? 
53 See Chapter 5: Locke’s Solutions to Process Problems. 
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attempting to illustrate the transfer of rights was valuable (for the sake of 
protection); Locke was attempting to illustrate the transfer of rights was not 
detrimental (as it imposed a natural limit on the exercise of power). 
The Nature of Sovereign Authority and the Need to Obey Commands 
Any aspect of commonality in relation to the nature of sovereign 
authority and the need to obey sovereign commands between Hobbes’s and 
Locke’s account must be located at the most general level of any of the 
common solutions identified here. Anyone with a passing familiarity with 
Hobbes and Locke will appreciate a number of differences in these ideas that 
are clear and apparent on the face of any account. It is for this reason that I 
suggest the similarity of solution exists only in the most abstract of senses 
when their solutions are generalised into solution-types; i.e. that both 
accounts provide solutions that relate to these factors. Whilst I do not 
anticipate that this (possibly overly) general account will be persuasive when 
taken alone, I hope its inclusion will bolster my wider argument.  
A key problem that arose in the period in which Hobbes was writing 
Leviathan was the question of de facto power: whether obedience to the 
new—parliamentary—regime was lawful, even if the change in government and 
Chapter 6: Hobbes and Locke 
 
317 
the ousting of Charles I as head of state had been unlawful.54 There were 
suggestions that, even if the government’s legitimacy is doubted, it is not the 
place of the individual to meddle,55 and suggestions that support of the 
government is justified if there is no power to visibly oppose the purported-
sovereign.56 The question boiled down to whether mere possession of the 
seat of power requires obedience. One of the most prominent pamphleteers, 
in a number of pamphlets published within months of one another, suggests 
those demanding obedience must have possession.57 Similar sentiments, and 
ardent opposition views, followed.58 These problems also led to the posing of 
                                               
54 For examples of similar views of the period, see SKINNER, supra note 40 at 271, 
292; WALLACE, supra note 40; THE INTERREGNUM: THE QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT, 1646-60, 
83 (G. E. Aylmer ed., Revised ed. 1974). For a more detailed exploration of these 
problems, see Chapter 4: The necessity of (the people’s) consent and its effect on the 
legality/legitimacy of the government; The impact and relevance of possession (of 
governmental power); and, The duty, or obligation, of obedience from protection. 
55 For one of the most well-known defences, see JOHN DURY, A CASE OF CONSCIENCE 
RESOLVED (1649).   
56 FRANCIS ROUS, THE LAVVFULNES OF OBEYING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT (1649). 
57 ANTONY ASCHAM, A COMBATE BETWEENE TWO SECONDS (1649); ANTONY ASCHAM, OF 
THE CONFUSIONS AND REVOLUTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS (1649). 
58 For similar points, see ANON., A LOGICAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE LAWFULNESS OF 
SUBSCRIBING THE NEW ENGAGEMENT (1650); NEDHAM, supra note 46. For opposition 
points, see NATHANIEL WARD, A RELIGIOUS DEMURRER, CONCERNING SUBMISSION TO THE 
PRESENT POWER (1649); JOHN AUCHER, ARGUMENTS AND REASONS TO PROVE THE 
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a further but related question: does protection by the government obligate 
the citizen to obey the government?59 These points lay the foundation for 
subsequent suggestions that self-preservation is a basic motivation for 
obedience.60 Between questions considering whether mere possession or the 
provision of some sort of protection, or indeed any motivation behind the 
creation of an obligation of obedience, it is clear that the question being 
explored during the Hobbesian authoring period is one of why individuals 
must obey the extant sovereign.  
The problem on which society was focused during the authoring 
period of the Two Treatises, in contrast, related to the issue of whether the 
extant sovereign (in the King) or a future sovereign (in parliament) should be 
                                               
INCONVENIENCE & UNLAWFULNESS OF TAKING THE NEW ENGAGEMENT (1650); ANON., THE 
GRAND CASE OF CONSCIENCE STATED (1649). 
59 ANTONY ASCHAM, THE BOUNDS & BONDS OF PUBLIQUE OBEDIENCE (1649). This is a 
defence of Rous, and a reaction to Ward. WARD, supra note 58. See also ASCHAM, 
supra note 57. 
60 SANDERSON, supra note 40. This opposes Ascham, as the author separates the 
force and authority of the government. See, WALLACE, supra note 40; SKINNER, supra 
note 40 at 301. See also Ascham’s response ANTONY ASCHAM, A REPLY TO A PAPER OF 
DR SANDERSONS (1650). Ascham’s largely secular point is taken up by others in 
secular terms. See JOHN DURY, CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE PRESENT 
ENGAGEMENT (1649). For a response to Dury, see HENRY ROBINSON, AN ANSWER TO MR. 
J. DURY (1650). 
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obeyed. There are close parallels between some of the issues. For example, 
the (Lockean period) question of how an ‘Arbitrary absolute Popish Tyrant’ 
can be a lawful successor to an established and bounded government in 
circumstances where he ‘violently, unlawfully, and tyrannically overruns the 
due bounds of power’ could, equally well, be applied to Hobbes’s authoring 
period.61 However, whilst the difference to the problems explored in 
Hobbes’s authoring period is not stark, it is important. I have already noted 
some of the questions that arose in relation to the authority of parliament.62 
The key point relates to the questions regarding the ability of parliament to 
function as it claimed it would: as a representative institution. The pregnant 
question in this point is: if parliament cannot be what it suggests it must be to 
rule, then it should not be obeyed. The contrary position—again referred to 
above63—is the Filmerian argument related to the divine authority of Kings: the 
monarch should be obeyed in consequence of natural law and the authority 
bestowed by God.64 Whig responses were focused on illustrating reasons why 
                                               
61 ELKANAH SETTLE, THE CHARACTER OF A POPISH SUCCESSOUR 20 (1681). 
62 See above, notes 42 and 49, and associated text. Regarding the problems related 
to Locke’s authoring period, see Chapter 5: An Arbitrary Sovereign; and, The 
Authority of Parliament. 
63 See above, notes 42 and 49, and associated text. See also Chapter 5: An Arbitrary 
Sovereign; and, The Authority of Parliament. 
64 Filmer, supra note 37; ROBERT FILMER SIR, THE FREE-HOLDERS GRAND INQUEST (1648).   
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the divine right of kings was sub-optimal and that, in comparison, 
parliament—as an institution created and limited by the consent of the 
people—represented a far superior option. This problem is, subtly, different to 
that which is being addressed in the earlier authoring period. Whilst 
alternatives were not un-mentioned in the period in which Hobbes was 
writing, the prominence of alternate institutions is not as apparent in the form 
of the problems raised. In contrast, the latter period’s problems relate 
principally to the suggestion of, and lobbying for, an alternative in the course 
of arguing that at least one prominent and popular opposing account is 
deficient.   
In the remainder of this chapter, I will expand upon the nature of the 
difference and explain why the difference is important to both the 
consideration of Hobbes and Locke, and in relation to the contest regarding 
conceptions of the Rule of Law more generally.   
Chapter 6: Hobbes and Locke 
 
321 
THE CHARACTER OF DIFFERENCES:  
HERE I GO AGAIN / SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?65 
There has been a change in Rule of Law-like ideas over time. This point 
is, in many respects, unsurprising and widely accepted.66 As already 
illustrated, the nature of the difference in accounts is—beyond the most 
obvious differences—infrequently considered. However, it is also correct to 
say that there has been little consideration of the way in which supposed 
similarities in Rule of Law-like accounts—which are frequently both assumed 
and relied upon—are, in fact, not similar. Being clear about what we mean 
when we consider two accounts as either being the same or as 
communicating the same argument / point is not only an analytically 
desirable outcome, it is also a fundamentally necessary one if we are to 
understand, operate, and apply the broader idea of the Rule of Law. In taking 
a further step toward exposing the inherent problems with failing to 
appreciate or apply this point in relation to the Rule of Law, I illustrate there 
has been a change in the nature of the Rule of Law between the two 
                                               
65 WHITESNAKE, Saints and Sinners HERE I GO AGAIN (1982); THE CLASH, Combat Rock 
SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO (1982). 
66 This point is one of the widely accepted, and frequently stated, Common 
Assumptions of the Rule of Law. See, Chapter 2. 
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accounts; for this reason, the accounts’ supposed similarities should not, 
therefore, be assumed, nor should they be relied upon. 
Differences, Similarities, and How These Relate 
In the preceding parts, I have identified that: Hobbes and Locke are, by 
way of their caricatures, frequently taken to be doing very different things; 
yet, notwithstanding the various differences, the accounts can, at least at 
some level, be seen as being similar (let us call this a ‘first stage’ 
consideration); the similarities that are apparent in first stage considerations 
can, as I illustrated in the last part, be disambiguated through considering the 
solutions provided in the accounts in the context of their associated problems 
(let us call this a ‘second stage’ consideration). The second stage reveals 
differences in the accounts; but, as I will illustrate, the differences that can be 
seen are not uniform. To see this, in the context of first stage similarities, it is 
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First Stage  
Solution Similarity Thinker 
Second Stage Differences/ 
Motivating Problems 
The Operation  
and Importance  
of Consent 
Hobbes: Addressing an existing sovereign’s legitimacy 
Locke: Addressing how a ruler or soon-to-be  ruler may act 
The Transfer of 
Individuals’ Rights  
or Powers 
Hobbes: Justifying why power must  be absolute 
Locke: Arguing why power cannot  be absolute 
The Nature of Sovereign 
Authority / the Need to 
Obey Commands 
Hobbes: Stating why an extant sovereign  must be obeyed 
Locke: Suggesting an alternate sovereign power as superior to the extant power 
Table 1.1: The similarities and Differences at the Second Stage of Consideration 
As will be apparent, the first stage similarities of solutions are in the 
column on the left, whilst the respective—different and differing—problems 
that relate to each thinker’s formulation of the solution are on the right. I have 
already exposed how the accounts’ solutions are different in relation to each 
of the first stage similarities. However, what is also apparent from the 
summary above is that the nature of these differences is, itself, different to the 
‘other’ difference that is suggested by the Lockean and Hobbesian 
caricatures. To see what I mean by this, recall that the caricatures were put in 
these terms: 
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The ‘Lockean caricature’:  A government opposing the operation 
of arbitrary or absolute power; and  
The ‘Hobbesian caricature’:  A sovereign that can exercise largely 
arbitrary and unlimited power.67 
In considering these, the difference between the two caricatures can 
be said to be (something like): a government or sovereign can exercise 
(Hobbes) or oppose (Locke) arbitrary power. Putting this another way, the 
willingness or ability of a government or sovereign to either exercise or 
oppose arbitrary power reflects the difference between the two. This sort of 
difference is a functional one: it relates to the function of opposing or 
exercising arbitrary power. (It is this intimate relationship to arbitrary power 
that makes these ideas fundamentally Rule of Law-like in terms of the broad 
distinctions adopted here.) As both caricatures can also be categorised as 
functional, consideration of the functional nature of the difference is relatively 
straightforward. However, this functional difference is not the same as the 
differences between the second stage problems; in other words, although 
there is a similarity in some sense—as there are differences between the two 
accounts—the differences that can be seen are themselves different in their 
nature. 
                                               
67 See above, notes 13 and  14. 
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The difference between the problems at the second stage of 
consideration varies in relation to both the difference between the problems, 
and in relation to the different nature of the problems (to each solution) 
themselves. For example, in considering the problems that relate to the 
operation and importance of consent, Locke’s societal problems relate to a 
functional problem: how a ruler, or soon-to-be ruler, may act. But, but the 
problem that relates to Hobbes—addressing an existing sovereign’s 
legitimacy—is not functional.68 It is recognitional. It relates to the necessary 
state of mind or situation that must exist for a sovereign to be recognised as 
such. 
The difference in differences is not, however, general. The problem 
contexts relating to the solution that there should be a transfer of individuals’ 
rights or powers can both be conceived in functional terms; both accounts’ 
problems relate to the nature of the exercise of power (as being in either 
absolute or non-absolute terms). However, the difference that is revealed is 
still, nevertheless, subtly different to the functional difference between the 
caricatures. Whereas there is undoubtedly a close relationship between the 
                                               
68 Here, I am not stating that legitimacy itself does not have a function. It clearly does.  
What I mean by this is that the question that concerns Hobbes is not one related to 
the function of the sovereign.   
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two forms of differences, those related to the second stage consideration are 
clearly broader; there isn’t merely a relation between the function of a 
sovereign (of opposing or exercising arbitrary power as in the caricatures’ 
differences); the second stage differences relate to both the exercise and the 
constitution of the powers that can be exercised. This breadth is not apparent 
from the mere functional difference between the caricatures. In this sense, 
even where the functional aspect is similar, a difference can still be identified. 
In considering the difference between the problems relating to the 
solution regarding the nature of sovereign authority / the need to obey 
commands, there is also a marked difference at the second stage when 
compared to the caricatures’ difference. The problem with which Hobbes is 
concerned relates to the normative reason or justification that subjects of 
power should obey commands; whilst, Locke’s problem context relates to the 
relative comparison of various forms of sovereign power. Accordingly, not 
only can neither problem context be conceived of as being functional in 
nature, the two contexts themselves are different to one another.  
It is clear that there are not only significant differences across the 
nature of the problem contexts to which Hobbes and Locke were responding, 
but also that these problem contexts are fundamentally different to the nature 
of the difference that can be seen from considering the caricatures of 
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Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts. We are left with the conclusion that not only 
are there differences, but also that apparent similarities (in the existence of 
differences generally between the caricature and the second stage) are, in 
fact, also different. A question, however, remains: why are these differences 
important?  
Benefits of Disambiguation 
The identification of the difference between the caricatures and the 
second stage problems that contextualise Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts 
provides a further way to disambiguate the differences, and similarities, in the 
accounts identified earlier in the chapter. Where the caricatures already 
provide one way of conceiving of the accounts as being different, the 
addition of another way to illustrate a difference could, more properly, be 
seen as a way to nuance that difference. This is, of itself, a useful feature as it 
illuminates one way in which the caricatures may fail to completely 
characterise the differences in the accounts. Furthermore, this nuanced 
approach also facilitates the identification of the differences in nature 
between the second stage problems as perceivable by Hobbes and Locke.  
Considering the relative problems in this way, and in-keeping with my 
illustration that a single answer to two different questions can be 
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disambiguated by the question, the relatively similar answers given in the 
accounts stem not only from problems that relate to a different subject 
matter—something that is apparent from the content of the pamphlets—but 
also from problems that fundamentally differ in their nature. In this sense, the 
problems that are being responded to—again, much like my question 
example—are of a fundamentally and structurally different type. The answers 
that are given, notwithstanding any similarity of expression or content, must 
therefore be disambiguated in order to avoid assuming that the answer given 
by one thinker in one context reflects a similar—or even identical—answer 
given in another context.  
The identification of these different differences enables two broad 
conclusions to be drawn. The first is that the Rule of Law-like conceptions that 
are provided by Hobbes and Locke should be seen as relating to very 
different ideas (by virtue of the very different problems to which they 
respond). Whilst this is, in some respects, hardly a revelatory conclusion, the 
fact that the differences to which I refer do not merely reflect—and are quite 
separate from consideration of—the textual differences is, I think, somewhat 
more revelatory and interesting from a Rule of Law perspective. The 
identification of this idea leads to a second conclusion in terms where 
Hobbes and Locke can both be considered as relating Rule of Law-like ideas: 
Chapter 6: Hobbes and Locke 
 
329 
changes in ideas of the Rule of Law—from one thinker to the next—can be 
more accurately and effectively identified where more nuanced differences 
between conceptions can be identified. Before concluding the chapter, I want 
to briefly consider this idea.  
CONCEPTUAL COMPARISONS AS CONCEPTUAL CHANGE:  
PARADISE CITY / IT’S THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT69 
Conceptual similarities and differences can be used as a way of 
identifying or considering the operation of certain forms of conceptual 
change. By illustrating a method of drilling down into Rule of Law-like ideas in 
order to identify and disambiguate similarities and differences that may 
appear at varying levels of examination, I have demonstrated it is possible to 
obtain a nuanced appreciation of a particular Rule of Law-like account’s 
meaning and to better understand how to consider that account in terms of 
and in relation to another account. Where it is stated that the idea of the Rule 
of Law has often changed over time,70 considering change—from Rule of Law-
like idea to Rule of Law-like idea—through a more nuanced approach that can 
shed light on the form of that change is sensible. I briefly suggest a form this 
                                               
69 GUNS N’ ROSES, Appetite for Destruction PARADISE CITY (1988); R.E.M., Document 
IT’S THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT (AND I FEEL FINE) (1987). 
70 See Chapter 2. 
The Problems and Solutions of Change in Conceptions of the Rule of Law 
 330 
sort of analysis may take. (I do not consider the exact nature of the change 
between Hobbes and Locke, that will follow in Chapter 7.)  
Forms of Change: Evolutionary and Revolutionary (a recap) 
In Chapter 2, I outlined and explained two ways to conceive of change: 
evolutionary and revolutionary.71 Given that was some time ago, the briefest 
of summaries is apposite. I suggested two—binary and extreme hypothetical—
mechanisms by which change across Rule of Law-like ideas could occur (in a 
macro- sense): evolutionary change and revolutionary change. Evolutionary 
change describes a change in the way that the Rule of Law is conceived that 
necessarily relates to, follows on from, or expands a prior conception; 
conceptual change occurs diachronically, and earlier conceptions are 
necessarily relevant to subsequent conceptions. Revolutionary change 
describes discreet, unrelated, iterations of the Rule of Law as paradigm 
shifting events; subsequent ideas are not necessarily reliant on earlier ideas; 
later ideas implicitly or explicitly supplant earlier ones. As evolutionary 
change necessarily relates to a previous idea, change is either evolutionary or 
it is not; if it is not evolutionary, it is revolutionary. 
                                               
71 For a complete explanation of this idea, and more detail, see Chapter 2: Change 
(Over Time and by Thinker) in Rule of Law Ideas. 
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Form of Change: Considering Conceptions 
How would the two hypothetical forms of change be considered in 
terms of Rule of Law-like conceptions? And, how does adopting a problem / 
solution approach assist? In responding to these questions, I adopt a Hobbes 
/ Locke framework; this is not because I want to draw any final conclusions 
here, it is simply expedient given the details already provided. As defined, in 
order to identify evolutionary change, a necessary connection to a prior idea 
must be established. This means, if evolutionary change has occurred 
between the accounts, Locke’s account must have a connection to a prior 
Rule of Law-like idea. Whilst Hobbes is not the sole provider of Rule of Law-
like accounts before Locke, his account provides a logical starting point. In 
adopting this starting position, the aim would be, first, to identify exactly what 
Locke meant by his Rule of Law-like idea, before, second, attempting to find 
any necessary connection to Hobbes’s prior ideas. The problem / solution 
framework, and the added clarity and nuance that it can bring to an individual 
account, assists in establishing the first aspect. The subsequent examination 
of differences and similarities that then becomes possible as a result of the 
framework’s application enables the immediate discounting of various earlier 
ideas as being unnecessary to subsequent conceptions in circumstances 
where differences of problem, or differences in nature, can be identified. In 
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short, the aim is to identify a situation where the same form of problem gives 
rise in a later conception to a similar form of solution; it is only in this 
circumstance that a necessary connection can be formed between prior and 
later conceptions. In this way, the problem / solution framework can be used 
as an early filter to discard various aspects that are unnecessary to 
subsequent conceptions. This enables substantial steps to be taken to 
identifying the operative mechanism of change between the two conceptions 
examined.  
CONCLUSION: 
UNDER PRESSURE / DON’T WORRY BE HAPPY72 
The problem / solution approach can be used to illuminate conceptual 
change across the full gamut of Rule of Law-like conceptions. The approach 
can also be used to shed much needed light on the contemporary debate 
regarding the content and nature of the concept of the Rule of Law itself.   
The many and varied accounts that are frequently associated with the 
concept of the Rule of Law are not only contested, but they also appear to be 
either similar or different depending on the level of analytical scrutiny that is 
                                               
72 QUEEN (FT. DAVID BOWIE), Hot Space UNDER PRESSURE (1981); BOBBY MCFERRIN, 
Simple Pleasures DON’T WORRY, BE HAPPY (1988). 
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applied. In this sense, and within the ongoing debate regarding the content 
and meaning of the concept of the Rule of Law, Hobbes’s and Locke’s Rule of 
Law-like accounts can be seen to either agree or disagree; however, the 
similarities or differences can be disambiguated by adopting an approach 
that seeks to situate the accounts—as solutions—in the societal context—and 
the associated problems—in relation to which they were meant to be situated. 
By illustrating the existence of inflections, the problem / solution approach 
illustrates that superficially similar aspects of each account are, in fact, 
different (by virtue of the superficially similar solution being a response to a 
different problem), and facilitates the identification of differences between 
frequently stated Hobbesian and Lockean caricatures and the nature of the 
problems to which their accounts were meant to solve. This process of 
disambiguation, and the nuance that is added to each account, also 
illuminates change across conceptions of the Rule of Law by identifying when 
a necessary connection may—or may not—exist from one conception to the 
next.  
A definitive conclusion is not reached here regarding the potential 
evolutionary or revolutionary nature of the change in the concept of the Rule 
of Law between Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts. The reason for this is 
because there is another form of difference that may impact the nature of the 
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change from conception to conception. This form of difference—that has 
merely been hinted at in this chapter—relates to the conceptual level or order 
at which each conception is constructed. Accordingly, before pronouncing 
on the nature of the change between Hobbes’s and Locke’s conceptions, 








CHANGE ACROSS RULE OF LAW CONCEPTIONS: 
A REVOLUTIONARY CONCLUSION’S MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 76,000 words ago,1 I posed my research question: What 
is the nature of the change across Rule of Law conceptions? I then took some 
time setting out original ways to view both the problem in the current 
literature and the problem / solution approach as a potential remedy. After 
taking some time to provide a novel definition of the Rule of Law and 
exploring two canonical ideas of the Rule of Law (via the problem / solution 
methodology), I came to some original conclusions regarding the differences 
in those accounts. After doing all of that, my answer to the research question I 
posed is: ‘revolutionary’. 
As a conclusion, I suspect this single word is both uninspiring and 
unsatisfactory. So, by way of some concluding comments, I will spend this—
very brief—chapter unpacking both what I mean and what this means. 
                                               
1 76,339, to be precise. 
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WHAT I MEAN (BY ‘REVOLUTIONARY’ AS AN ANSWER) 
In one sense, I am sure that it is clear what I mean by ‘revolutionary’ 
being the answer to the question; change across ideas of the Rule of Law—
specifically across Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts—has occurred in a way that 
reflects the definition of ‘revolutionary’ that I provided in Chapter 2:  
Revolutionary change describes discreet, unrelated, iterations of 
the Rule of Law as paradigm shifting events: conceptual 
revolutions in thought that fundamentally alter or change the 
way a concept is perceived; subsequent ideas are not 
necessarily reliant on earlier ideas; later ideas implicitly or 
explicitly supplant earlier ones.2 
This (binary) conception of change as being either evolutionary or 
revolutionary stems from evolutionary change necessarily relating to a 
previous idea; if there is no necessary connection to prior ideas, ‘change’ is 
revolutionary. Because the change between Hobbes’s and Locke’s ideas of 
the Rule of Law has no necessary connection, change is revolutionary.  
This conclusion follows simply because there is a conceptual and 
fundamental difference between the nature of the two accounts. Locke’s 
account can, and must, be clearly differentiated from Hobbes’s as a result of 
                                               
2 Chapter 2: Change (Over Time and by Thinker) in Rule of Law Ideas. 
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both the difference in the content of the (first-order) account and the 
caricatures of the accounts,3 as well as the difference in the accounts’ 
disambiguated contextual (problem / solution) content.4 In short, in the 
absence of importing some wider—presentist—conception of an overarching 
concept of the Rule of Law into which we can—perhaps, somewhat 
unthinkingly—deposit both accounts, there is no reason to draw a necessary 
connection between the two. 
There is clearly a contest that exists in the Rule of Law literature 
regarding the meaning and content of the concept of the Rule of Law.5 
However, notwithstanding the analytical rigor of the contest, the underlying 
assumption that it is appropriate to include all of the usual suspects of the 
Rule of Law in the same overarching concept is flawed. Assuming that each of 
the canonical authors is talking about the same thing is, of course, a stretch at 
best when a majority of the authors (including canonical authors like Aristotle, 
Hobbes, Locke, and Fuller) make no mention of ‘the Rule of Law’ in any 
recognisable sense. What I have sought to demonstrate is that some of the 
most important Rule of Law thinkers should not—despite this obvious 
                                               
3 See Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
4 See Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
5 See Chapter 3. 
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difference—be considered as talking about the same thing. In re-capping why 
this is the case, I will put to one side the obvious first-order differences that 
exist.6 After all, these are well known and, it seems, largely ignored in terms of 
illustrating that these canonical authors should not be considered as all 
talking about the same thing. Instead, I will focus on the original arguments 
made in Chapter 6 relating to the contextual differences in the nature of 
Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts.  
Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts can, and must, be both differentiated 
and disambiguated.7 When this happens, it becomes clear that they are not, 
nor should they be conceived as, talking about the same thing; this is the 
case even where there are superficial similarities in the conceptions. Hobbes’s 
and Locke’s Rule of Law-like conceptions relate to very different ideas by 
virtue of the very different problems to which they respond; these problems 
can assist in identifying forms of conceptual change.8 The nuance that the 
problem / solution methodology brings provides a filter to discard various 
aspects that are unnecessary to subsequent conceptions. In this sense, and as 
is the case with Hobbes and Locke, the fact that the two accounts differ in 
                                               
6 These were dealt with at length in Chapters 2 and 3. 
7 See Chapter 6. 
8 See Chapter 6: Conceptual Comparisons as Conceptual Change. 
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their most fundamental natures, and because they provide answers—in 
different or differing terms—to different questions, illustrates that Hobbes’s 
account is conceptually unnecessary to the Lockean account. The absence of 
any necessary connection renders the form of change between these two 
accounts as being not-evolutionary; and, therefore, revolutionary. 
WHAT THIS ALL MEANS (FOR THE RULE OF LAW) 
There are two ways to view the title to this part. I could mean what this 
all means for the Rule of Law in terms of our appreciation of the meaning of 
the concept (generally); or, I could mean in terms of the use, application, and 
operation of the concept (in either analytic or practical terms). Whilst they are, 
of course, related, I will deal with them individually.  
Meaning for our Appreciation of the Concept 
The debate regarding the content of the Rule of Law, and the 
associated debate regarding the use and application of the usual suspects of 
the Rule of Law, is ongoing and unlikely to progress substantially. The general 
acceptance of the concept as being essentially contested means that the 
various first-order differences will not, and likely cannot, be resolved without 
a reassessment of the way in which Rule of Law-like accounts are discussed, 
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debated, and differentiated.9 One of my aims in considering the research 
question in this thesis was to provide some alternative ways in which the usual 
suspects of the Rule of Law can be differentiated as part of the ongoing 
debate. Differentiating accounts through the methodologies I have 
generated provides one way for the debate to move forward; it provides a 
way for the discussion to consider the same thinkers—and perhaps even some 
new ones—in further efforts to refine the idea of the Rule of Law. 
The new methodologies I have conceived and applied—the problem / 
solution approach in Chapter 2, and the distillation of Rule of Law elements in 
Chapter 3—are of wider import. Whilst each has been applied to Hobbes and 
Locke, they can be broadened to apply to any other ‘canonical’ account. This 
is, however, not the only potential impact on the future appreciation of the 
concept. The provision of a methodology to identify other Rule of Law-like 
ideas means that it may be possible to identify—with a level of analytical rigour 
that could be seen as lacking in relation to some of the present canons—a 
number of other thinkers that provide Rule of Law-like ideas.  
                                               
9 For discussion of this point as a Common Assumption, see Chapter 2. For an 
exploration of the nature of the contest, see Chapter 3. 
Chapter 7: Change Across Rule of Law Conceptions 
 341 
This potential influx of other thinkers’ conceptions could be criticised 
for fear that it will generate a mass of conceptual confusion; however, the 
application of my other methodologies will assist in differentiating the various 
conceptions into different categories of the Rule of Law. In effect, being able 
to more cogently identify differences (that extend to both the problems that 
the solutions are focused on solving as well as the solutions themselves) 
extends some additional level of clarity to the debate—even an extended 
debate—regarding the meaning and content of the concept of the Rule of 
Law. 
Meaning for the Use, Application and Operation of the Concept 
Whilst a level of analytic rigour and clarity can be brought to the Rule 
of Law debate through the consideration of the ideas contained herein, there 
is also a way in which my thesis may assist in clarifying the use, application, 
and operation of the Rule of Law. If the concept’s analytic meaning is 
reconceived in terms akin to my argument, a broader, yet clearer, idea of the 
Rule of Law could emerge. This is, of course, unlikely to happen based on this 
thesis alone. This is not merely a result of the general lack of impact 
associated with a PhD thesis, but is due to the limited scope of the study I 
have conducted. In order to—sensibly—impact any re-conception of the idea 
of the Rule of Law more generally, a consideration of far more thinkers—and 
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more pairs of thinkers—must be undertaken.10 Doing so would result in an 
appreciation of the nature of change from thinker-to-thinker that would 
enable a re-conception of the overall nature of the concept. Of course, given 
the potential inclusion of a large number of other thinkers, this may be a life’s 
work.  
My argument cannot be seen as practically focused. The practical 
application of the Rule of Law—in terms that reflect the U.N.’s position11—is 
often, contemporarily, inclusive of substantive or ‘thick’ ideas of the Rule of 
Law. These ideas, like democracy, human rights, or justice, play no part in the 
formal consideration of the concept that I have explored. However, as noted 
earlier, these ‘thick’ ideas are generally grounded on a base of ‘thin’ ideas 
about what the concept is. Accordingly, if the fundamentals of the ‘thin’ idea 
are shifted in the way that I have suggested, it is nevertheless possible for 
some impact to flow through to the practical application of the Rule of Law.  
                                               
10 I explore some suggestions for further research below. 
11 For one example of the U.N.’s idea of the Rule of Law, see UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 
THE RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES - 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 6 (2004), 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/2004%20report.pdf (last visited Jul 20, 2018). See 
also my brief comments in relation to this conception in Ch. 2: Change (Over Time 
and by Thinker) in Rule of Law Ideas. 
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This brings up one, last, fundamental consideration in relation to the 
meaning of the Rule of Law and, more specifically, the potential for my thesis 
to impact—practical or operative—Rule of Law thinking. This can best be put in 
terms of a question: How can a focus on accounts from 17th Century England 
possibly hope to influence and impact the contemporary idea of the Rule of 
Law? 
There is a glib, and a not-so-glib, answer to this question. The glib 
answer is simply: ‘I didn’t start it.’ The question, when raised in this context, 
seems to be a valid one; after all, what can we possibly hope to learn from 
exploring these philosophical positions from a long-gone era, from societies 
that do not resemble our own. However, by saying ‘I didn’t start it’, I point to 
the fact that the use and application of these 17th Century ideas—and many 
older ones—remains a key and core part of the contemporary Rule of Law 
debate. So, for the glib answer, my point is simply that I am working within 
the confines of the current debate, notwithstanding the accounts’ historical 
nature. The glib answer can also be extended. By introducing the 
methodologies that I have, my precise point is to ensure that the problems to 
which the thinkers’ solutions are applied do match the contemporary Rule of 
Law idea. The approach I am advocating in many senses would address the 
(hypothetical) questioner’s concern; the obvious result of a Hobbesian or 
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Lockean contextual analysis—where the problems that each thinker could 
perceive were borne of a period of unprecedented turmoil that does not exist 
anywhere in the Western world today—would be the whittling down of their 
ideas to apply only the aspects of their thought that could be seen to mirror 
contemporary society.  
My not-so-glib answer brings in aspects of my previous comments 
regarding the thin / thick application, my glib answer, and the general contest 
that exists in the debate. Where the contemporary ideas regarding the Rule 
of Law are built on and already draw in historical accounts, it makes analytical 
sense to attempt to determine why those accounts should remain relevant. 
The approach advocated through the methodologies that I introduce 
provides the tools to critically evaluate the inclusion of those historical 
accounts. In a second sense, the use, inclusion and consideration of historical 
figures like Hobbes and Locke could be seen as being purely illustrative. By 
considering only these two thinkers, I have not suggested that their accounts 
are any more (or less) canonical than the accounts of other usual suspects. 
Not only is the consideration of Hobbes and Locke a single step along a 
process of considering other thinkers, but they are used merely as an 
illustration of how a particular—and different—way of thinking about the Rule 
of Law may be conducted.  
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In considering my responses and comments above, it will be apparent 
that I have focused on the various methodologies that I have introduced and 
have not discussed the issue that takes centre stage as part of the title of my 
thesis: conceptual change. It is this aspect, however, that may facilitate the 
most impact on the meaning and operation of the Rule of Law. The idea of 
change across conceptions of the Rule of Law is not new. As noted in 
Chapter 2, it represents one of the Common Assumptions of the Rule of Law. 
The nature of the change—from conception to conception, or generally across 
the concept of the Rule of Law—has, however, not previously been explored in 
any substantial depth. Accordingly, other than the fact that it is recognised 
that there are differences from conception to conception, little attention is 
paid to the nature of those differences. By providing a framework in which to 
consider the nature of change—as being evolutionary or revolutionary—it is 
possible to see more clearly the nature of some of the differences that exist.  
My examination in the chapters above illustrates that the change 
between Hobbes and Locke, notwithstanding their temporal and 
geographical similarity, was conceived as being revolutionary: no necessary 
connection exists. This is not necessarily universally true. Conducting a similar 
analysis across other pairs of Rule of Law-like thinkers may reveal evolutionary 
connections. This could lead to genealogies of types of Rule of Law accounts 
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being identified. This process would provide analytical rigour, and potentially 
a way to disambiguate between accounts, in a way that is not presently 
possible when all of the accounts are simply placed in a large and single Rule 
of Law bucket (as they are now). On this basis, the identification of forms of 
change—whether the accounts are historical or contemporary—provides 
substantial analytic benefit to the Rule of Law debate.  
WHAT’S NEXT? 
The vastness of the debate, scope, and volume of original material 
relating to the Rule of Law cannot be underestimated. No single work can 
hope to bring order to this particular brand of chaos. In providing the 
arguments and methodologies that I have, a small step has been taken. But 
many more are required. The task is so herculean that even the process of 
suggesting some next steps must be considered as being incomplete. 
Accordingly, I limit my comments and suggestions to relatively abstract ideas. 
A logical next step, as hinted at above, is to conduct an analysis 
equivalent to the Hobbes / Locke assessment in respect of other pairs of Rule 
of Law-like thinkers. By considering each thinker in terms of each other 
thinker, connections between ideas that had not previously been apparent 
may be revealed. The assessment of each Rule of Law-like thinker—perhaps 
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starting with the canonical thinkers before considering other potentials—in 
terms of the solution provided and the motivating-problems would afford a 
way to compare each set of problems and identify, as I have done with 
Hobbes and Locke, commonalities. This would allow the change between 
each pair of thinkers to be identified as being evolutionary or revolutionary. 
Should it be that all of the accounts are identified as being revolutionary, that 
would of itself be an interesting finding; however, intuitively, this seems like 
an unlikely event. Should any evolutionary connections be identified, this 
would allow the creation of a historical conceptual map that traces trends in 
conceptions over time. This would be a tremendously useful way to conceive 
of the conceptions’ development and overall change. 
The above suggestion relates to the conceptual and temporal-
extension of the analysis of the Rule of Law. This does not, however, address 
one of the most interesting aspects: the geopolitical and cultural difference in 
Rule of Law-like ideas. One thing that was alluded to in early chapters was the 
fundamental Anglo-American-ness of both the concept of the Rule of Law 
generally, and the subsequent consideration of the debate herein.12 If the 
                                               
12 See Chapter 2: Introduction. For an exploration of this aspect, as a problem in 
relation to the international Rule of Law, see Paul Burgess, Deriving the International 
Rule of Law: an Unnecessary, Impractical and Unhelpful Exercise, (FORTHCOMING). 
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scope of what is to be considered as a Rule of Law-like idea is extended 
beyond the list of (favourite Anglo-American) thinkers responsible for the 
majority of the canon of the Rule of Law, the inclusion of non-Anglo-American 
ideas seems both likely and desirable. The Rule of Law itself is seen as, and is 
derived from, fundamentally Anglo-American ideas and the debate about the 
conceptual content of the Rule of Law is conducted fundamentally across the 
English-speaking literature. This is not to say that non-Anglo-American ideas 
that could fall within the ambit of Rule of Law-like ideas do not exist. They do. 
The extension of the conceptual category would facilitate a wider 
appreciation of the idea and, hence, allow what are seen as cognate ideas 
(like the Rechtsstaat or the Etat de droit) to be brought—usefully—under the 
conceptual banner. Their inclusion, much like the application of the other 
methodologies outlined above, would enhance our analytical rigour, as well 
as our appreciation and understanding of the Rule of Law more generally.  
And, after all, this was exactly what I wanted to do when I set out to write this 
thesis.   
AVOIDING (UNINTENDED) CONCEPTUAL EUGENICS 
Only a few loose ends require tying up. In Chapter 1, in considering 
the rationale for continuing to discuss the meaning and content of various 
Rule of Law conceptions, I raised a number of questions:  
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Do we know—and do we care—exactly where (or when) the tools 
came from? What, exactly, were the tools originally intended to 
be used for? Why are these tools in this box? And, what exactly 
did the person who originally deposited them mean to 
communicate?13 
In that chapter, I illustrated the relevance of the questions through a 
tool analogy relating to the repurposing of butter knives and flat-head 
screwdrivers. In the cut-and-thrust of my argument in the last five chapters, I 
have answered each of these questions. However, I want to draw specific 
attention to a related point that I raised later in that chapter. In suggesting 
that the result of my approach will afford clarity as to why a particular tool is 
included within the toolbox, I then said: 
What’s more, it seems conceivable that an increased focus on 
the history of Rule of Law conceptions will not only illuminate 
what is in the toolbox, but it may also illuminate what is not 
presently accepted as being in the box (but perhaps was 
intended to be included by original thinkers).14 
 This was exactly what happened. The focus on what is not included in 
the Rule of Law’s conceptual toolbox provided a vitally important point of 
focus. In examining Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts, I identified that the 
                                               
13 Chapter 1: A Neglected Origin. 
14 Chapter 1: Our Conceptual Toolbox. 
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toolbox that each thinker is taken to be using is incomplete; there are a 
number of things missing that are not evident on a standard appreciation of 
the conceptions; these, however, become evident when considering the 
accounts in terms of a problem / solution methodology.15 Further, it is clear 
from exploring the context of the accounts that each thinker meant their 
account to include these—otherwise unappreciated—aspects.  
Through illuminating both the presence and relative absence of 
conceptual tools, it is possible to attain a more thorough understanding of 
the meaning of Rule of Law conceptions. Through gaining this appreciation, 
and by understanding the mechanisms of change that have operated 
between conceptions, the dire consequences that may follow from the 
neglect of conceptual origins may be avoided; subsequent change in Rule of 
Law Conceptions, whether by evolutionary or revolutionary means, will occur 
only in a way that is fully intended and appreciated; and, (unintended) 
conceptual eugenics will not occur. 
                                               
15 Here, I mean the aspects that relate to the solutions to the problems that illustrate 
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